Panel: Complainant Needed Evidence of Targeting Considering Dictionary Meaning of “Etihad”
Though perhaps initially a surprising outcome, the Panel provided a compelling explanation of its determination that there was no basis for finding targeting of the Complainant’s trademark given the dictionary meaning of the transliterated word, Etihad, and given its common use amongst third parties in various industries. Despite the facts being remarkably similar, the outcome in Etihad.ai is diametrically opposed to the outcome of the 2019 Forum decision in the Acrobat.ai dispute. In the Acrobat.ai dispute, a single-member panel ordered the transfer of the domain name, which was being offered for sale, despite “Acrobat” being a common English word.
The panel held inter alia, “that the mere fact of knowingly incorporating a third-party’s trademark in a domain name constitutes registration in bad faith”. The Panel further found that “since Complainant’s trademark is used in the disputed domain name it is reasonable to conclude that many Internet users would suppose that the websites to which the disputed domain name resolve have a connection with the Complainant”. Essentially, the single Panelist in Acrobat adopted a trademark-maximalist approach to the UDRP, where it is bad faith to register a domain name once aware of a trademark, even if the domain name corresponds to a common dictionary word and is used by numerous unrelated third parties as brands. Continue reading commentary here.
February 2, 2026
Gerald Levine, Special Guest Columnist
In effect, a refiled complaint is like an appeal in that a new panel is appointed to revisit the circumstances of the dispute. But it also is not an appeal because a refiled complaint must offer something new to justify its refiling. WIPO Overview (3.0) sec. 4.18 (2017) tells us that “[t]he UDRP itself contains no appeal mechanism, there is no express right to refile a complaint; refiled complaints are exceptional.” The emphasis is on exceptional! Something must have happened in the interim to justify the refiling. The jurisprudence on the refiling of complaints began with a number of cases from the first year of the Policy beginning with Grove Broadcasting Co. Ltd. V. Telesystems Communications Ltd., WIPO Claim No. D2000-0703 (“Grove 2”) followed by Creo Products Inc & anor v. Website in Development, WIPO Claim No. D2000-1490 (“Creo 2”) and others. The consensus began earlier and quickly matured. It has never been questioned.
These two and other cases form the core of the consensus are captured by Section 4.18 of WIPO 3.0. It states: “Panels have accepted refiled complaints only in highly limited circumstances,” [emphasis added] as follows:
(i) when the complainant establishes that legally relevant developments have occurred since the original UDRP decision, (ii) a breach of natural justice or of due process has objectively occurred, (iii) where serious misconduct in the original case (such as perjured evidence) that influenced the outcome is subsequently identified, (iv) where new material evidence that was reasonably unavailable to the complainant during the original case is presented, or (v) where the case has previously been decided (including termination orders) expressly on a “without prejudice” basis.
The “without prejudice basis” is a reformulation of earlier language in WIPO Overview 2.0 (2011). If circumstance (v) is invoked, the prior panel must have “expressively [decided] on a ‘without prejudice’ basis.” Panelists cannot willy nilly deviate from the jurisprudence to accept a refiled complaint, for the good reasons noted by Zak Muscovitch in his weekly commentary of January 27, 2026, commenting on Sesame AI, Inc. v. Jingyi Huang, Claim Number: FA2512002196719 (“Sesame 2”). He noted that “it is very concerning . . . [that “the Panel allowed the case to proceed and ordered the Domain Name transferred, despite the earlier dismissal].” His quarrel with the decision is that the new Panel introduces new theories to transfer the disputed domain name. I agree.
WIPO and ICA Conclude Comprehensive Review of the UDRP
This initiative was driven by a robust international process that included nearly a dozen consultations with industry leaders, legal experts, and stakeholders. The goal was to identify best practices, establish areas of consensus, and pinpoint potential improvements to the policy. Coordinated by Zak Muscovitch, General Counsel to the ICA and Brian Beckham, WIPO, the project team, comprising experts and UDRP stakeholders from around the world.
Following a period of public comment on the draft, the Final Report is now being shared, including submission to ICANN for consideration in any future UDRP review undertaken by its Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO). By clearly identifying where stakeholder agreement and disagreement lie, this independent report is expected to significantly benefit and streamline ICANN’s official review process, ensuring any future changes are well-informed and reflective of community input.
The UDRP is the cornerstone for resolving domain name disputes globally, and its effectiveness relies on continuous review and refinement. We thank everyone involved. You can access the complete WIPO/ICA UDRP Review Final Report and background information on WIPO’s website. The Executive Summary Table of Recommendations in the Final Report, is also available here.
We hope you will enjoy this edition of the Digest (vol. 6.5) as we review these noteworthy recent decisions with expert commentary. (We invite guest commenters to contact us):
‣ Panel: Complainant Needed Evidence of Targeting Considering Dictionary Meaning of “Etihad” (etihad .ai *with commentary)
‣ Panel: No Evidence of Targeting the Complainant or Its Trademarks (fin .com *with commentary)
‣ Principality of Monaco Loses Attempt to Grab Monaco Domain Name (monaco .com *with commentary)
‣ AI Domain Name Registered for Its Descriptive Meaning (logmein .ai)
‣ Panel: Complaint Was Poorly Researched and Reasoned (nationalwillregistry .com)
Panel: Complainant Needed Evidence of Targeting Considering Dictionary Meaning of “Etihad”
Etihad Airways v. Hale Com, WIPO Case No. DAI2025-0058
<etihad .ai>
Panelists: Mr. Matthew Kennedy (Presiding), Mr. Luca Barbero, and Mr. Gerald M. Levine
Brief Facts: The Complainant, the national airline of the UAE, commenced operations in November 2003 and now operates one of the largest airlines in the country, with an online presence at <etihad .com>. The Complainant owns trademarks for ETIHAD in multiple jurisdictions, including registrations in the United States. These include registrations in Class 39 dated November 6, 2007, Class 43 dated December 25, 2011, and Class 35 dated July 30, 2013. The United States registrations state that the English translation of the word “Etihad” is “union.” The Respondent is a domain name investor, who acquired the Domain Name at an auction on or about August 7, 2023 for a price of USD $631 and also owns more .ai domain names. The disputed Domain Name redirects to a website where it is advertised for sale to the general public at an asking price of USD $98,500, which the Complainant alleges does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services for the purposes of the Policy.
The Complainant further alleges that the Respondent creates a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant and its trademarks by registering a domain name that incorporates the Complainant’s ETIHAD trademark, which demonstrates that the Respondent is using the domain to confuse unsuspecting Internet users looking for the Complainant’s services and to mislead them. The Respondent contends that “Etihad” is the transliteration of a common Arabic word meaning “union” or “unity” and is therefore inherently non-distinctive. Just as the word “United” itself cannot be exclusively appropriated by United Airlines, the same principle should apply to the word “Etihad” in Arabic. The Respondent further contends that the Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name because of its inherent meaning and suitability as a generic, brandable term in the “.ai” space, rather than with any intention of targeting the Complainant’s trademark. Speculating and investing in inherently valuable domain names is a legitimate business and in good faith.
Held: The disputed Domain Name was acquired by the Respondent in 2023, years after the registration of the Complainant’s ETIHAD mark, which is identical to the ETIHAD mark; however, the mark is not a coined term. The Complainant has been operating its airline since 2003, and has won various industry awards. Nowhere in the detailed Response does the Respondent deny awareness of the Complainant or its mark. Accordingly, the Panel is willing to infer that the Respondent knew of the Complainant and its mark when he acquired the disputed Domain Name. Nevertheless, the disputed Domain Name is a transliteration of the common Arabic word “اتحاد“, meaning “union” or “unity”, which is not an exclusive reference to the Complainant. The Respondent, who plausibly attests that he is an Arabic speaker born in Djibouti, submits that it was in this ordinary, dictionary word sense that he understood the term when deciding to acquire the disputed Domain Name.
The Respondent submits that “Etihad” is a generic, brandable term that has been independently adopted by various parties due to its common meaning in the Arabic language. The evidence shows that this term is relatively common in branding in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, across a range of sectors. For example, there are active websites for Etihad Advanced Investment, Etihad National Holding, Etihad Energy Services, Etihad Capital, Etihad Hospitality, Al-Etihad Gold, Etihad Food Industries, Etihad Medical Services, Etihad Sugar Mills, Etihad Technology, Etihad Town, Etihad Blue Contracting Co., El Etihad (engineering and electromechanical), Etihad Holding, Etihad Leading Investment, Al-Etihad Gasket Factory, Bank Al-Etihad, Etihad Zurmati Cold Storage Company, Etihad Club, and Etihad Logistics. According to search results presented by the Respondent, over 200 companies in different jurisdictions incorporate “Etihad” in their company names; including many that are active and do not appear to be affiliated with the Complainant.
The Panel sees no evidence on the record that the Respondent acquired the disputed Domain Name based on its trademark significance rather than its meaning as a transliteration of a common word. The disputed Domain Name does not contain any term that refers to the Complainant (such as “airways”) nor does the ccTLD extension “.ai” (artificial intelligence) have any apparent connection to the Complainant’s operations. The disputed Domain Name has not been used with website content displaying the Complainant’s stylized mark or related to its services. The Respondent did not contact the Complainant.
The Complainant argues that the offering of the disputed Domain Name for sale is evidence of bad faith. However, generally speaking, prior UDRP panels have found that the practice as such of registering a domain name for subsequent resale (including for a profit) would not by itself support a claim that the respondent registered the domain name in bad faith with the primary purpose of selling to a trademark owner (or its competitor). See WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.1.1. In the present dispute, the Panel is unable to determine that the Respondent’s asking price of USD $98,500 reflected the disputed Domain Name’s value as a trademark rather than as a transliteration of a common word in the “.ai” ccTLD. While the Respondent fails to substantiate his allegation that he originally intended to use the disputed Domain Name with a web application and only offered it for sale later, that does not alter the Panel’s conclusion in the circumstances of this case.
Accordingly, the evidence in the case file as presented does not indicate that the Respondent’s aim in registering the disputed Domain Name was to profit from or exploit the Complainant’s trademark.
RDNH: The Complainant failed to address the material circumstance that its ETIHAD trademark is a transliteration of an Arabic word meaning “union”. The Complainant and its legal representative are both based in the UAE and can be presumed to be aware of that circumstance; indeed, it is noted on a trademark registration certificate annexed to the Complaint. Even though the Complainant may have obtained the transfer of other domain names in prior UDRP proceedings without addressing this circumstance, the Complainant should have appreciated the factual differences in the present dispute, in particular, the composition of the disputed Domain Name and the absence of targeting of the Complainant or its mark. While the Complainant alleged that the offering of the disputed Domain Name for sale constituted evidence of targeting, this was based on the premise that the term “Etihad” is uniquely associated with the Complainant. The Complainant, which has legal representation, should have appreciated the weakness of its case and the need to provide evidence of targeting in light of the dictionary meaning of “اتحاد“ (etihad).
Complaint Denied (RDNH)
Complainant’s Counsel: Clyde & Co., UAE
Respondent’s Counsel: Archer Softech, India
Case Comment by ICA Director, Nat Cohen and ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch: Though perhaps initially a surprising outcome, the Panel provided a compelling explanation of its determination that there was no basis for finding targeting of the Complainant’s trademark given the dictionary meaning of the transliterated word, Etihad, and given its common use amongst third parties in various industries. Despite the facts being remarkably similar, the outcome in Etihad.ai is diametrically opposed to the outcome of the 2019 Forum decision in the Acrobat.ai dispute. In the Acrobat.ai dispute, a single-member panel ordered the transfer of the domain name, which was being offered for sale, despite “Acrobat” being a common English word. The panel held inter alia, “that the mere fact of knowingly incorporating a third-party’s trademark in a domain name constitutes registration in bad faith”. The Panel further found that “since Complainant’s trademark is used in the disputed domain name it is reasonable to conclude that many Internet users would suppose that the websites to which the disputed domain name resolve have a connection with the Complainant”. Essentially, the single Panelist in Acrobat adopted a trademark-maximalist approach to the UDRP, where it is bad faith to register a domain name once aware of a trademark, even if the domain name corresponds to a common dictionary word and is used by numerous unrelated third parties as brands. The Acrobat.ai reasoning effectively provide prominent trademark owners a right to acquire any corresponding domain name despite the fact that the term is a commonly used dictionary word and is not associated only with the complainant.
In contrast, the three-member panel in the Etihad.ai dispute denied the complaint, highlighting that “Etihad” is the Arabic word for “United”. The Panel found inter alia:
- Legitimacy of Resale: The panel asserted that the practice of registering a domain name for subsequent resale (even for profit) does not, by itself, support a claim of bad faith.
- The Necessity of Targeting: Merely offering a dictionary-word domain for sale does not prove the respondent was targeting the complainant, regardless of how prominent the brand may be.
- Reverse Domain Name Hijacking (RDNH): The panel issued a finding of RDNH, noting that the complainant – being legally represented – should have recognized the weakness of its case given the term’s dictionary meaning.
The three-member Panel’s unanimous decision clearly reflects the evolved consensus view when it comes to dictionary word domain names, whereas the Acrobat decision appears to be a regressive view that does not have consensus. As Serbian IP attorney and UDRP panelist Igor Motsnyi noted in his UDRP Digest comment on the acrobat.ai dispute, the key question to determine respondent’s bad faith was: “Did Respondent target Complainant in the <acrobat.ai> case?”. He concluded that when a word is a common dictionary term adopted by many unrelated companies, targeting cannot be easily inferred.
The proper approach is to focus on targeting, as the Etihad case does. As discussed in UDRP Perspectives at 3.3, the onus is on the Complainant to prove its case and this includes providing evidence of the Respondent’s intention to target a specific Complainant rather than anyone who may have a trademark for the corresponding or similar term. In the absence of evidence that Respondent registered the Domain Name specifically because of the Complainant or that its value was derived exclusively from Complainant’s mark, the Complaint must fail. It is in general essential to a finding of bad faith registration and use under the Policy, that a Respondent must have targeted Complainant or its trade mark.
Targeting is easier to prove where the domain name corresponds to a highly distinctive mark primarily associated with one single holder and less easy to prove where it corresponds to a common term. For example, CITIBANKLOGIN .COM would clearly show targeting of Citibank whereas MAHOGANY.COM would likely have been registered for its generic or descriptive meaning rather than because a greeting card company had adopted this term for a trademark.
Panel: No Evidence of Targeting the Complainant or Its Trademarks
<fin .com>
Panelist: Mr. Gerald M. Levine, Ms. Carol M. Stoner, Mr. Eugene I. Low (Chair)
Brief Facts: The Complainant relies on USPTO registrations, including FIN in stylized block format (Class 36; Apr. 07, 2015); FIN in stylized block format (Class 9; Jan. 28, 2020); and FIN in stylized letters containing a design of light rays (Class 36; Mar. 03, 2020). The Complainant alleges that the Respondent has not used the Domain Name in connection with any bona fide offering of goods or services, and believes that the sole and intended purpose of owning the domain name is to sell it to the Complainant or its competitors. The Complaint further alleges that while the Complainant is unaware that the Respondent registered the Domain Name specifically to prevent the Complainant from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name and has no knowledge of Respondent’s pattern of conduct given the Complainant is presently barred from knowing Respondent’s identity, the Respondent was certainly on constructive notice that the domain name was a registered mark.
The Respondent contends that the Complainant’s stylized FIN marks do not confer rights in the plain text “FIN,” a highly descriptive/generic abbreviation for “financial/finance,” as confirmed by USPTO prosecution histories and lack of standard character claims; third-party FIN marks and Domain Names further show no exclusive rights. The Respondent further claims legitimate interests via good-faith acquisition in June 2023 as part of its domain investment business (hundreds of generic/descriptive domains), no knowledge of the Complainant, later leased to Fin, Inc. for bona fide fintech services (cross-border payments). The Respondent further denies bad faith as Domain Name predates trademarks, no targeting/intent to sell to the Complainant (conclusory claims unproven), lawful trading/leasing of descriptive domain name, no pattern, and Complainant’s minimal operations preclude disruption or confusion. The Respondent requests RDNH for baseless filing by the represented Complainant.
Held: The US trademark registrations for the stylized letters FIN do not carry a disclaimer of the text FIN as such. The Panel also notes from the prosecution files, as adduced by the Respondent, that the Complainant appeared to acknowledge that the term FIN was (highly) descriptive and that the Complainant sought to register the trademark only in a highly stylized form. Further, based on the Panel’s review of the USPTO online records for these three trademarks, the Panel notes that no “Standard Character Claim” has been made. All these factors, plus the inherent descriptive meaning of the FIN term in relation to the goods and services in question (i.e. financial), lead the Panel to conclude that it is not appropriate to make a text-to-text comparison between Complainant’s registered trademarks and the disputed Domain Name. The Complainant’s registered trademark rights are confined to the specific stylized designs of its FIN trademarks but do not confer exclusive rights to the descriptive/generic FIN term. The Complainant has not asserted or adduced proof that it has acquired any common law rights to the descriptive/generic FIN term.
The Panel would also have found in favor of the Respondent under the second element. The Complainant merely points to Respondent’s website(s) which allegedly had “no activity” or was “populated by numerous fake links and unclickable components”. However, there is no evidence or explanation from the Complainant as to how the links were “fake” or that the components were “unclickable”. The Panel notes that, even if a website is blank, or contains mainly/exclusively of third party links (or “unclickable” components), this does not necessarily mean the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests to the disputed Domain Name under the second element. Indeed, the burden is higher on the Complainant to establish a prima facie case that the Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in relation to a descriptive term such as FIN. For example, see Abnormal Security Corporation v. Narendra Ghimire, FA 2099733, (Forum July 29, 2024).
On the other hand, Respondent’s evidence on the history of domain name purchase and use has shown that the Respondent has acquired and used the domain name as part of its domain name investment business, and without bad faith. Investing in domain names without bad faith constitutes a legitimate interest (see Section 2.6, UDRP Perspectives). This, in the absence of any contrary evidence by the Complainant, would have demonstrated that the Respondent has the requisite rights and legitimate interests in the disputed Domain Name. In addition, there is simply no evidence that the Respondent was/is targeting the Complainant or its trademarks, whether now or at the time that the Respondent registered or acquired the disputed Domain Name. See Section 3.3 “Targeting” of UDRP Perspectives: “(t)he key to demonstrating bad faith registration is “targeting”. Accordingly, the Complainant would also have failed to establish the third element.
RDNH: This Panel makes a finding of RDNH against the Complainant. The Complainant, especially since it is legally represented, should have been aware that this Complaint could not have reasonably succeeded. The Complainant largely relies on bare assertions without supporting evidence. In particular, the Complainant should have been well aware of the descriptive nature of the “FIN” term and that the evidential threshold is higher for all three elements, yet the Complainant has produced scant evidence.
Complaint Denied (RDNH)
Complainant’s Counsel: James A. Italia of Italia IP, Inc., USA
Respondent’s Counsel: Sushila Chanana of Farella Braun + Martel LLP, USA
Case Comment by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch: With this case in combination with the above Etihad case, we are seeing a welcome trend of little patience amongst panelists for cases bereft of evidence of targeting. As discussed above and also in the present decision, targeting is the essence of bad faith.
Principality of Monaco Loses Attempt to Grab Monaco Domain Name
MARQUES DE L’ETAT DE MONACO (dba MONACO BRANDS) v. Redacted, CAC Case No. CAC-UDRP-108171
<monaco .com>
Panelists: Mr. Assen Alexiev, Mr. Igor Motsnyi, and Ms. Dawn Osborne
Brief Facts: The Complainant is a Monegasque public limited company whose stated purpose is to protect, value and defend the trademarks, trade names and the image of “MONACO” and “MONTE-CARLO”. The Complainant is the owner of a number of trademark registrations for MONACO, including the Monaco registration (14 July 2010); International registrations (1 December 2010 and 18 June 2014). The Complainant is also the owner of the United States trademarks, in which the “MONACO” element is disclaimed, earliest registered on August 10, 2021. The Panel notes that at the time of issuance of the present decision there are many live trademark registrations owned by third parties that include “MONACO” and are valid in the European Union or in the United States. The disputed Domain Name was initially registered on 6 July 1995 by the entity Monaco Enterprises Inc., established in 1971 in the United States by the late Mr. Eugene Monaco. After Mr. Monaco passed away, the disputed Domain Name was inherited by his daughter, Ms. Noelle Barno. After her divorce in 2024, Ms. Barno resumed the use of her maiden surname Monaco. In 2024, the disputed Domain Name resolved to a parking webpage with varying content, including pay-per-click links to credit card or banking matters, pain relief, travel and tourism.
On 20 September 2024, the Complainant contacted by e-mail Ms Barno with an offer to acquire it for a price that covered the out-of-pocket costs for it. In early 2025, Ms. Monaco engaged a broker for the sale of the disputed Domain Name, who distributed an e-mail message to numerous recipients including the Complainant with the title “Exclusive Opportunity: Acquire Monaco .com – A Prestigious Geodomain”. With a Domain Name Purchase and Sale Agreement dated 19 September 2025, Ms. Monaco sold the disputed Domain Name to a US entity Irwin Inc. To secure the payment of the agreed price for the disputed Domain Name, the Seller and the Buyer engaged an escrow agent through an Escrow Agreement dated 23 September 2025. Since a portion of the purchase price has not been paid by the date of issuance of the present decision, the disputed Domain Name is still being held by the Escrow Agent, i.e. the Respondent. The disputed Domain Name currently resolves to a landing webpage with the text “Your Next Generation Revenue Platform”. It has mail-exchange (“MX”) records enabled. The Complainant alleges that the Complainant states that it is impossible to consider any legitimate use of the disputed Domain Name, and that it is highly probable that it was created to send scam e-mails to the Complainant’s clients.
The Complainant further alleges that given the distinctiveness and reputation of the MONACO trademark and the image of the Principality of Monaco, it is inconceivable that the Respondent could have acquired the disputed Domain Name without actual knowledge of Monaco and of the Complainant’s rights in the MONACO trademark. The Response in this proceeding was filed by the Buyer of the disputed Domain Name, who contends that the present dispute involves an asset that has been in the Monaco family for two generations, and which was recently sold to a start-up business having nothing to do with any goods or services in which the Complainant has trademark rights. The Buyer further submits that it is preparing to launch a sales automation and customer relationship management platform and that it has raised millions of U.S. dollars from investors, hired more than 30 employees, and spent several hundred thousand U.S. dollars on preparations for its planned launch and its current operations conducted in stealth mode. The Buyer further adds that the Complainant’s allegations concerning sale of the disputed Domain Name do not show bad faith, because Ms. Monaco was entitled to sell this business asset to whomever she pleased on any terms she might find acceptable.
Held: The Complainant has, to the satisfaction of the Panel, shown the disputed Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights (within the meaning of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy). The Panel takes note of the argument raised in the Response that the United States trademark registrations of the Complainant’s trademark disclaim their “MONACO” element. Nevertheless, the Complainant has provided evidence and has thus established that it has rights in a number of registrations of MONACO as a word trademark without a disclaimer.
The Response includes evidence that the disputed Domain Name has been registered, owned and used by two generations of people bearing the surname Monaco in the United States, and that on 19 September 2025, the then owner of the disputed Domain Name – Ms. Noelle Monaco (the Seller), entered into a yet uncompleted sales transaction for the disputed Domain Name with the Buyer. This evidence leads to the conclusion that Ms. Monaco, being commonly known by an identical name, has rights and legitimate interests in it the disputed Domain Name pursuant to Paragraph 4(c)(ii) of the Policy (although she is not a party to the present proceeding). Further, the Response includes evidence that before notice of the present dispute the Buyer has started preparations for use of the brand MONACO for its planned sales automation and customer relationship management platform, has made arrangements related to the launch of this platform and has attracted millions of US Dollars of investments for it. There is no evidence of targeting of the Complainant by the Buyer, and, as discussed, the Complainant’s trademark registrations in the United States disclaim their “MONACO” element. This leads the Panel to the conclusion that before any notice of the dispute to it, the Buyer has carried out demonstrable preparations to use the disputed Domain Name and the trade name MONACO, which corresponds to the disputed Domain Name, in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services.
The evidence in the case shows that the Respondent became the transferee of the disputed Domain Name in performance of its function of a licensed Escrow Agent holding the disputed Domain Name in trust for the benefit of the Buyer and the Seller, and it is obligated to transfer the disputed Domain Name to the Buyer or to the Seller depending on the occurrence of specific circumstances detailed in the Escrow Agreement. Therefore, the Respondent is legitimately acting for the benefit of third parties, and there is nothing to suggest that it may be doing so in bad faith. Further, the Buyer cannot be held responsible for any events related to the disputed Domain Name that have taken place prior to the conclusion of the purchase agreement for the disputed Domain Name on 19 September 2025. Considering also that the Buyer has demonstrated its preparations to use the disputed Domain Name in relation to a bona fide activity prior to the notice of the dispute and that there is no evidence of targeting of the Complainant, there is no basis for a finding that the Buyer has acted in bad faith either. For completeness, and although the Seller Ms. Monaco is not a party to the present proceeding, the Panel observes that there is also no basis for a finding of bad faith in respect of her, as she has rights and legitimate interests, and since she was free to use the disputed Domain Name for any legitimate commercial or other activities, as well as to offer it for sale at any price.
RDNH: There is no basis for a finding that the Complainant knew that it could not succeed as to any of the required three elements, or that the Complainant ought to have known it could not succeed under any fair interpretation of facts reasonably available prior to the filing of the Complaint.
There is no evidence showing that prior to the filing of the Response, the Complainant knew about the sale transaction for the disputed Domain Name in September 2025 between the Seller and the Buyer and about the participation of the Respondent in this transaction as an Escrow Agent, so it may have misunderstood who was behind the use of the disputed Domain Name prior to this transaction and the offer for sale in early 2025.
There is also no evidence showing that prior to the filing of the Response the Complainant may have known about the plans of the Buyer to use the disputed Domain Name for its bona fide business and its preparations to do so. In view of the above, the Panel concludes that a finding of RDNH against the Complainant is not warranted.
Complaint Denied
Complainant’s Counsel: TAYER Avocat
Respondent’s Counsel: Dr. John Berryhill (John B. Berryhill LLC)
Case Comment by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch: This was a particularly complex but interesting case. For more on this case see “Government of Monaco Loses Cybersquatting Case Against Monaco.com” in Domain Name Wire (January 29, 2026). By happenstance, I wrote about the prospect of a Monaco .com UDRP dispute back some ten years ago in “Monaco: No You Can’t Trademark a Country Name”.
AI Domain Name Registered for Its Descriptive Meaning
Goto Technologies USA, LLC v. Domain Admin, Reg .AI, WIPO Case No. DAI2025-0061
<logmein .ai>
Panelist: Mr. Robert A. Badgley
Brief Facts: The Complainant claims to be a global provider of software and software-as-a-service (‘SaaS’) for cloud-based tools for remote collaboration and IT management, having online presence at <logmein .com>. The Complainant claims to own the well-known LOGMEIN trademark. Since April 2004, the Complainant and its predecessors have continuously used the LOGMEIN trademark in connection with software and cloud-based remote work tools for collaboration and IT management. The Respondent acquired the Domain Name on September 4, 2023 and is available for sale at the price of USD $26,999. The Respondent asserts, “The phrase ‘log me in’ is plainly descriptive of authentication functionality” and he acquired the Domain Name for the development of an AI-powered browser automation and authentication tool. Annexed to the Response are documents and screenshots appearing to corroborate Respondent’s alleged efforts to develop its business plan.
The Complainant alleges that the “Respondent has not offered any bona fide goods or services under the Domain or a name corresponding to the Domain. Instead, the Domain resolves to a webpage offering the Domain for sale […], along with over 530 domains, including other well-known third-party trademarks. The Respondent does not deny that it holds a portfolio of domain names and is in the business of domain name transactions. The Respondent contends that though it registered the Domain Name without knowledge of Complainant’s LOGMEIN mark, and did so because “log me in” is a known phrase associated with the basics of Complainant’s business idea. According to Respondent’s principal, he spent several months trying to develop the business, and these good faith demonstrable preparations to make a bona fide offering of services constitute a legitimate interest in the Domain Name within the meaning of the Policy.
Held: The Panel concludes, on the record provided, that the Complainant has failed to establish that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. There is enough plausible evidence in the record that the Respondent registered the Domain Name for its descriptive value (“log me in”). The Respondent may overstate the extent to which “log me in” is an accepted phrase, but Complainant’s assertion that “log me in” has no currency as an expression and must refer only to the Complainant and its registered trademark strikes the Panel as equally unavailing. Because the ultimate burden of proof rests with the Complainant on this issue, the Panel concludes that the Complainant has failed to carry that burden. The Complaint fails.
RDNH: On the record presented, the Panel declines to make an RDNH finding against the Complainant. At the time the Complaint was filed, the Complainant had an established trademark that had enjoyed a measure of renown and which was identical to the Domain Name. Moreover, as far as the Complainant was aware, the Respondent owned a number of domain names corresponding to well-known trademarks and was offering them for sale at prices high enough to support the suspicion that the Respondent was engaged in cybersquatting. In the Parties’ September 30, 2025 email exchange, the Respondent articulated his reasons for registering the Domain Name, but did not provide corroborating evidence of his demonstrable preparations to develop his business. Had he done so, the outcome on the RDNH issue might have been different. In sum, this case does not warrant a finding of RDNH.
Complaint Denied
Complainant’s Counsel: Day Pitney LLP, United States
Respondent’s Counsel: Internally Represented
Panel: Complaint Was Poorly Researched and Reasoned
<nationalwillregistry .com>
Panelist: Mr. W. Scott Blackmer
Brief Facts: The Complainant, since 1996, claims to have continuously operated as a national will registration and document storage platform. The Complainant did not specifically address it but provides evidence that it was established in May 2013, dissolved in September 2019, and reestablished in January 2020. The earliest domain names were registered on December 10, 2011. The Complainant owns rights in a U.S. trademark registered on August 19, 2025, for the composite mark and disclaims any exclusive right to the terms “THE U.S. WILL REGISTRY.” The disputed Domain Name was created on January 14, 2012. As per the Archives, the disputed Domain Name was used for a website advertising “National Will Registry” services to create and store wills from 2013 through early 2022, but it appears that this website was operated not by Mr. Ryke but by a company based in the State of California, with Mike Nicholas as CEO.
The Complainant alleges that the Respondent acted in bad faith, as the disputed Domain Name “remained inactive for several years” until early 2025, after the Complainant’s “national growth following its 2024 launch of an Online Will Program”. The Respondent argues that the Complainant fails to show bad faith at the time of the registration of the disputed Domain Name, contending that there is no evidence that the Complainant was using the mark at that time. The Response nowhere states that Mr. Ryke was the original registrant but claims only that “[t]his domain name was registered several years ago as a descriptive term, for expansion into national-scale will registry and document storage services …”. The Respondent also points out that the Complainant filed an application to register THE U.S. WILL REGISTRY as a word mark on June 18, 2014 (claiming use since January 1, 2014), which was abandoned on March 31, 2015.
Noting that the US trademark registration claimed by the Complainant as grounds for the Complaint is not in the name of the Complainant, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 1 calling on the Complainant to furnish documentation concerning its interest in the trademark and allowing the Respondent to reply. In response to the Procedural Order, the Complainant furnished a copy of a recent (December 24, 2025) filing with the State of Florida, registering THE US WILL REGISTRY as a fictitious name for five years. The Complainant also acknowledged an “administrative error” in registering the composite trademark under an incorrect name and attached a copy of its Correction Request to the USPTO (dated December 24, 2025). Commenting on the Complainant’s supplemental filings, the Respondent insists on the descriptive nature of the disputed Domain Name, which is clearly relevant to both of their business models but which pre-dates the Complainant’s online offerings.
Held: The Complainant’s case would clearly fail if the Respondent were the original registrant of the disputed Domain Name in 2012, as the Complainant was not formed until 2013 and does not establish evidence of using the registered composite mark online until 2017. But the historical screenshots suggest that while the Respondent may have had the idea “10 years ago”, it did not acquire the disputed Domain Name before 2022 at the earliest, because it was still being used by a third party for a similar service. The Panel finds it significant that the Respondent, a lawyer represented by experienced counsel, never expressly states when the Respondent acquired the disputed Domain Name, even while emphasizing that “the Complainant was not using its mark on the Internet at the time when the Respondent registered his domain.”
Further, the Respondent’s denial of prior awareness cannot simply be taken at face value, given that the Complainant was in fact online at <theuswillregistry .org> by 2017. Nevertheless, with the burden of proof resting on the Complainant, the Panel is unable to find that the Respondent more likely than did not acquire the disputed Domain Name for its descriptive sense rather than in an effort to target the Complainant’s mark, which was not yet established at that time. The Panel notes the USPTO had rejected the Complainant’s word-mark application as inherently descriptive, and when the Respondent likely acquired the Domain Name there was no trademark application for the composite mark. That registration later disclaimed the textual element due to its descriptiveness. The Respondent had his own, quite different, figurative logo and used the word “national” rather than “U.S.” to modify “will registry”.
RDNH: The Panel does not find that the Complaint has been brought in bad faith and constitutes an attempt at Reverse Domain Name Hijacking. The Complaint was poorly researched and reasoned, considering that the Complainant did not assure itself or the Panel that it properly identified the ownership of the relevant trademark and its use over time and did not adequately investigate the potential interests of a party that had been operating an apparently legitimate business with the disputed Domain Name for a substantial period of time. However, as a matter of equity, the Panel also takes account of the Respondent’s apparent equivocation concerning the timing of his acquisition of the disputed Domain Name, which is relevant to the issue of bad faith. In these circumstances, the Panel declines to enter a finding of RDNH.
Complaint Denied
Complainant’s Counsel: Internally represented
Respondent’s Counsel: Soti Law Associates, India
Ankur Raheja is the Editor-in-Chief of the ICA’s new weekly UDRP Case Summary service. Ankur has practiced law in India since 2005 and has been practicing domain name law for over ten years, representing clients from all over the world in UDRP proceedings. He is the founder of Cylaw Solutions.
He is an accredited panelist with ADNDRC (Hong Kong) and MFSD (Italy). Previously, Ankur worked as an Arbitrator/Panelist with .IN Registry for six years. In a advisory capacity, he has worked with NIXI/.IN Registry and Net4 India’s resolution professional.