Three-Letter Domain Value Cannot Overcome Direct Evidence of Targeting
The Respondent relied on a principle familiar from numerous UDRP decisions: A short three-letter domain name may have substantial inherent value independent of any particular trademark, and acquiring such a domain for that inherent value can constitute a bona fide registration. The difficulty for the Respondent was not the validity of that principle, but the evidence concerning why was actually registered.. Continue reading commentary here.
We hope you will enjoy this edition of the Digest (vol. 6.34) as we review these noteworthy recent decisions with expert commentary. (We invite guest commenters to contact us):
‣ Three-Letter Domain Value Cannot Overcome Direct Evidence of Targeting (rox.md *with commentary)
‣ Football Federation Rivalry Ends in RDNH (fif7football7.com and football7official.com *with commentary)
‣ Panel Declines to Stretch J PHARM SCI to Cover “JPS” Initialism (jpsjournal.com *with commentary)
‣ Knowledge Is Not Targeting: Prior Rights and Competition Were Not Enough (superiorfencenj.com *with commentary)
‣ Complainant Chose Federal Court First, UDRP Terminated (raisingbrowsbook.com and raisingbrowslive.com *with commentary)
Three-Letter Domain Value Cannot Overcome Direct Evidence of Targeting
<rox.md>
Panelist: Mr. Lawrence K. Nodine
Brief Facts: The Chinese Complainant, founded in 2023, is a hybrid-electric vehicle manufacturer, marketing the ROX line across the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia under trademark registrations in China (2022), the EU (2022), and an International Registration designating Moldova (2023). The Respondent, CEO of a Moldovan renewable-energy and construction firm, registered the disputed Domain Name on March 24, 2025, and emailed the Complainant the very next day proposing a distribution partnership. Months of dealership negotiations followed – the Complainant sent product and pricing information, the Respondent submitted dealer-application materials, but no agreement was ever signed and no vehicles were purchased. During this period the domain resolved to a site displaying Complainant’s ROX 01 SUV; after a January 2026 rival distributor flagged the site and a formal cease-and-desist followed in April, the site was stripped down but continued to bear the header “ROX Moldova: Premium Automobile Distributor.”
The Complainant alleges that because the Respondent falsely claimed to be a “Premium Automobile Distributor” for Complainant’s Rox vehicles, Respondent’s use of the disputed Domain Name was not bona fide under paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy and the communications between Respondent and Complainant’s representatives were not “extensive commercial negotiations”. The Complainant alleges that the Respondent may not rely on the inherent value of short domain names to justify its registration of the disputed Domain Name because he targeted the Complainant’s mark in bad faith. The Respondent contends that before receiving any notice of this dispute, the Respondent had undertaken extensive and well-documented preparations to use the disputed Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services, including negotiations with ROX Motor concerning dealership opportunities, vehicle importation, commercial cooperation, business planning and market development.
Held: It is widely recognized that a three-character domain name may legitimately be purchased for its inherent value, and that in such cases the registration will usually be for bona fide purposes. The record here includes direct evidence of targeting. The Respondent contacted the Complainant immediately – within one day, after registering the disputed Domain Name. In one of the email exchanges with the Complainant, the Respondent explained: “Having closely followed ROX’s growth and innovation in the EV and SUV segments, we believe your product line is highly aligned with the emerging consumer trends and sustainable mobility goals in our region.” Although there may very well be inherent value in the disputed Domain Name, the Panel finds that it is more likely than not that the Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name because of its value as Complainant’s Mark.
Transfer
Complainant’s Counsel: Chofn Intellectual Property, China
Respondent’s Counsel: Self-represented
Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
The Respondent relied on a principle familiar from numerous UDRP decisions: A short three-letter domain name may have substantial inherent value independent of any particular trademark, and acquiring such a domain for that inherent value can constitute a bona fide registration. The difficulty for the Respondent was not the validity of that principle, but the evidence concerning why <rox.md> was actually registered.
The chronology provided unusually direct evidence of targeting. The Respondent registered <rox.md> on March 24, 2025 and contacted the Complainant the following day proposing a commercial relationship involving ROX vehicles. In subsequent correspondence, the Respondent expressly stated that it had been closely following ROX’s growth and products. The Panel therefore accepted that the three-letter domain might possess inherent value, but found it more likely than not that the Respondent registered this particular domain because of its significance as the Complainant’s trademark.
The case is a useful illustration of the limits of the short-domain-name defence. The fact that a three-letter string is capable of many meanings does not insulate its registration where the record demonstrates that the registrant had a particular trademark owner in mind. Here, the Respondent’s approach to the Complainant one day after registration largely displaced the need to infer targeting from the distinctiveness of the mark or surrounding circumstances.
Football Federation Rivalry Ends in RDNH
<fif7football7.com> and <football7official.com>
Panelist: Mr. Andrew D. S. Lothian
Brief Facts: The First Complainant is an individual resident, and the Second Complainant is a corporate entity that the Complaint describes as the international governing body for the sport of Football 7. The First Complainant is the registered proprietor of Canadian Trademark for the word mark IFA 7 WWW.IFA7.COM, filed on December 13, 2018, and registered on September 9, 2022.The Second Complainant asserted rights in a Costa Rican trademark for the word mark FIF7, originally filed by an unrelated third party on October 29, 2021 and granted January 27, 2022, the same day the third party assigned it to the Second Complainant, though that assignment wasn’t formally recorded with the Costa Rican trademark office until July 24, 2026, after both the Complaint and the Response had been filed. The disputed Domain Name <fif7football7.com> was registered on December 16, 2021 and it resolves to a website showing the history of football 7 worldwide from 2011 to 2024. The disputed Domain Name <football7official.com> was registered on August 25, 2022 and was later used for a website covering the sport’s news, tournaments, and history.
The Complainant alleges that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests, instead running a “coordinated online ecosystem” of sites and social accounts trading on the IFA7/FIF7 identifiers. The Complainant further alleges that the Respondent registered <fif7football7.com> just three days after being served with a Mexican civil lawsuit over the disputed identifiers, which the Complainant framed as proof of actual knowledge and opportunistic registration, and pointed to the parties’ long history to argue the Respondent could not have independently conceived either term. The Respondent contends that this was not cybersquatting but a decade-long rivalry between two competing Football 7 federations, noting the First Complainant had himself been a member of Respondent’s organization back in 2014 before splitting off to found IFA7; and that the Mexican service-timing theory was unsupported since Complainant’s own annex showed service had not yet been completed as of the registration date.
Held: The evidence shows that the Respondent adopted the “FIF7” identifier in about April 2017. The media evidence shows that the Respondent was using this in a trademark-like manner from as early as 2018 and further registered the Domain Name that incorporates said mark, but is not the subject of this proceeding, <fif7official.com>, on September 24, 2020. The evidence shows that the Respondent proceeded to use this domain name for a website that operated from at least March 2021, according to the Complainant’s evidence. All of these activities pre-dated the registration of the Complainant’s Costa Rican FIF7 trademark. There is no evidence that the Respondent adopted the term to unfairly capitalize on the Complainant’s nascent trademark rights. Indeed, the Complainant’s only prior use of the term appears to be in the Canadian copyright registration, and the Complainant does not show how this use would have come to the Respondent’s attention, nor, as discussed in the first element assessment, is there any evidence that the Complainant possesses unregistered trademark rights in the terms “FIF7” or “football7”.
When the disputed Domain Name <fif7football7.com> was registered on December 16, 2021, the Respondent had therefore been using the “FIF7” identifier since about April 2017. Although the Costa Rican trademark had been filed on October 29, 2021, there is no evidence that this had come to the Respondent’s attention. Notably, the mark had been filed in the name of a third party and there is no evidence that it had been associated with the Complainant or otherwise used by it, save in the copyright registration. There is no basis therefore for the Panel to find that the disputed Domain Name <fif7football7.com> was registered in a scenario akin to those described in the WIPO Overview 3.1, section 3.8.2, or that the purpose of the Respondent’s registration was to take unfair advantage of any nascent rights of the Complainant. The Panel finds that the Respondent did not register the disputed Domain Name in bad faith targeting of the Complainant or its trademark rights.
RDNH: In the present case, the Panel considers that the Complainant clearly ought to have known it could not succeed under any fair interpretation of facts reasonably available prior to the filing of the Complaint. The deficiencies in the Complaint were apparent both from the facts known to the Complainant and from those reasonably available to it at the point when the Complaint was filed. The Complainant was aware that it possessed no trademark rights in any term corresponding to the disputed Domain Name <football7official.com>. Turning to the disputed Domain Name <fif7football7.com>, the Complainant likewise knew that the trademark rights upon which it relied had not accrued prior to the registration date of the disputed Domain Name. The Complainant knew or should have known that its copyright registrations did not amount to trademark rights in terms of the Policy, even if it considered these to be of other evidential relevance.
Complaint Denied (RDNH)
Complainant’s Counsel: Self-represented
Respondent’s Counsel: Freitas & Mourão Advocacia, Brazil
Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
This was an unusually tangled dispute, involving two rival Football 7 organizations, a relationship going back more than a decade, competing trademark and copyright claims, and proceedings in several countries. The Panel did a commendable job of working through that complicated record while keeping the focus on the comparatively narrow questions that the UDRP actually asks. For those like me who were unaware, apparently ‘Football 7’, or ‘7v7 football’, is a non-contact version of American football.
Most importantly, the chronology simply did not support cybersquatting. The Respondent had adopted FIF7 years before the Complainant acquired the trademark rights upon which it relied and had already been publicly using FIF7, including through an earlier domain name and website. Nor could the Complainant turn copyright registrations into the missing trademark rights. As the Panel aptly observed, “a copyright work is not a trademark.” Against that background, the attempt to characterize the later registration as opportunistic targeting based on the Mexican proceedings could not overcome the evidence that the Respondent was continuing a brand that it had already been developing for years.
The RDNH finding is particularly important. This was not merely a weak Complaint arising from an uncertain chronology. The Complainant knew that it had no corresponding trademark rights for one of the disputed domain names and knew that the trademark relied upon for the other had not accrued before the domain name was registered. It also knew of the Respondent’s longstanding FIF7 activities. The Panel was therefore well justified in concluding that the Complaint had no reasonable prospect of success.
The case also illustrates a persistent practical problem with the UDRP. For US$1,500 in filing fees, a complainant can commence a proceeding that may require a respondent to retain counsel, reconstruct years of dealings, locate historical evidence, address foreign litigation and trademark proceedings, and prepare a substantial defense. An RDNH finding provides an important measure of accountability, but it does not compensate the Respondent for the considerable expense required to defeat a Complaint that should never have been brought.
Panel Declines to Stretch J PHARM SCI to Cover “JPS” Initialism
<jpsjournal.com>
Panelist: Mr. David E. Sorkin
Brief Facts: The Complainant publishes the Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences, a peer-reviewed publication that is widely recognized in the field and is indexed in major scientific databases. The Complainant uses the J PHARM SCI mark in connection with this publication and operates a website at <jpharmsci.org>. The Complainant owns a longstanding United States trademark registration for J PHARM SCI in standard character form. The disputed Domain Name <jpsjournal.com> was registered in August 2025 and is being used for a website entitled “Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences – Scopus Indexed International Pharmaceutical Research Publication” that includes prominent references to “JPharmSci” and “Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences.” The Complainant alleges that the website is being used to impersonate Complainant’s publication in support of a fraudulent scheme, collecting publication fees from authors who believe that they are dealing with the Complainant. The Complainant further alleges that the Respondent is the same as or connected with the respondent in a prior proceeding involving similar facts and an identical website, American Pharmacists Association v. Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences, FA 2194569 (Forum Jan. 5, 2026) (ordering transfer of <jpharmsci.com>).
Held: The test for confusing similarity involves a side-by-side comparison between the complainant’s mark and the disputed Domain Name, to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the Domain Name. See UDRP Perspectives, § 1.8; WIPO Overview, § 1.7. The Complainant maintains that confusing similarity may be found based upon the use of an obvious abbreviation of a registered mark, citing BOURSORAMA SA v. BRS, CAC-UDRP-103657 (Czech Arb. Ct. Apr. 18, 2021) (finding <brs.contact> confusingly similar to BOURSORAMA). Other terms may also be included in the domain name, as long as the trademark is recognizable within the name. See LEGO Juris A/S v. DBA David Inc/ DomainsByProxy.com, D2011-1290 (WIPO Sept. 20, 2011) (finding <legoninjagokai.com> confusingly similar to LEGO).
The Complainant makes no assertion of trademark rights in JPS, and there is no evidence that JPS has been used by the Complainant or any third parties to refer to Complainant’s publication. Cf. BOURSORAMA SA v. BRS, supra (noting complainant’s prior use of BRS as an abbreviation for its registered BOURSORAMA mark). Other cases involving initialisms have generally relied upon the complainant’s trademark rights in the initialism, rather than a finding of confusing similarity to the full mark. See, e.g., Hachette Filipacchi Presse v. Lina Boumediene, D2025-5328 (WIPO Feb. 15, 2026) (finding <lejdd.net> confusingly similar to JDD, where the complainant owned trademark registrations for JDD and LE JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE); Morgan Stanley v. Stacey Wilson / hsbc, FA 1938103 (Forum Apr. 23, 2021) (accepting complainant’s assertion of common law trademark rights in MS initialism for registered MORGAN STANLEY mark, and finding <msfundservlces.com> confusingly similar to MS).
In this Panel’s view, it requires quite a stretch to consider <jpsjournal.com> confusingly similar to J PHARM SCI. The letters JPS can, and almost always do, refer to many things other than Complainant’s publication (including other academic journals, several of which appear to rank more prominently than Complainant’s publication in Google search results for “jps journal”). A cursory search of registered United States trademarks reveals several registrations for JPS, none of which relate to the Complainant or its publication. And Complainant’s own trademark registration disclaims the exclusive right to use “J” apart from the J PHARM SCI mark. The Panel finds that the disputed Domain Name is not identical or confusingly similar to a mark in which the Complainant has rights.
Complaint Denied
Complainant’s Counsel: Slaven Jesic of Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP, United States
Respondent’s Counsel: No Response
Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
The facts alleged by the Complainant made this look, at first glance, like a conventional impersonation case. The disputed Domain Name was used for a website bearing the title “Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences,” displaying references to “JPharmSci,” and allegedly collecting publication fees from authors who believed they were dealing with the Complainant. The difficulty arose one step earlier: the Complainant’s registered trademark was J PHARM SCI, while the disputed Domain Name was <jpsjournal.com>. The Complainant did not claim trademark rights in JPS itself.
That distinction illustrates an important limit on the role that website content can play under the first element. The usual inquiry remains a side-by-side comparison of the trademark and the domain name to determine whether the mark is recognizable in the domain name. UDRP Perspectives §1.8 recognizes that broader circumstances, including website content suggesting targeting, can sometimes support the analysis, but cautions that they are an additional factor rather than a substitute for confusing similarity.
Here, the allegedly impersonating website therefore could not by itself establish that JPS was a recognizable abbreviation of J PHARM SCI. The Panel distinguished BOURSORAMA v. BRS, where there was evidence that the complainant itself had previously used BRS as an abbreviation of its mark.
Had the Complainant demonstrated longstanding use of JPS as a source identifier – for example, through its own branding and promotional materials, references by authors and readers, media or industry usage, or other evidence showing that JPS had acquired secondary meaning in relation to its journal – it could have asserted trademark rights directly in JPS. The first-element comparison would then have been between JPS and <jpsjournal.com>, rather than requiring JPS to serve merely as an asserted abbreviation of J PHARM SCI.
The case also demonstrates the limited scope of the UDRP. Allegations that a website impersonates a complainant, deceives consumers, or even facilitates fraud may be highly relevant to rights or legitimate interests and bad faith. But the Policy still requires the complainant to establish all three elements. Where the complainant cannot establish the threshold connection between the disputed domain name and a trademark in which it has rights, the UDRP does not provide a mechanism for reaching the remaining allegations.
Knowledge Is Not Targeting: Prior Rights and Competition Were Not Enough
Lynx Franchising Intellectual Property, LLC v. Superior Fence LLC, Forum Claim No. FA2606002229318
<superiorfencenj.com>
Panelist: Mr. Flip Jan Claude Petillion (Chair), Mr. Christopher S. Gibson and Mr. Jeffrey M. Samuels
Brief Facts: The Complainant is the intellectual property affiliate of Empower Brands Franchising, LLC, which is also the parent company of Superior Fence and Rail Franchisor, LLC. The Complainant owns U.S. trademark registrations for SUPERIOR FENCE & RAIL, INC., registered on November 9, 2010, and SUPERIOR FENCE & RAIL, registered on December 26, 2023. Both trademarks cover the installation of fences. The Complainant claims use of the SUPERIOR FENCE & RAIL mark in connection with fencing services since at least 2002 and operates a website at <superiorfenceandrail.com>. The Respondent formed Superior Fence and Railing LLC in New Jersey on October 4, 2019. The disputed Domain Name was registered on January 15, 2020, and was used in connection with Respondent’s fencing business in New Jersey. The Respondent registered Superior Fence LLC as an alternate name for its business on March 2, 2020 but later changed its business name to Leslie & Sons Fencing LLC. The disputed Domain Name currently redirects to the domain name <leslieandsonsnj.com>, resolving to Respondent’s website under its new business name.
The Complainant alleges that the Respondent’s use of the disputed Domain Name for competing fencing services creates a risk of implied affiliation and submits that the Respondent intentionally attracts Internet users for commercial gain by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s marks. The Respondent contends that it became aware of confusion between the two businesses in 2025, as Complainant’s presence in Respondent’s state of New Jersey became more substantial. To address this issue, the Respondent decided to rename her business in November 2025 to “Leslie & Sons Fencing LLC” / “Leslie & Sons Fence”. The Respondent did so not because of any pressure or cease-and-desist letters from the Complainant but at her own will. It renamed its business prior to any communication from the Complainant or its attorneys. The Respondent further contends that the UDRP has a limited scope and is not designed to address good-faith disputes between holders of competing legitimate interests or claims of alleged trademark infringement.
Held: Prior trademark rights and activity in the same field do not, without more, establish that the Respondent targeted the Complainant when registering the disputed Domain Name. In the Panel’s view, the terms making up the relevant portion of Complainant’s mark are laudatory and descriptive in the context of fencing services. Moreover, the record also contains evidence that various unrelated businesses in the United States have used names incorporating “Superior Fence” for fencing-related businesses. Against that background, the Respondent has provided a plausible and contemporaneously supported explanation for its choice of the disputed Domain Name. The record supports Respondent’s explanation that the disputed Domain Name was selected because it corresponded to the name of Respondent’s own business and described that business.
The Complainant asserts longstanding use of its mark and states that its brand is currently present in numerous states. However, the evidence submitted by the Complainant does not establish the extent of the mark’s reputation in late 2019 or January 2020, when the Respondent selected its company name and registered the disputed Domain Name. In particular, the historic material relied upon by the Complainant establishes earlier use of its website and trademark, but does not demonstrate that the mark had such a reputation at the relevant time, particularly in New Jersey, that the Respondent’s knowledge and targeting of the Complainant can reasonably be inferred. The burden remains on the Complainant to establish bad faith, and the evidence before the Panel is insufficient to show that the Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name because of the Complainant or its trademark.
Complaint Denied
Complainant’s Counsel: Maria Jose Rivera, McHale & Slavin, P.A., USA
Respondent’s Counsel: Igor Motsnyi, Motsnyi IP dba Motsnyi Legal, Serbia
Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
The fact that a complainant’s trademark predates a disputed domain name, even by many years, does not itself establish bad faith registration. Nor does the fact that the parties operate in the same industry. As this three-member Panel emphasized, the relevant inquiry is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the Respondent registered <superiorfencenj.com> with the Complainant’s trademark in mind and with an intention to take unfair advantage of or otherwise abuse that mark.
That distinction between knowledge and targeting is particularly important where the trademark is composed of words which are not particularly distinctive or unique. In such circumstances, the mere existence of the Complainant’s earlier trademark registration did not explain why the Respondent selected those words. Instead, the Respondent produced contemporaneous evidence that it had formed Superior Fence and Railing LLC several months before registering the Domain Name and then actually used the Domain Name for that local fencing business. The Panel found this to be a credible plausible explanation in the circumstances, independent of the Complainant.
The analysis is consistent with UDRP Perspectives §3.3 (Targeting), which identifies targeting as the key to bad faith registration and places the burden on the complainant to prove that the respondent registered the domain name specifically because of the complainant or its trademark. The strength and distinctiveness of the mark, its reputation at the relevant time, the nature of the domain name, geographic proximity, and the respondent’s explanation for its selection can all bear on that inquiry. Targeting is generally easier to infer where a domain corresponds to a highly distinctive or well-known mark, and considerably harder where it consists of common or descriptive language capable of an obvious independent explanation.
Respondent’s counsel is my co-editor in UDRP Perspectives.
Complainant Chose Federal Court First, UDRP Terminated
<raisingbrowsbook.com> and <raisingbrowslive.com>
Panelist: Mr. Georges Nahitchevansky (Presiding), Ms. Sally M. Abel and Mr. Robert A. Badgley
Brief Facts: The Complainant is a California eyebrow cosmetics company doing business as Billion Dollar Beauty and Billion Dollar Brows. It designs, manufactures, markets, and sells eyebrow cosmetic products. It owns US registrations for BILLION DOLLAR BEAUTY (registered on August 13, 2019), BILLION DOLLAR BRAND (registered on August 8, 2023), and BILLION DOLLAR BROWS (registered on December 13, 2005). The Respondent is a marketing strategist who registered the two disputed Domain Names on behalf of the real parties in interest: Anastasia Soare, founder/CEO of rival eyebrow-cosmetics brand Anastasia Beverly Hills, and her company. In October 2025, Penguin Random House published Soare’s memoir Raising Brows: My Story of Building a Billion-Dollar Beauty Empire; the Domain Names were registered that September and used to promote the book and a related live event with Oprah Winfrey. Coincidentally, Complainant’s own founder self-published a competing memoir that same month titled The Plain Truth…About Building a Billion Dollar Brand.
The Complainant sued Soare, Anastasia Beverly Hills, and Penguin Random House in the US District Court for the Central District of California on October 13, 2025, alleging trademark infringement over the memoir’s title and marketing; the Respondent moved to dismiss and separately petitioned to cancel Complainant’s RAISING BROWS registration. The Complainant filed an amended federal complaint on February 18, 2026, then filed this UDRP two days later. The Complainant alleges that the Respondent registered the disputed Domain Names with knowledge of the Complainant’s RAISING BROWS mark and that the Respondent’s use of the disputed Domain Names is not a legitimate non-commercial or fair use because the Respondent has used them to promote a commercially distributed book, provide links to commercial offerings that benefit the Respondent, and sell tickets to a live event. The Respondent maintains that given the pending Federal Court Action and Petition to Cancel, the scope of the dispute between the parties before the Panel exceeds the limited scope of the Policy.
The Respondent requested in correspondence to the Center on April 4, 2026, and in its Response that the Panel suspend or terminate the proceeding in view of the pending Federal Court Action and Petition to Cancel which will decide issues that are at the heart of this proceeding. The Complainant has opposed such termination or suspension on the grounds that the Federal Court Action and this proceeding are not inextricably intertwined and that the Complainant has not included a claim or prayer for relief seeking a transfer of the disputed Domain Names in the Federal Court Action. The Complainant urges that this UDRP proceeding and the Federal Court Action are complementary, not overlapping, and notes that suspending or terminating this UDRP would be unfair to the Complainant and would shelve an expedient proceeding in favor of one that may not yield a relevant ruling for years, one that seeks different relief.
Held: To the Panel, the Federal Court Action essentially covers the parties’ dispute and their respective claims and defenses, including implicitly the registration and use of the disputed Domain Names. While the Panel is mindful that a UDRP has a relative expediency that benefits parties by providing an expedited resolution of a domain name dispute, and Panels are thus generally reluctant to suspend or terminate a pending proceeding, there are good reasons here to terminate the pending matter.
First, any decision rendered by this Panel would likely be immediately suspended by the losing party in the Federal Court Action and would thus serve little purpose.
Second, the Federal Court Action will fully resolve the many claims and defenses of the Parties since it will allow for a full record, with discovery and cross examination of the Parties’ many conflicting assertions, something that is unavailable in this proceeding. Lastly, it should be noted that the Complainant is the one that filed the Federal Court Action and chose to do so in October 2025 without seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin the activities it claimed were infringing its rights in its RAISING BROWS mark, including the registration and use of the disputed Domain Names.
Having chosen its forum, the Complainant should not now claim it will be harmed by a termination of its later in time filing of this proceeding. In closing, the Panel notes that this is an exceptional situation warranting a termination of this proceeding in light of the pending Federal Court Action (and the suspended Petition to cancel). As such, the Panel’s termination of this proceeding is without prejudice to the filing of a future UDRP complaint by Complainant pending resolution or discontinuance of the Federal Court Action.
Terminated
Complainant’s Counsel: Katz Ruby & Carle LLP, USA
Respondent’s Counsel: Greenberg Traurig, LLP, USA
Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
Should UDRP proceedings continue when the Complainant had already placed substantially the same dispute before a federal court? Although panels are generally reluctant to terminate a proceeding merely because related litigation is pending, the circumstances here provided compelling reasons not to run the UDRP in parallel.
Any UDRP transfer order could readily have been challenged in the already-pending Federal Court Action, potentially resulting in suspension of implementation while the court addressed the underlying trademark dispute. Meanwhile, the litigation permits discovery, testimony, cross-examination, and development of a factual record concerning issues that the parties sharply contest – procedural tools that are deliberately absent from the streamlined UDRP process.
Perhaps most significant was the sequence chosen by the Complainant itself. The Complainant commenced the Federal Court Action in October 2025, amended it in February 2026, and only two days later commenced the UDRP. Having elected to place the broader trademark controversy before a court with jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ competing claims, it was difficult to characterize termination of the subsequently filed UDRP as unfair. As the Panel observed, the Complainant had also chosen not to seek preliminary injunctive relief in the court proceeding despite its allegations concerning ongoing infringement.
Although the Panel characterized the circumstances as exceptional rather than suggesting that pending litigation ordinarily displaces the UDRP, Panels should generally be cognizant of the inherent superiority of court proceedings and would do well to defer to them where appropriate. Doing so does not diminish the importance or stature of the UDRP but instead, recognizes its limited scope and utility.
Disclaimer: The facts are taken from the decisions themselves and have not been independently verified. The editors and publishers accept no responsibility for their accuracy.
Ankur Raheja is the Editor-in-Chief of the ICA’s new weekly UDRP Case Summary service. Ankur has practiced law in India since 2005 and has been practicing domain name law for over ten years, representing clients from all over the world in UDRP proceedings. He is the founder of Cylaw Solutions.
He is an accredited panelist with ADNDRC (Hong Kong) and MFSD (Italy). Previously, Ankur worked as an Arbitrator/Panelist with .IN Registry for six years. In a advisory capacity, he has worked with NIXI/.IN Registry and Net4 India’s resolution professional.