Thank you for tuning in to this week’s digest (Vol 2.34)! In this issue, we review these noteworthy decisions:
‣ “Upon Information and Belief” Inadequate in UDRP Proceedings (KaufmanAuctions .com *with commentary)
‣ Complainant’s “Knowingly False Statement” Results in RDNH (IpnPaymentUs .com)
‣ Nominative Fair Use Defense Fails in Comparative Advertising Case (RechargePayment .com *with commentary)
‣ Record Doesn’t Show That Korean Respondent Registered Domain Name Because of Spanish Complainant (Palex .com *with commentary)
‣ Transfer Denied Despite Respondent Offer to Transfer (NutramaxWell .com *with commentary)
‣ Strange and Unexplained Defense Doesn’t Convince Panel (TevaPharm .careers)
Our General Counsel Zak Muscovitch has added commentary as well. Enjoy!
“Upon Information and Belief” Inadequate in UDRP Proceedings
Kaufman Realty and Auctions, LLC v. WEB REG / RARENAMES, INC., NAF Claim Number: FA2207002006249
<KaufmanAuctions .com>
Panelist: Mr. Terry F. Peppard
Brief Facts: The Complainant specializes in auctions and sale of property. The Complainant holds a registration for the KAUFMAN AUCTIONS service mark, registered on October 5, 2021 (claimed first use in commerce: December 31, 2011). The disputed Domain Name was registered on September 9, 2005 and resolves to an inactive website. The Complainant alleges that the Respondent’s previous use of the Domain Name was intended to create confusion among Internet users by redirecting them to other websites which appeared to contain malware, from which the Respondent intended to profit. The Respondent did not file a Response.
Held: The Complaint in this proceeding is exceedingly spare. It contains only seven substantive paragraphs and is accompanied by two attached exhibits, that includes USPTO registration certificate and a Business Entity Summary issued by the competent authority for the Respondent in this proceeding. Notably absent from the Complainant’s exhibits is the pertinent WHOIS information for the disputed Domain Name. When this information is compared to the Complainant’s mark registration certificate, it becomes apparent that the disputed Domain Name was first registered more that sixteen (16) years before the Complainant registered its competing mark and more than six (6) years before the Complainant first used the mark in commerce. The Complaint is devoid of any evidence explaining why the Respondent should be held to have known of the Complainant’s rights in its mark at the time of Domain Name registration in 2005.
Moreover, the seven bare paragraphs of the Complaint are punctuated by an equal number of recitations of the phrase “upon information and belief,” an expression borrowed from the realm of notice pleadings in civil litigation. Proof of at least some portion of these separate contentions would likely be necessary to sustain a finding of both registration and use of the disputed Domain Name in bad faith, but none of them is supported by the merest showing of evidence. The Rules under the Policy provide that “the complaint shall Annex any documentary or other evidence… upon which the complaint relies”. The point of this requirement is that the familiar notice pleadings of civil litigation are inapposite in a UDRP proceeding, so that, absent a surprising contention produced in a respondent’s response to a complaint, a complainant has one opportunity both to state and prove its case in the same pleading event. Here, the Complainant failed to satisfy this mandate. Hence, the Panel is not persuaded that the disputed Domain Name was registered or is being used in bad faith.
RDNH: The Complainant, represented by experienced legal counsel, at the time of filing of its Complaint must have known from available public records, that the Respondent had acquired the disputed Domain Name long before the Complainant had established trademark rights. Moreover, the Complainant did not offer any evidence showing that the Respondent procured its domain name registration in bad faith anticipation of the Complainant’s acquisition of rights in its claimed mark. Further, the Complainant also knew that its contentions were advanced in the absence of adequate proof as demonstrated by the repeated references in its Complaint to the inapposite phrase “on information and belief.”
On these facts, the Panel finds both that the Complainant’s Complaint lacks merit, as detailed above, and that the Complainant’s submissions demonstrate that, in filing and prosecuting this proceeding, the Complainant attempted in bad faith to obtain the disputed Domain Name. Hence, the Complainant attempted to commit Reverse Domain Name Hijacking as defined in the Rules.
Complaint Denied (RDNH)
Complainants’ Counsel: Andrew R. Burton, Ohio, USA. Respondent is WEB REG / RARENAMES, INC.
Respondents’ Counsel: No Response
Case Comment by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
Panelist Terry Peppard correctly observed that while common within the context of civil litigation where “notice pleadings” are used, UDRP Complaints based solely “upon information and belief” rather than evidence, will often be inadequate under the UDRP. A proper UDRP Complaint is akin to a motion for summary judgment (putting your ‘best foot forward’ while marshalling your supporting evidence, accompanied by supportive case citations), rather than a “notice pleading”. According to the Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, a notice pleading refers to a system of pleading requirements that only emphasizes pleadings as a way to notify parties of general issues in a case”. Unlike a notice pleading, a good UDRP Complaint will contain all the annexes, facts, arguments, and case citations necessary to prove – not just allege – a case. Moreover, a Respondent’s failure to answer a Complaint does not alleviate the requirement for a Complainant to prove its case, as there is no “default judgment” in the UDRP. A Complainant must still prove its case even in the absence of a Response.
All too often, Panelists see Complaints which are as Panelist Peppard stated in this case, “exceedingly spare”, containing just a handful of paragraphs, boilerplate, and conclusory allegations. One of the contributing factors to this unsatisfactory approach to UDRP Complaint drafting is the common misapprehension amongst counsel who are inexperienced with the UDRP, that all they must do is “fill out the form” or file a skeletal complaint making bare allegations as in a “notice pleading”. Experienced Complainant counsel will know that even a clear-cut cybersquatting case for a repeat client, often involves at least several hours of research and tailoring supporting case citations to the facts of the case. The complaint forms are made available by Providers only to provide some basic structure and guidance to counsel and should not be taken as an indication that UDRP Complaints require only perfunctory pleadings or the barest of evidence. What can be done about this? Greater education and express guidance to counsel, perhaps even right on the Complaint forms so that they are forewarned that UDRP Complaints are serious business that require research, evidence, and knowledge of the case law.
Complainant’s “Knowingly False Statement” Results in RDNH
Paymentus Corporation v. Domain Admin / TotalDomain Privacy Ltd, NAF Claim Number: FA2207002005377
<IpnPaymentUs .com>
Panelist: Mr. Alan L. Limbury
Brief Facts: The Complainant is a provider of electronic bill presentment and payment services and maintains a website at <paymentus .com>. The Complainant owns PAYMENTUS trademark with the USPTO registered on December 13, 2016 (first use: January 01, 2005). The Respondent registered the Domain Name on November 18, 2014 and resolves to an active website indicating that the domain name may be for sale and containing pay-per-click links to third party websites offering services competing with those of the Complainant. The Complainant alleges that the Respondent uses the Domain Name to attract users and disrupt the complainant’s business through the use of PPC links to competing third parties. The Complainant further contends “Upon information and belief, the Respondent is also using the domain name in furtherance of a phishing scheme”. The Respondent did not file a Response.
Held: There is no evidence that the Respondent is using the domain name in furtherance of a phishing scheme. The fact that the domain name may be for sale does not establish that it was registered primarily for the purpose of selling, renting or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the Complainant in terms of the Policy. Accordingly, the Complainant did not establish bad faith within paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy. The disputed Domain Name was registered on November 18, 2014, some 2 years before the registration of the Complainant’s mark and there is no evidence to substantiate Complainant’s claim that the PAYMENTUS mark was first used in commerce as early as 2005. Accordingly, the Panel is not satisfied that the Respondent registered the domain name with the Complainant’s mark in mind and there is no basis to find bad faith within paragraphs 4(b)(ii) or (iii) of the Policy.
As to paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy, the Panel finds the Domain Name is currently being used in bad faith by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of Respondent’s website or of a product or service on its website. The Panel considers that the PAYMENTUS mark is not one of a kind and is a combination of descriptive words. However, it’s incorporation in the Domain Name with the acronym “IPN”, which stands for Instant Payment Notification in the payment processing industry, some two years prior to the Complainant’s application to register its mark, is insufficient to enable the Panel to conclude that the Respondent was aware of the Complainant’s PAYMENTUS mark and of its use by the Complainant at the time of registration of the disputed Domain Name. Under these circumstances, the Panel finds that the Complainant has failed to establish that the disputed Domain Name was registered in bad faith.
RDNH: The mere lack of success of the complaint is not itself sufficient for a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking. However the reasons articulated by panels for finding RDNH include the provision of false evidence, or otherwise the Complainant’s attempt to mislead the panel. The Amended Complaint acknowledges that the Domain Name was registered on November 18, 2014 and that the Complainant’s mark was registered on December 13, 2016. Accordingly, the Complainant’s statement: “Because the PAYMENTUS mark was registered at the time Respondent registered the domain, it is presumed that Respondent had knowledge of the mark” is knowingly false. Therefore the Panel finds RDNH.
Complaint Denied (RDNH)
Complainants’ Counsel: Stephen M. Vaughn of Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, Georgia, USA
Respondents’ Counsel: No Response
Nominative Fair Use Defense Fails in Comparative Advertising Case
Recharge, Inc. v. Kennan Davison / Jika, Inc., NAF Claim Number: FA2207002003712
<RechargePayment .com>
Panelist: Mr. Ho-Hyun Nahm, Esq.
Brief Facts: The Complainant, since 2014, offers its goods and services through its subscription payments software platform as well as Complainant’s website hosted at <rechargepayments .com>. The Complainant owns rights in the RECHARGE mark through its registration with the USPTO, dated March 14, 2017. The Respondent acquired the disputed Domain Name on March 28, 2022 and it redirects to <skio .com/compare> featuring a chart comparing Skio’s services to its competitors and lists those competitors as ‘Overcharge Pro,’ ‘Retextion,’ and ‘Smartrr’. The Complainant sent a cease-and-desist letter to the Respondent on August 21, 2021, it was duly acknowledged by the Respondent.
The Complainant alleges that the Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name, with actual knowledge of the Complainant’s rights in the RECHARGE mark in order to divert customers for commercial gain and that the Respondent engages in typosquatting. The Respondent contends that it has rights and a legitimate interest in the Domain Name because Respondent makes nominative fair use of it by using it to resolve to a webpage displaying comparative advertising information and that Complainant is engaged in anti-competitive behaviour. The Respondent claims that its use of the Disputed Domain Name amounts to ‘an authentic, non-confusing comparison website’ as contemplated by Hästens Sängar AB v. Jeff Bader / Organic Mattresses, Inc . (<CompareToHastens .com>).
Held: The Panel finds that the Respondent uses the disputed Domain Name to offer competing services and regardless of the legitimacy of the comparative advertising information displayed at the redirected landing page, the said usage is not a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate non-commercial or fair use. For the same reasons, the Panel finds that the Respondent has engaged in typo squatting, and thus demonstrated its lack of rights or legitimate interests in the disputed Domain Name. The Panel also notes that the Complainant’s RECHARGE mark was well known prior to Respondent’s acquisition of the disputed Domain Name, in the relevant industry and among consumers.
Given the totality of the circumstances, the Panel infers that the Respondent acquired the disputed Domain Name with actual knowledge of the Complainant’s right in the RECHARGE mark to direct Internet users seeking the Complainant’s website to the redirected landing page of the Respondent, which offers competing services with the Complainant as well as the comparative advertising. The Panel observes that use of a disputed Domain Name to redirect consumers to competing goods or services can be evidence of bad faith disruption of a complainant’s business and an attempt to attract users for commercial gain under the Policy. Therefore, the Panel finds that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed Domain Name in bad faith regardless of the legitimacy of the comparative advertising.
Transfer
Complainants’ Counsel: Alyssa M. Worsham of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, California, USA
Respondents’ Counsel: Stephen Jadie Coates of Coates IP LLP, Washington, USA
Case Comment by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
This case raises an interesting issue: When can a Respondent legitimately register and use a Domain Name comprising a Complainant’s mark for comparison advertising purposes? Nominative fair use is a well-established principle and defense in trademark law as well as in the UDRP. In principle, a Respondent can legitimately register a Domain Name comprising a Complainant’s mark and the case referenced in the decision, Hastens, is a good example. There, Panelist David Bernstein held that a “Compare to” Domain Name can be registered and used in good faith if it is associated with a website that does not cause confusion as to source, sponsorship or affiliation and it is clear that the website is provided by a competitor. Although the website in the present case arguably did so, the deciding and crucial factor for the Panelist was that the Respondent selected and used a Domain Name which was so similar to the Complainant’s own website and which did not include any terms to dissociate itself from the Complainant, thereby serving to confuse and to impersonate the Complainant. This is ultimately what led to the Panel’s transfer order in this case. As the Panelist noted, “The Respondent turns a blind eye to the critical fact that the present proceeding does not concern a domain with the key ‘compare to’ terms, and thus the decision is not persuasive precedent in this matter. The addition of key words ‘compare to’ in the domain in the Hästens Sängar AB proceeding was a circumstance that was emphasized throughout the proceeding.”
Record Doesn’t Show That Korean Respondent Registered Domain Name Because of Spanish Complainant
Palex Medical, S.A. v. Hanjin Ko (고한진), WIPO Case No. D2022-1473
<Palex .com>
Panelist: Ms. Kathryn Lee
Brief Facts: The Complainant is a Spanish healthcare company founded in 1955. It is in the business of selling and distributing specialized equipment and supplies to hospitals throughout Spain and Portugal, having invoiced EUR 325 million in 2020. The Complainant owns the trademark registrations to PALEX in Spain (1989), E.U. (2002) and U.K. (2002). The Korean Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name on November 18, 1996 and resolves to a website with pay-per-click links, with an offer to sell. The Complainant asserts that this shows that the Respondent intends to sell the disputed Domain Name to the Complainant for a profit.
The Complainant further points out that the Respondent’s email address is associated with more than 17,000 domain names, some of which are identical or confusingly similar to third party registered trademarks, and argues that this shows that the Respondent is engaging in a pattern of bad faith registrations. The Respondent contends that his registration of the disputed Domain Name was proper and lawful, and that the Complaint should be rejected given the significant amount of time that has passed since the disputed Domain Name was registered.
Held: The defense of laches is not generally recognized as such in UDRP proceedings as the purpose of a UDRP remedy is injunctive rather than compensatory. The WIPO Overview clearly provides that bad faith under the UDRP is “broadly understood to occur where a respondent takes unfair advantage of or otherwise abuses a complainant’s mark”. Here, the record in this case – including the information provided in the Parties’ responses to the Procedural Order – does not support a finding of bad faith. There is no evidence to suggest that, on the balance of probabilities, the Respondent knew of the Complainant when registering the disputed Domain Name. Although the Complainant’s registration and use of the PALEX mark precede the registration of the disputed Domain Name, the use of the mark seems to have been limited to Spain and Portugal, while the Respondent resides in the Republic of Korea.
Further, the Panel finds that although the disputed Domain Name corresponds exactly to the Complainant’s trademark, it only consists of five letters and it is certainly possible for someone to have conceived of this combination of letters on his/her own even with no knowledge of the Complainant. The offer to sell the disputed Domain Name or the Respondent’s use of the disputed Domain Name for domain name parking with pay-per-click links, without additional supporting factors, do not necessarily indicate bad faith. And based on the available record, while an inference could be made that the Respondent targeted the Complainant in bad faith to sell the disputed Domain Name to the Complainant, mindful of the burden being on the Complainant, the totality of the evidence ultimately does not point in this direction. Therefore, the Panel does not find sufficient evidence of bad faith in this case.
Complaint Denied
Complainants’ Counsel: Ubilibet, S.L., Spain
Respondents’ Counsel: Self-represented
Case Comment by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
To her credit, Panelist Lee appears to have made a particularly nuanced finding in this case. Here, the trademark belonged to a large company and the trademark clearly predated the Domain Name registration. Yet what appeared to have been missing, even after an apparent second opportunity via a Procedural Order, was sufficient evidence demonstrating that the Korean Respondent had likely been aware of the Spanish company and that was the likely reason for the Domain Name registration.
Other panelists may have made such an inference merely based upon the fact that the Domain Name had been listed for sale and was used with PPC links. But Panelist Lee noted that given the nature of the domain name, the location of the parties, and having regard to the burden of proof and totality of the evidence, this was not an inference that she was prepared to make. Apparently, the Panelist even attempted to see if there was sufficient evidence available via a Procedural Order, yet the result left her unsatisfied and accordingly decided that in the circumstances, the appropriate result was to deny the transfer. (The appropriate use of procedural orders is itself controversial, however we will leave that for another day).
This self-restraint is admirable, as the natural inclination of a Panelist may be to help out, where appropriate, a substantial corporation that claims to have been aggrieved by a Domain Name identical to its trademark. Yet a just Panelist will also be cognizant of the burden of proof on the Complainant and will give the benefit of the doubt to a Respondent except where the totality of the evidence clearly demonstrates bad faith registration and use. As some baseball fans would put it, the “tie goes to the runner”. It is often easy to point to an offer for sale and PPC links as “proof” of registration in bad faith, but where the nature of the domain name, location of the parties, and the proven reputation of the Complainant or lack thereof, does not make bad faith sufficiently clear, a prudent Panelist may recognize that self-restraint is most appropriate in the circumstances. What is “sufficiently clear” though? Technically it might be said that the test of “balance of convenience” only requires a 50.1% likelihood in favour of the Complainant. Yet issuing a transfer order with such a modest balance of probabilities leaves the Panelist with a 49.9% chance that he or she got it wrong. Accordingly, in practice, a prudent and justice-minded panelist will want to feel substantially more assured than what a minimal 50.1% probability would permit, and instead err on the side of caution. After all, the UDRP is but one mechanism for achieving justice and a dispute need not end there in the absence of a transfer order.
Transfer Denied Despite Respondent Offer to Transfer
<NutramaxWell .com>
Panelist: Mr. Debrett G. Lyons
Brief Facts: The Complainant sells nutritional supplements for humans and animals by reference to the trademark, NUTRAMAX LABORATORIES. It owns the trademark with USPTO, registered on March 16, 1999. The disputed Domain Name was registered on April 22, 2022 and is inactive. The Respondent failed to submit a response in these proceedings. The Complainant argues that at a minimum, the Respondent is in violation of subparagraphs (iii) and (iv) of Para 4(b) of the Policy because there is no colorable rationale for use and registration of the disputed Domain Name other than to; 1) disrupt the business of the Complainant by causing people to mistakenly believe they are visiting an authorized seller of Nutramax Laboratories; or 2) attract for commercial gain, people to the Respondent, falsely believing it is Complainant’s online location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s NUTRAMAX LABORATORIES Marks.
No Response was filed but after Respondent was notified of the Complaint, it wrote to Complainant stating that its products were not in the same industry as Complainant’s goods but that “for the sake of international peace and friendly settlement, we agree that we can propose the transfer of domain names (sic)…”. So far as the Panel is aware, Complainant did not respond to that offer and so it must be understood that Complainant prefers instead that the Policy be applied. The Panel has acted accordingly.
Held: The name of the Domain Name registrant disclosed to the Panel is “Celine / NUTRAMAXWELL NETWORK TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.” but there is no suggestion that the Respondent might be commonly known by the disputed Domain Name, or that the Respondent owns any trademark. However, the Panel cannot agree with the Complainant’s submissions which pay little regard to the wording of the Policy. Paragraph 4(b)(iii) requires the parties to be competitors. Without use of the domain name or other means of establishing Respondent’s business or intended purpose for the domain name, it is senseless to characterize it as Complainant’s “competitor”. Likewise, paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy requires proof of use likely to result in commercial gain. Neither element can be shown or even reliably inferred on the evidence.
Indeed, all that can be said is that there is a degree of resemblance between the terms such that they are – in the abstract – confusingly similar for the purposes of the first element of the Policy. As underscored there, even that finding is borderline. Beyond that, there is nothing more to insinuate bad faith in this case and on the evidence put before the Panel. Whilst the Panel is entitled to accept reasonable allegations or draw reasonable inferences, it may rightly deny relief where statements are conclusory or unsubstantiated. The Complaint does not establish paragraph 4(b)(iii) or (iv) of the Policy nor shown on the evidence that either of the remaining scenarios might apply. Further, in the absence of use of the Domain Name the Complaint did not argue in any cohesive way that there may be “passive” holding in bad faith. Therefore, the Panel finds that the Complainant has failed to establish that the disputed Domain Name was registered and used in bad faith.
Complaint Denied
Complainants’ Counsel: Jenny T. Slocum of Dickinson Wright PLLC, District of Columbia, USA
Respondents’ Counsel: No Response
Case Comment by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
Here, we have a second example within this Digest of a Panelist appropriately holding a Complainant to the required standard of proof. Another Panelist might have simply found the Domain Name to be “similar”, noticed that it was not used, and thereby made the blunt inference that it was registered and used in bad faith. Indeed, given the Respondent’s offer to transfer, another Panelist might have felt even more comfortable ordering a transfer despite the Complainant not proving its case. Yet Panelist Debrett Lyons to his credit, did not take the path of least resistance and instead astutely analysed the Policy and weighed the evidence. This case is a good reminder to all, that the UDRP remains a serious legal procedure that requires parties to meet certain evidentiary thresholds. When not met, a Panelist is well within his or her rights, or rather, is obliged, to deny a transfer. Kudos to Panelist Lyons for holding the line and issuing a tough decision for the Complainant, but one which appears to have ultimately been the correct and just one.
Strange and Unexplained Defense Doesn’t Convince Panel
<TevaPharm .careers>
Panelist: Mr. Warwick A. Rothnie
Brief Facts: The Complainant Company, incorporated in 1901, is one of the largest suppliers of generic medicines in the world and also produces and markets a range of specialty medicines. The Complainant holds an extensive portfolio of trademark registrations for TEVA in International Classes 3, and 5 including Israeli Trademark (August 5, 1975); US Trademark (November 28, 1989) and European Union Trademark (April 1, 1996). The Complaint also includes evidence of numerous other registrations in European, Asian and Pacific countries. The Complainant promotes its products and services from a website to which the domain name <tevapharm .com> resolves. The disputed Domain Name was registered on May 18, 2022 and redirects to the Complainant’s website. In addition, mail exchanger (“MX”) records for the disputed Domain Name actively point to Google mail servers. The Complainant plausibly contends that the activation of the MX records indicates the associated email addresses are being used for phishing or some other fraudulent purpose.
In Response, Mr. Sims describes himself as the President of the Respondent and communicated to the Center: “This filing is unjust and not right. The person or entity that has filed this claim is a bad actor. My company had a website that was hacked, and, in the process, I decided to eliminate any footprint that my company had on the web. The domain name we used was my company acronym. However, since we were hacked, I have chosen not to continue to do business with the keepers of my website. This dispute that has been filed is a form of fraud and should be dismissed.” However, the Respondent failed to respond to the Center’s request for further information as to his identity.
Held: There is no evidence on record to prove that the disputed Domain Name was derived from the Respondent’s name. Nor is there any suggestion of some other name by which the Respondent is commonly known from which the disputed Domain Name could be derived. Significantly, the configured MX records pointing to active Google mail servers indicate that the disputed Domain Name is being used in connection with email communications, without any authorization. Given the content of the disputed Domain Name, however, emails from such an account would at the very least misrepresent that the account holder was from, or associated with, the Complainant. That risk of association is reinforced by the redirection of the disputed Domain Name to the Complainant’s website and such conduct cannot qualify as a right or legitimate purpose under the Policy.
In the present case, the Complainant is part of a large global corporate group operating around the world under the name “Teva”, for many years. Apparently, “teva” means “nature” in Hebrew. Despite Mr. Sims’ claim, however, there is nothing in the corporate Respondent’s name which suggests a connection either with “nature” or “teva”. Nor does its corporate name, which references the provision of contracting for insulation and contracting services, suggest any association with the pharmaceutical industry. In these circumstances, therefore, the Panel accepts that there is a very strong inference that the Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name with knowledge of the Complainant (or its corporate group) and trademark to take advantage of its significance as the Complainant’s trademark. The registration of the disputed Domain Name, which falsely represents an association with the Complainant with that knowledge, constitutes registration in bad faith under the Policy.
Transfer
Complainants’ Counsel: SILKA AB, Sweden
Respondents’ Counsel: Self-represented