Once Answered, a Complaint Cannot Simply Be Taken Back
The sequence of events here is tight. The Response was filed on September 24, 2026, more than two weeks ahead of the due date. The next day, the Complainant wrote to the Center asking that the proceeding be terminated. The Center invited the Respondent’s comments, and the Respondent objected and asked that the proceeding continue to a decision, later confirming that the Response as filed was his final and complete submission. Once appointed, the Panel refused the termination request, denied the Complaint and declared RDNH. Continue reading commentary here.
We hope you will enjoy this edition of the Digest (vol. 6.44) as we review these noteworthy recent decisions with expert commentary. (We invite guest commenters to contact us):
‣ Once Answered, a Complaint Cannot Simply Be Taken Back (menaspeakers.com *with commentary)
‣ Related-Party Transfer Is Not a New Registration; Panel Declines RDNH in “Borderline” Case Over ARATA.AI (arata.ai *with commentary)
‣ Lookalike Site Copying the Official Store and Selling Infringing Goods Is Ordered Transferred (dollyparton.shop *with commentary)
‣ Chronological Barrier Defeats Self-Represented Complainant (mydpboss.com *with commentary)
‣ Contractor’s Surname-Based Domain and Genuine Construction Business Defeat BROSCO Complaint (broscoconstruction.com *with commentary)
Once Answered, a Complaint Cannot Simply Be Taken Back
MENA SPEAKERS L.L.C v. TALAL ABDULKARIM, WIPO Case No. D2026-3650
<menaspeakers.com>
Panelist: Mr. Assen Alexiev
Brief Facts: The Complainant is a Middle East-based regional agency specialising in keynote speaker and corporate trainer representation, speaker management, and event protocol services. The Complainant operates its official website at the domain name <mena-speakers.com>, registered on March 16, 2014. The Complainant is the owner of various trademark registrations for the “MENA SPEAKERS trademark,” including the Saudi Arabian trademark (November 6, 2023); the United Arab Emirates trademark (March 6, 2024); and the Qatari trademark (May 22, 2024). On October 15, 2020, the Complainant filed a U.S. trademark application for MENA SPEAKERS, which was refused and subsequently abandoned. The disputed Domain Name was registered on August 15, 2010 and currently resolves to a website that promotes the speakers bureau services of “MENA Speakers Bureau.” The website features 31 speakers on different topics, one of which is the Respondent, described as a “global business luminary and strategic innovator”, and “an esteemed global entrepreneur with a rich career spanning over 30 years, marked by significant leadership roles at top-tier organizations like Intel, Xerox, and Al-Jazeera.”
The Complainant alleges that the Respondent’s own written communications show that he was aware of the Complainant’s brand since at least 2018, that he made an explicit written offer to sell the disputed Domain Name for the price of USD $33,500, that he intended to replicate the Complainant’s specific business model, and that he engaged in a sustained pattern of brand impersonation, client interference, and website mirroring spanning eight years. The Respondent points out that the Complainant was established in 2016 and its trademarks were registered in 2023 and 2024, while the disputed Domain Name was registered in 2010. The Respondent contends that in August 2010, he was working with the MENA Smart Management Consultancy (“MENA Smart”) – a Dubai management consultancy, and that he registered the disputed Domain Name and the earlier domain name for the purposes of this entity, and set the disputed Domain Name to redirect to the other domain name. The Respondent further contends that in English-speaking countries, “MENA” is a common acronym for “Middle East and North Africa”, and its combination with the dictionary word “speakers” makes it a descriptive reference to speakers from the MENA region.
Procedural Issue: After the filing of the Response, the Complainant requested the termination of the proceeding with prejudice. The Respondent objected to the termination and requested the continuation of the proceeding. The Panel considers that the Respondent, who has retained specialised counsel and has been put to the expense of preparing a Response, is entitled to receive a decision on the merits of this case. A termination of the proceeding, even with prejudice, would leave the Complainant’s allegations without an answer, and would not provide the Respondent with the legal certainty that any party wrongly and publicly accused of improper conduct deserves. Therefore, the Panel denies the Complainant’s termination request and proceeds to a determination on the merits.
Held: As noted by the Respondent, “MENA” is a commonly-used acronym, and its combination in the disputed Domain Name with “speakers” means “speakers from or on subject matters related to the Middle East and North Africa”. This meaning led the USPTO to refuse registration of the Complainant’s “MENA SPEAKERS” trademark application in the United States as merely descriptive. The Respondent has provided evidence that in 2010 and 2011 he was involved with the entity MENA Smart, that the activities of this entity included public speaking training, media and communication management and public relations, and that the domain name was used for the purposes of this entity. All this taken together leads the Panel to the conclusion that, prior to the establishment of the Complainant and the commencement of its activities, prior to the registration of the Complainant’s trademark, and prior to receiving notice of the dispute, the Respondent has used the disputed Domain Name for a bona fide offering of services related to its ordinary meaning. It continues to do so at the moment. The Respondent therefore has rights and legitimate interests in the disputed Domain Name under paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy.
The Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name in 2010 and started using it to redirect to the domain name in 2011, while the Complainant started its activities in 2016 and registered the MENA SPEAKERS trademark only in 2023-2024. In this situation, the Respondent could not have targeted the then non-existent Complainant with the registration of the disputed Domain Name. The correspondence between the parties submitted by the Complainant also shows that, rather than attempting to benefit from the confusion created by the similarity between the disputed Domain Name and the Complainant’s domain name <mena-speakers.com>, the Respondent on numerous occasions forwarded to the Complainant the correspondence that was mistakenly sent to him. The Respondent cannot be blamed for such confusion since the Complainant adopted the name MENA Speakers and registered its domain name four years after the Respondent had registered the disputed Domain Name, so it must have been aware of this registration and of the risks of confusion at the time. The Panel finds the third element of the Policy has not been established.
RDNH: It is also well accepted that for an RDNH finding to be made, it is not necessary for a respondent to seek such finding or prove the presence of conduct constituting RDNH. The fact that the disputed Domain Name was registered in 2010 was known to the Complainant when it filed the Complaint, and the evidence submitted by the Complainant shows that on June 7, 2023, the Respondent informed it that “[…] my company is registered since 2008 and that we have been all that time on the same name. I believe that your company has taken over the name from us otherwise you would have reserved menaspeakers.com. […]” This must have alerted the Complainant that there could not have been a bad faith registration of the disputed Domain Name under the Policy and that the Complaint could not succeed.
The Complainant however filed its Complaint, where it disregarded completely the Respondent’s statement and the timing of the registration of the disputed Domain Name. Notably, the Complaint did not address the issue of registration in bad faith at all, although it must have been clear to the Complainant that this issue cannot be circumvented. The Complainant went further. It did not disclose to the Panel the material fact that its United States trademark application for MENA SPEAKERS had been refused for mere descriptiveness and that it had not filed any response to the refusal and had abandoned the application. The Complainant was therefore well aware of the weakness of its trademark, but nevertheless filed its Complaint and attempted to hide this material evidence from the Panel. The Panel therefore finds that the Complaint has been brought in bad faith and constitutes an attempt at Reverse Domain Name Hijacking.
Complaint Denied (RDNH)
Complainant’s Counsel: Internally represented
Respondent’s Counsel: John Berryhill, Ph.D., Esq., United States
Commentary by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
The sequence of events here is tight. The Response was filed on September 24, 2026, more than two weeks ahead of the due date. The next day, the Complainant wrote to the Center asking that the proceeding be terminated. The Center invited the Respondent’s comments, and the Respondent objected and asked that the proceeding continue to a decision, later confirming that the Response as filed was his final and complete submission. Once appointed, the Panel refused the termination request, denied the Complaint and declared RDNH.
Nothing in the Rules entitles a complainant to withdraw at will once a response is on file. Paragraph 17(a) of the Rules directs a panel to terminate where the parties agree to settle. Paragraph 17(b) directs termination where it becomes unnecessary or impossible to continue, but only “unless a Party raises justifiable grounds for objection”. A respondent who has retained counsel, answered the Complaint and asked for a ruling has such grounds. The Panel put it this way:
“The Panel considers that the Respondent, who has retained specialised counsel and has been put to the expense of preparing a Response, is entitled to receive a decision on the merits of this case. A termination of the proceeding, even with prejudice, would leave the Complainant’s allegations without an answer, and would not provide the Respondent with the legal certainty that any party wrongly and publicly accused of improper conduct deserves.”
That reasoning follows Gstaad Saanenland Tourismus v. Domain Administrator, PrivacyGuardian.org / Dimitri Dimitriadis, WIPO Case No. D2016-2601, where the panel declined to let a complainant withdraw over the respondent’s objection, and Comind Technologies Limited v. Mikael Yan, WIPO Case No. D2026-2684, discussed in Vol. 6.41 of this Digest, where the panel held that absent agreement between the parties a complainant should not be allowed to withdraw unilaterally after a response, especially in the face of an express objection. As UDRP Perspectives, §0.4 (Withdrawal After a Response is Filed) explains, once a response has been filed a respondent may have a valid objection to a unilateral request to terminate, particularly where the respondent wants an adjudication on the merits.
The offer to terminate “with prejudice” deserves a word. Termination with prejudice protects a respondent from a refiled complaint, and some respondents will take it and be glad of the time saved. It is the respondent’s choice to make, not the complainant’s. What it does not provide is a finding. The Response had raised the 2010 registration date, the descriptive meaning of “MENA speakers” and the undisclosed USPTO refusal, and the Respondent wanted those points answered. The decision gave him what a termination could not: a finding of rights and legitimate interests under paragraph 4(c)(i), a finding that the Complaint had not addressed bad faith registration at all, and a declaration of RDNH founded in part on the Panel’s conclusion that the Complainant had withheld the refused and abandoned United States application from the Panel.
The timing raises an obvious question, which the Panel did not need to answer, as to whether the termination request was prompted by the Response itself. Whatever the reason, the decision to file is the one that counts. Once a respondent has answered and objects, the proceeding belongs to the panel, and the complainant’s remaining options are to settle with the respondent under paragraph 17(a) or to see the case through to a decision. This Respondent stood on his Response, asked for a decision, and obtained the RDNH declaration that a withdrawal with prejudice would have foreclosed.
Related-Party Transfer Is Not a New Registration; Panel Declines RDNH in “Borderline” Case Over ARATA.AI
Arata AI Inc. v. Arata, LLC, Peng Bo, SAHO Inc., WIPO Case No. DAI2026-0077
<arata.ai>
Panelist: Mr. Pablo A. Palazzi
Brief Facts: The Complainant, a Delaware corporation incorporated on March 20, 2025, develops and provides artificial intelligence software and software-as-a-service (SaaS) solutions for technical bid evaluation, as well as related AI consulting services. It owns the U.S. registration for ARATA AI, filed on March 30, 2025, and registered on April 14, 2026, and claims use since at least March 13, 2025. The disputed Domain Name was created on April 7, 2024. The Respondents are Arata, LLC, a Delaware LLC formed on April 30, 2025, Peng Bo, an individual in Osaka, Japan, and SAHO Inc., a Japanese company in Osaka. The Respondents filed a Japanese application for ARATA.AI on April 15, 2024; the application was refused on August 22, 2025. From at least March 27, 2025, the Domain Name hosted a waitlist page for an “In Development” AI product and later presented Arata, LLC as an “AI software company.” The Domain Name was transferred to Cloudflare Registrar in July 2025. The Complainant offered USD $2,000 for the Domain Name, while the Respondents requested USD $30,000.
The Complainant alleges that the 2025 changes amount to a new registration, and relies on the USD $30,000 demand and evidence of actual confusion. The Complainant further alleges that, because the Respondents state that their software project “has never been commercially released” and have failed to produce the referenced GitHub repository or other dated records documenting its development, there is no evidence of a bona fide offering of goods or services or of demonstrable preparations before notice of the dispute. The Respondent contends that he first became aware of the Complainant through its email of May 21, 2026, and relies on GitHub commits as evidence that the project had been under continuous development before receiving notice. The Respondent further contends that the trademark filings, company records, development records, and website captures demonstrate preparations to use the disputed Domain Name before notice. The Respondents add that, under paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy, such preparations do not require a commercial launch (WIPO Overview 3.1, section 2.2).
Held: The Panel acknowledges that the Respondents have not fully explained the rationale for the several changes in corporate vehicles and registration details in the WhoIs of the disputed Domain Name over a period of roughly two years, including the formation and dissolution of a Wyoming entity within a few months. These changes are, however, corroborated by the evidence on record. There is no evidence that any of these changes was intended to mask a change of control, to obtain the benefit of an earlier registration date, or to take advantage of the Complainant’s mark, see HIGHLEVEL Inc. v. Domain Administrator, Weedmaps, Ghost Management Group, Inc, WIPO Case No. D2025-2991. When the disputed Domain Name was registered, the Complainant did not exist, held no registered or unregistered rights in ARATA AI, and had not used the name in commerce. Therefore, there was no bad faith at the time of registration because the Respondents could not have targeted a company or a mark that had not yet come into being.
In addition, the record does not suggest that the Respondents registered the disputed Domain Name to anticipate and take advantage of nascent rights of the Complainant. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 3.8.2. The Panel considers that the filing of the Japanese trademark application is contemporaneous evidence supporting the Respondents’ good faith. It also shows a clear intention, from the outset, to develop a project under the ARATA.AI name, even though that project did not, for other reasons, lead to a product launched under that name. The Panel also considers the Respondents’ July 5, 2026 offer to transfer the disputed Domain Name to the Complainant for USD $30,000, made only in response to the Complainant’s unsolicited offers of USD $2,000. There is no evidence that the domain name was offered for sale to the public or the Complainant before that exchange. A price quoted in response to a purchase approach more than two years after a good-faith registration does not establish registration primarily for resale under paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy.
RDNH (declined): The factors favoring the Complainant are that the Respondents do not answer a July 8, 2026 letter, that their proof of continuous possession comes only with the Response and later filings, and that the registrant changes in the pre-complaint record could reasonably raise doubts as to whether the disputed Domain Name had remained in the same hands. The factors favoring the Respondents are that the Complainant is represented by counsel, the Domain Name’s April 2024 creation date is public, and the Respondents’ Japanese application for ARATA.AI was published in April 2024. The Complainant also corrects some of its earlier statements in its Supplemental Filing, which the Panel treats as candor.
The Panel considers this to be a borderline case and relies on HIGHLEVEL, noting that the Complainant has evidence of actual confusion and is not acting primarily to harass. In these circumstances, although the Complainant would have been well advised to scrutinize more closely the registration history of the disputed Domain Name via available online tools and the information the Respondents had provided before filing, the Panel is not persuaded that the Complainant knew, or clearly should have known, that it could not succeed under the Policy.
Complaint Denied
Complainant’s Counsel: Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads LLP, United States
Respondent’s Counsel: Self-represented
Commentary by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
The Domain Name was created in April 2024, but the registrar changed in July 2025, the registrant of record became a Delaware company formed in April 2025, and the registrant later reverted to a Japanese company. Each of those events postdated the Complainant’s first use of its mark in March 2025. On the familiar principle that a transfer to an unrelated party is treated as a new registration, the Complainant asked the Panel to fix the relevant date in July 2025 and to find bad faith on that footing.
The Panel declined, and the reason is the point of this comment. What matters is not whether the name on the WhoIs changed, but whether control did. The Respondent showed that the Domain Name was registered through an account linked to a Japanese company he wholly owned, that his own Cloudflare account was managing its DNS and email routing within four months, and that the later registrant entries in his personal name, in the Japanese company’s name and in the Delaware company’s name were all vehicles he owned and controlled. The registrar change was a change of registrar, not a change of hands. The Panel put it simply:
“The Panel is of the view that a domain name holder is free to hold a domain name personally or through companies under its control, and this appears to be what Mr. Peng Bo did.”
That is the right frame. The Policy is concerned with abusive registration, and the “new registration” rule exists because a stranger who acquires a domain name makes a fresh decision to hold it, and that decision can be made with a complainant’s mark in mind. Where the beneficial owner never changes, no such decision is made. Moving a domain name from one’s personal name to one’s company, or between two companies under common ownership, is a change of hat, not a new registration. The Panel treated HIGHLEVEL Inc. v. Domain Administrator, Weedmaps, Ghost Management Group, Inc, WIPO Case No. D2025-2991, where a domain name passed from an individual to an affiliated company, as the comparable case, and noted that the present facts were stronger still because no transfer to a different holder had been shown at all. The analysis is consistent with the approach taken to a transferee stepping into the shoes of the original registrant, discussed in an earlier edition of this Digest on <capte.com>, where continuity of control and purpose was the test. Here continuity was not inherited. It was never interrupted.
Two features of the reasoning deserve attention. First, the Panel did not require the Respondent to justify every corporate step. It acknowledged that the Respondent had not fully explained the formation and dissolution of a Wyoming entity within a few months, or the successive changes in the registrant of record over two years. What mattered was that the changes were corroborated by the evidence, that there was no indication they were intended to mask a change of control or to borrow an earlier registration date, and that they were consistent with a project documented before the Complainant existed, most notably a Japanese trademark application for ARATA.AI filed eight days after the Domain Name was registered. Second, the Panel treated the Respondent’s later decision to market the product under a different name as a business decision that did not alter the character of a registration made in good faith.
Continuity of beneficial ownership is a fact, and the records that prove it are almost always in the respondent’s hands alone. Here they consisted of a registrar order confirmation, DNS provider logs, business banking notices, and Japanese corporate documents, produced for the first time with the Response and in part only with the Reply. As UDRP Perspectives, §0.16 (Determining the Date of Registration) explains, the creation date is not usually the registration date of the current registrant, complainants must still make the effort to investigate registration dates by compiling circumstantial evidence such as a change of use or a change of registrar, and respondents should be clear and forthcoming on their registration date and should be expected to furnish evidence of it, such as a registration or transfer receipt. The Respondent’s pre-complaint email asserted the 2024 date but supplied nothing to support it, and the Panel counted that against the RDNH request. A registrant who holds a domain name through several vehicles would do well to keep the chain documented and to produce it when first challenged.
Lookalike Site Copying the Official Store and Selling Infringing Goods Is Ordered Transferred
ESTATE OF DOLLY PARTON v. Mark W. Larson, Forum Claim No. FA2609002246131
<dollyparton.shop>
Panelist: Mr. Héctor Ariel Manoff
Brief Facts: The Complainant is the Estate of Dolly Parton, whose trademark DOLLY PARTON has been used in interstate commerce in the United States since as early as 1974, in connection with the sale of merchandise bearing her trademarks through a wide variety of retail outlets and her official website. The Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name in August 2026. The resolving website is nearly a mirror image of the Complainant’s official website and uses copyright-protected images to deceive unsuspecting consumers. The Complainant alleges that the disputed Domain Name resolves to a website that attempts to sell infringing goods, which does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods and services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. It further alleges that the disputed Domain Name was registered and is used in bad faith. The Respondent did not file a Response.
Held: The Panel finds that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed Domain Name because the Complainant has not authorized the Respondent to use the DOLLY PARTON mark. The Respondent is mentioned as Mark W. Larson and the Respondent has not submitted evidence to the contrary. Thus, the Panel concludes that the Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed Domain Name per Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). Further, the Respondent has neither filed a response nor submitted evidence to prove that the Respondent has any trademark rights on the disputed Domain Name. The evidence submitted by the Complainant shows that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain <dollyparton.shop> is not a bona fide offering of goods. The Respondent’s website mimics Complainant’s official website and uses copyright protected images from Complainant’s official website to try to sell identical goods. This Panel agrees with the Complainant that the Respondent is not using the domain name in connection with a legitimate noncommercial use or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).
The domain registration by the Respondent was done in August 2026 and, more than 30 years after Complainant’s registration and first use of the trademark DOLLY PARTON. The Panel finds that the registration of the domain name was done with Complainant’s marks in mind since it was registered by including the exact mark along with the gTLD “.shop”. In the Panel’s point of view the cited facts, which were neither responded nor refuted by the Respondent, are sufficient evidence to support that the registration of the domain name was registered in bad faith. In addition, this Panel finds that the use of the domain name was done in bad faith too. The Complainant has submitted evidence to prove that the domain name is used to impersonate the Complainant. This Panel concludes that the Respondent has registered the domain names with the intent to attract and divert Internet users to the corresponding websites for its own benefit.
Transfer
Complainant’s Counsel: Willmore F. Holbrow, Buchalter LLP, United States
Respondent’s Counsel: No Response
Commentary by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
Dolly Parton died on August 25, 2026. The disputed domain name was registered that same month, resolved to a near copy of her official online store, and the Complaint was filed on September 18, 2026, less than four weeks after her death. The Policy was written for cases like this one. The death of a famous person draws opportunistic registrations within hours, and whatever the exact date here, a personal name combined with “.shop” and pointed at a cloned storefront leaves no room for an innocent explanation. The Panel appropriately ordered a transfer, and the whole proceeding, from filing to decision, took six weeks.
What stands out is how the Panel handled the default. The Respondent filed nothing, but the Panel did not treat silence as proof. It grounded each element in the record. The registrations in Annex 3 established rights in the mark, and the screenshots in Annex 5 showing the mirrored website carried both the second and third elements. The Panel also noted at the outset that it may deny relief where a complaint rests on conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. That is the approach UDRP Perspectives §0.8 (Inferences in No Response Cases) describes. Material allegations must be proven and not simply alleged, even where no response is filed, and the inferences a panel draws must be grounded in evidence rather than in the failure to respond alone. Here the evidence did the work, and the default added nothing the Complainant needed.
Chronological Barrier Defeats Self-Represented Complainant
IQBAL KHAN S/O ABDUL MAJEED v. SANJAY KUMAR JHA, WIPO Case No. D2026-4153
<mydpboss.com>
Panelist: Ms. Meera Chature Sankhari
Brief Facts: The Complainant, Iqbal Khan, is the registered proprietor of the Indian registrations for the DPBOSS trademarks, including a word mark dated April 15, 2023, and a device mark dated May 13, 2024. The disputed Domain Name was registered by the Respondent, Sanjay Kumar Jha, on June 14, 2021, with the registrar PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com. The disputed Domain Name is active and appears to provide an online gambling platform associated with “Satta Matka” gambling, through which the Respondent offers daily live and fast gambling results, along with self-proclaimed accurate charts, guessing tips, and lucky numbers to online gamblers. The disputed Domain Name displays the mark “MyDPBOSS,” which appears similar to the Complainant’s subsequently registered DPBOSS marks, along with advertisements for certain third-party adult apps.
The Complainant alleges that the Respondent is operating an unlawful online gambling website through the disputed Domain Name and is using it to create confusion in the minds of the public regarding an association, affiliation, sponsorship, or endorsement by the Complainant or its marks. The Respondent contends that registration of the disputed Domain Name predates the Complainant’s trademark rights in the DPBOSS marks by approximately three years and that it is legally impossible for the Respondent to have registered the disputed Domain Name in 2021 to target the Complainant’s trademarks, which did not exist before 2023. The Respondent further contends that there is a substantial mismatch between the class and nature of the trademarks and those of the disputed Domain Name, and that its online platform does not compete with or tarnish any physical security services of the Complainant.
Held: The Panel finds that the Respondent did not register the disputed Domain Name in bad faith targeting the Complainant or its trademark rights because the Complainant had no trademark rights at the time that the Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 3.8.1. The Panel notes that the disputed Domain Name was registered on June 14, 2021, approximately two years before the Complainant’s 2023 word mark registration and approximately three years before its 2024 device mark registration. The Panel notes that the Complainant’s trademark registrations postdate the registration of the disputed Domain Name and that nothing in the case file indicates that the Complainant had used the DPBOSS mark before June 14, 2021, or that the Respondent knew or could reasonably have known of the Complainant or any intended use of that mark when registering the disputed Domain Name.
The Panel makes the following observations, which have no bearing on its finding that the third element has not been established, based on the Complainant’s contentions, the documents submitted during the proceedings, and the website at the domain name <dpbosse.net>, which was transferred to the Complainant in Iqbal Khan v. Express Now, Venture Marketplace, WIPO Case No. D2026-2588. The Complainant’s trademark registrations cover a range of services, including, in class 45, security guard services, legal consultancy services, and Internet-based social networking services. The Complainant’s device mark and the “MyDPBOSS” branding on the Respondent’s website use a nearly identical pink color for the first two letters and black for the remaining letters. The Panel visited the Complainant’s website at “www.dpbosse.net” and observed that the services offered and the website’s look and feel were identical to those of the Respondent’s website.
RDNH: The disputed Domain Name was registered on June 14, 2021, before the Complainant obtained its trademark registrations for DPBOSS in 2023 and 2024. Nothing in the case file indicates that the Complainant had begun using the DPBOSS mark before the disputed Domain Name was registered, or that the Respondent knew or could have known of any intended use of the mark by the Complainant. The Complainant has neither explained nor alleged how the Respondent could have been aware of the Complainant, its business, or its claimed trademark rights at the time of registration, particularly given that those rights postdate the registration of the disputed Domain Name. The Panel finds that the Complaint has been brought in bad faith and constitutes an attempt at Reverse Domain Name Hijacking.
Complaint Denied (RDNH)
Complainant’s Counsel: Self-represented
Respondent’s Counsel: Self-represented
Commentary by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
The Complainant’s case rose and fell on two Indian registrations dated 2023 and 2024. The disputed domain name was registered in June 2021. On that timeline the result follows almost automatically. As UDRP Perspectives §3.2 (Trademark Rights Must Predate Domain Name Registration) explains, a respondent cannot have registered a domain name in bad faith before the complainant acquired rights in the corresponding mark, and the only exception is a registration made because of nascent rights, such as a trademark application or an announced rebrand. Nothing of that kind was alleged here.
But the more interesting question is one the Complainant never asked. A registration certificate records when the mark was registered, not when the mark was first used. If the Complainant had been operating under DPBOSS before June 2021, he may well have held unregistered rights that predated the domain name, and the case would have looked quite different. The Panel’s own observations suggest the question was a live one. It noted that the parties’ websites were identical in services, look and feel, that both used the same pink and black treatment of the name, and that the resemblance gave it some pause. Yet the Panel also found that nothing in the case file indicated any use of DPBOSS before the domain name was registered. The Complainant pleaded his registrations and stopped there.
That was fatal, and rightly so. Unregistered rights are a matter of evidence. As UDRP Perspectives §1.1 (Demonstrating Common Law Trademark Rights) and §1.2 (Establishing Secondary Meaning) describe, a complainant claiming them must show the duration and manner of use, sales, advertising and public recognition, and conclusory assertions will not do. A complainant who could have made that showing but did not has only himself to answer for.
Contractor’s Surname-Based Domain and Genuine Construction Business Defeat BROSCO Complaint
Boise Cascade Building Materials Distribution, L.L.C. v. Matthew Brossman, WIPO Case No. D2026-3837
<broscoconstruction.com>
Panelist: Mr. W. Scott Blackmer
Brief Facts: The Complainant is a Delaware limited liability company headquartered in Boise, Idaho, and a subsidiary of Boise Cascade, a North American wood products group. It owns U.S. Registration No. 3594231 for the composite mark BROSCO SINCE 1890, registered March 24, 2009 in Classes 6 and 19. It obtained the registration by assignment from Brockway-Smith Company on April 7, 2025, after Boise Cascade acquired Brockway-Smith in 2023. The Complaint does not describe its business or the use of this mark apart from conclusory statements, although the Panel noted a brosco.com website advertising windows, doors and millwork in three Maine cities, with archived versions dating to 1997. The Respondent, Matthew Brossman, has an Arizona postal address and registered the Domain Name on February 10, 2025. It resolves to a “BROSCO CONSTRUCTION” landing page with a contact form and an update sign-up option. Brosco Construction LLC was formed in Arizona on March 31, 2025, with Mr. Brossman as sole member, and has been a licensed Arizona general contractor since June 19, 2025.
The Complainant alleges that the Respondent is using the Complainant’s mark in bad faith to divert Internet traffic to its own site for commercial gain, targeting “the identical class of sophisticated commercial customers – developers, general contractors, and property owners – who specify, purchase, and install the very materials the Complainant distributes under the BROSCO Mark.” The Complainant argues that the Respondent had actual and constructive knowledge of the Complainant’s long-established BROSCO mark and no credible reason for choosing an identical domain name to market services in the same industry. The Respondent contends that “the disputed Domain Name does not interfere with traffic that is driven specifically to the complainant’s domain name of BROSCO or brosco.com. We do not operate in any way a website that allows commerce; it is only used for the exchange of information. It is our position that the use of the disputed Domain Name does not interfere with the Complainant’s sales, nor does it lead to any loss in revenue.”
Held: The Panel finds that, before receiving notice of the dispute, the Respondent used the disputed Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services under paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy. The Respondent’s website is not an e-commerce site used to advertise goods or accept orders and payments for them, but the Panel does not interpret the example in the Policy as being restricted to such use. Although the website has limited functionality and appears to have been created using a registrar’s website-construction tool, the Panel notes that its heading and copyright notice identify the Respondent as “Brosco Construction.” The website does not use “Brosco” alone or the Complainant’s BROSCO SINCE 1890 mark. The Panel further finds that the Respondent has been “commonly known” by the disputed Domain Name or a name corresponding to it within the meaning of paragraph 4(c)(ii) of the Policy.
The Complainant’s argument that the Respondent intentionally targeted its mark for commercial gain is based on the presumption that the Respondent had “actual and constructive knowledge” of the Complainant’s mark and saw value in targeting it because the Parties seek “the identical class of sophisticated customers.” In fact, the Respondent’s family name is “Brossman,” and he plausibly claims to have named his construction company “Brosco Construction LLC” with reference to that family name. There is no evidence on the record that the Respondent is a competitor of the Complainant. The evidence in the case file, as presented, does not indicate that the Respondent’s aim in registering the disputed Domain Name was to profit from or exploit the Complainant’s trademark. The Panel finds the third element of the Policy has not been established.
Complaint Denied
Complainant’s Counsel: Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, United States
Respondent’s Counsel: Self-represented
Commentary by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
This was never a clear-cut case of cybersquatting, and the Panel’s reasons show why. The Complainant holds a composite mark for BROSCO SINCE 1890, used for doors and millwork sold from three locations in Maine. The Respondent is Matthew Brossman, an Arizona general contractor whose company, Brosco Construction LLC, is registered with the state and licensed to build. The domain name is simply his company’s name. Once the Registrar disclosed who the registrant was, the Complainant had the obvious explanation for the domain name in front of it. It pressed on regardless, arguing that the Respondent had “actual and constructive knowledge” of the mark and no credible reason for choosing the name. The Panel found the surname explanation plausible, found no evidence that the parties compete, and denied the Complaint.
The Policy was built for a narrow class of disputes. As UDRP Perspectives §0.1 (Scope of the Policy) explains, it is designed for abusive registrations made with bad faith intent to profit from another’s mark, and disputes between competing legitimate interests are left to the courts. The Complainant’s own theory placed this case outside that class. Its argument was that the parties sell to the same class of commercial customers, so the Respondent must have known of the mark and must have chosen the name to trade on it. That is a likelihood of confusion argument presented as a targeting argument. As UDRP Perspectives §0.19 (Trademark Infringement) notes, infringement requires no intent while cybersquatting does, and a respondent who adopts a similar name for similar services may be infringing without cybersquatting at all. Whether their activities are close enough to confuse anyone is a question for a court. Whether Mr. Brossman set out to exploit a Maine millwork distributor when he named his Arizona contracting company is the only question the Policy asks, and the answer on this record was plainly no.
The reliance on constructive knowledge adds nothing. As UDRP Perspectives §3.4 (No Constructive Notice Under UDRP) explains, the concept has no place under the Policy. Bad faith requires actual knowledge of the complainant, because a registrant who is unaware of the trademark owner cannot sensibly be said to have targeted it. A complainant that falls back on constructive knowledge usually does so because actual knowledge cannot be shown, and a case that rests on the fallback is not a clear one.
Disclaimer: The facts are taken from the decisions themselves and have not been independently verified. The editors and publishers accept no responsibility for their accuracy.
Ankur Raheja is the Editor-in-Chief of the ICA’s new weekly UDRP Case Summary service. Ankur has practiced law in India since 2005 and has been practicing domain name law for over ten years, representing clients from all over the world in UDRP proceedings. He is the founder of Cylaw Solutions.
He is an accredited panelist with ADNDRC (Hong Kong) and MFSD (Italy). Previously, Ankur worked as an Arbitrator/Panelist with .IN Registry for six years. In a advisory capacity, he has worked with NIXI/.IN Registry and Net4 India’s resolution professional.