When Trademark Infringement Is Not Cybersquatting – Why Likelihood of Confusion Does Not Necessarily Establish Bad Faith Under the UDRP

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When Trademark Infringement Is Not Cybersquatting – Why Likelihood of Confusion Does Not Necessarily Establish Bad Faith Under the UDRP

by Ivan (Yitzchak) Lipshitz, Adv., JMB Davis Ben-David, Israel

 Introduction

A trademark practitioner discovering a domain name identical or confusingly similar to a client’s mark may instinctively conclude that the registrant is infringing the client’s trademark rights and that the domain name should be recoverable through the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “UDRP” or the “Policy”).

That instinct is understandable. Trademark lawyers are accustomed to assessing competing commercial identifiers through principles of priority, distinctiveness, reputation and likelihood of confusion. A domain name used by a competitor to market similar goods or services may present precisely the marketplace confusion that trademark law seeks to prevent.

Yet trademark infringement and cybersquatting are not coterminous legal concepts.

The UDRP was designed to address abusive domain name registration and use, not to provide an alternative forum for every dispute involving competing trademarks or commercial names. Conduct that may support an infringement action under national trademark law does not necessarily establish cybersquatting under the Policy.

Recent decisions reveal a particularly interesting tension: a respondent’s commercial use may be considered insufficiently bona fide to establish a legitimate interest in a domain name, yet the complainant may still fail to prove that the domain name was registered in bad faith.

That apparent paradox exposes an important boundary between trademark infringement and the UDRP and raises a further question about how far UDRP panels should go in assessing infringement allegations.

Different legal inquiries: confusion versus targeting

Under the United States Lanham Act, trademark infringement generally turns on whether an unauthorized commercial use is likely to cause confusion concerning the source, sponsorship or affiliation of goods or services. Comparable, though not identical, principles operate under other national and regional trademark systems.

Importantly, infringement does not invariably require proof that the defendant deliberately intended to appropriate another’s goodwill. A business may independently adopt a commercial name that nevertheless infringes an earlier trademark.

The UDRP addresses a different wrong.

Its first element, requiring a domain name identical or confusingly similar to a trademark in which the complainant has rights, serves principally as a standing requirement. It is not the comprehensive likelihood-of-confusion inquiry familiar to trademark lawyers.

The essential distinction emerges under paragraph 4(a)(iii), which requires proof that the domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith.

Ordinarily, this is understood to mean that the evidence must support an inference that the respondent registered the domain name with the complainant’s trademark in mind, intending to take unfair advantage of its trademark significance, or otherwise abuse the complainant’s rights.

Bad faith is not confined to fraud or impersonation. Paragraph 4(b) identifies non-exhaustive circumstances involving abusive registration, including certain registrations for sale to a trademark owner, patterns of blocking registrations, disruption of a competitor and intentional attraction of Internet users for commercial gain through trademark confusion.

The common thread is abusive targeting, not merely the possibility that two commercial identifiers may be confused.

Trademark law asks whether a commercial use impermissibly interferes with protected trademark rights.

The UDRP, on the other hand, asks whether the domain name was registered and used to exploit or otherwise abuse those rights.

The distinction becomes especially apparent where the respondent claims to have independently developed a genuine business.

END LABEL: possible infringement without cybersquatting

Ashworth and Parker Limited v. Fraser Lee, End Label, WIPO Case No. D2026-3037, concerning <end-label.com>, provides a striking illustration.

The complainant operated a fashion business under its END trademarks. The respondent operated an online clothing business under the name END LABEL, supported by a Shopify-based website.

The respondent produced evidence of independent brand development, including design work, social-media activity and branding distinct from the complainant’s presentation.

The panel accepted, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent had independently conceived its END LABEL business rather than deliberately copying the complainant’s branding.

That finding did not resolve the infringement question.

Because both businesses operated in the clothing sector, the panel considered it more likely than not that the respondent’s activities infringed the complainant’s registered trademark rights. It was therefore unwilling to conclude that the respondent had established rights or legitimate interests through a bona fide offering of goods or services.

Yet the complaint was denied.

The evidence did not establish that the respondent had registered the domain name to target the complainant’s trademark or exploit its goodwill. Significantly, the respondent acknowledged awareness of the complainant’s END business, but the Panel held that such knowledge, without sufficient evidence of an intention to exploit its trademark, did not establish bad-faith registration.

The result is initially counterintuitive. The respondent’s commercial use raised sufficiently serious infringement concerns to undermine its claimed legitimate interest, yet the respondent retained the domain name.

The explanation lies in the different legal questions being addressed.

The panel’s concern about infringement related to the legal character of the respondent’s commercial activity. Its finding under the third element concerned whether the respondent had registered the domain name with an abusive intent.

An independently adopted business name may generate actionable marketplace confusion without having been selected to exploit another party’s trademark.

That is the distinction at the heart of the decision.

The apparent paradox: no bona fide use, but no bad-faith registration

The most challenging aspect of END LABEL concerns the relationship between paragraphs 4(a)(ii) and 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.

How can a respondent’s use be insufficiently bona fide to establish a legitimate interest, yet fail to establish bad-faith registration?

At first glance, the findings appear inconsistent. If commercial use probably infringes the complainant’s trademark, why should that conduct not establish cybersquatting?

The answer requires separating the legal functions of the second and third elements.

The legitimacy of use and the purpose of registration

Under paragraph 4(c)(i), a respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests through use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, a domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services before notice of the dispute.

A genuine business is not necessarily engaged in a bona fide offering for UDRP purposes. Investment, branding, customers, website development and actual sales do not automatically legitimize commercial activity that improperly trades on another’s trademark.

Where infringement is sufficiently established, a panel may regard that conduct as incapable of supporting the claimed legitimate interest.

But the conclusion does not necessarily establish why the respondent registered the domain name.

A respondent may have independently selected a commercial name without intending to exploit the complainant’s trademark, only for the resulting use to present a substantial infringement problem.

Under national trademark law, the absence of deliberate targeting may not prevent liability. Under the UDRP, the circumstances and purpose of registration may be decisive.

There is also an important evidentiary qualification.

Under paragraph 4(a)(ii), the complainant retains the ultimate burden of proving the absence of rights or legitimate interests. Once the complainant makes a prima facie showing, the burden of production shifts to the respondent. The respondent ordinarily bears the burden of producing evidence of such rights or interests. A failure to substantiate a particular defence does not, by itself, relieve the complainant of its overall burden.

Nor are the second and third elements separated by a rigid distinction between objective conduct and subjective intention. Both involve contextual evidence and inferences about the respondent’s activities and purposes. WIPO Overview 3.1, particularly sections 2.1, 2.13, 2.15 and 3.1, provides the relevant analytical framework.

The critical point is that an adverse finding on legitimate interests cannot mechanically substitute for proof of bad-faith registration and use.

Knowledge, intention and inference

The UDRP does not require a confession of improper intent. Targeting may be inferred from objective circumstances, including the distinctiveness and reputation of the mark, the nature of the domain name, the respondent’s website, copying of branding, misleading representations, or other conduct.

Likewise, independent adoption does not automatically establish legitimate interests. A respondent cannot create a safe harbour merely by establishing an operating business around another party’s trademark.

The evidence may therefore support different conclusions under the two elements without logical inconsistency.

The distinction is between a commercial use that may be legally objectionable and a registration shown to have been undertaken for an abusive trademark-related purpose.

How far should a UDRP panel adjudicate infringement?

END LABEL raises a further, more difficult question.

If a panel considers trademark infringement sufficiently likely to undermine a respondent’s legitimate interest, is it not effectively adjudicating an infringement claim while simultaneously recognizing that infringement lies outside the “UDRP’s intended scope”?

That concern deserves closer scrutiny.

Where the conduct is plainly deceptive, such as impersonation, counterfeit sales or deliberate reproduction of distinctive branding, the same evidence will commonly establish both the absence of legitimate interests and bad-faith targeting.

But infringement may also depend on contested questions of priority, territorial rights, similarity of goods, consumer perception and available defences. Such issues may require evidentiary procedures unavailable in the UDRP’s streamlined process.

A panel must sometimes consider alleged infringement to determine whether the respondent’s claimed commercial activity is bona fide. That does not make its assessment equivalent to a binding judicial determination of trademark infringement. Nor should a panel’s concern about likely infringement predetermine the separate question of abusive registration.

END LABEL therefore illustrates both the independence of the Policy’s elements and the need for adjudicative restraint.

The essential discipline is to distinguish evidence of infringement, evidence concerning legitimate interests, and evidence of bad-faith registration and use.

These categories may overlap considerably. They should not be collapsed into one another.

Competing businesses and independent adoption

A useful contrast appears in ScaleITS GmbH v. Scale IT GmbH, WIPO Case No. D2026-3225, concerning <scale-it.com>.

The complainant relied on earlier SCALEITS rights. The respondent had acquired the domain name, established an IT business and subsequently registered its own German figurative trademark incorporating SCALE IT.

The complainant alleged actual customer confusion, and parallel trademark litigation was underway.

Unlike END LABEL, the panel found that the respondent had established rights or legitimate interests through its genuine business activities. Whether the respondent’s use infringed the complainant’s earlier rights under German or European trademark law was a separate question.

Importantly, alleged marketplace confusion arising years after acquisition did not establish that the respondent had originally registered the domain name to target the complainant.

As an additional finding, the panel held that the expression “scale IT” also possessed a plausible independent commercial meaning in the technology sector.

The distinction becomes clearer when the decisions are compared. In END LABEL, likely infringement undermined the respondent’s claimed legitimate interest, but bad-faith registration was not established. In Scale IT, the respondent established legitimate interests, and the evidence likewise failed to establish bad-faith registration.

A further illustration is Gazela Family Doo Beograd-Novi Beograd v. Nikola Nadlacki, Obuća Gazela DOO, WIPO Case No. D2026-1271, concerning <koznaobucagazela.com>.

The parties were competing Serbian footwear businesses. Despite the complainant’s earlier trademark rights, the respondent’s longstanding commercial identity and use of the corresponding name supported a finding of legitimate interests. The panel also found insufficient evidence of abusive targeting and denied the complaint.

Boise Cascade Building Materials Distribution, L.L.C. v. Matthew Brossman, WIPO Case No. D2026-3837, concerning <broscoconstruction.com>, provides a further recent example. The complainant sought to infer trademark targeting from the parties’ alleged overlap in commercial customers. The Panel rejected that inference. The respondent had adopted a business name plausibly derived from his surname, operated a registered and licensed construction business, and had not been shown to compete with or exploit the complainant’s trademark. The Panel found legitimate interests under paragraphs 4(c)(i) and 4(c)(ii) and concluded that bad-faith registration and use had not been established. The decision illustrates why an allegation of commercial overlap or potential confusion cannot, without more, substitute for evidence of intentional trademark targeting.

The decision also highlights the danger of converting an asserted likelihood of marketplace confusion into presumed bad-faith targeting. Even where customers or commercial sectors appear to overlap, the UDRP requires evidence connecting the registrant’s choice of domain name to an intention to exploit the particular complainant’s mark. The Panel’s conclusion on legitimate interests was reinforced by its assessment of the same evidence under bad faith.

These cases demonstrate that competing commercial activities, similar names and even a plausible infringement dispute do not automatically establish cybersquatting.

The decisive inquiry remains the circumstances of adoption and registration, assessed against the evidence of the complainant’s rights and reputation.

Trademark priority does not retrospectively establish bad faith

The distinction has an important temporal dimension.

In Plura AI LLC v. Ilan Kadar, Plurai Inc., WIPO Case No. DAI2026-0075, concerning <plurai.ai>, the respondent registered the domain name in May 2024, before the complainant’s asserted trademark rights arose.

The complaint was denied, and the panel found reverse domain name hijacking.

The decision illustrates the general principle that a respondent cannot ordinarily register a domain name to target trademark rights that did not yet exist. Recognized exceptions may arise where a respondent anticipates and targets nascent trademark rights. But later trademark rights do not, merely by coming into existence, establish that an earlier registration was abusive.

This is distinct from national trademark priority rules.

For example, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) provides for constructive-use priority based on the filing date of a trademark application, contingent upon registration and subject to statutory qualifications.

That rule may determine priority between competing trademark claimants. It does not retrospectively establish a domain registrant’s knowledge or intention at an earlier date.

For UDRP purposes, the chronology must be considered alongside evidence of actual trademark use, reputation, respondent knowledge and any circumstances suggesting anticipation of emerging rights.

Nor does a later change in website content necessarily establish a new registration or acquisition of the domain name.

Superior trademark priority is not, without more, proof of bad-faith domain name registration.

Descriptive language and the danger of assuming exclusivity

The risk of conflating infringement with cybersquatting is particularly acute where trademarks incorporate ordinary, descriptive or commercially suggestive language.

A trademark registration may confer enforceable rights within a particular jurisdiction or geographical area, and commercial context. It does not necessarily establish that every domain name containing the same expression was selected to exploit the trademark owner.

In ARAG North America Incorporated v. Steve Lowry, FORUM Claim No. FA2604002213883, concerning <legal-now.com>, the complainant relied on its United States LEGAL NOW trademark rights. The respondent asserted that it had independently developed a Canadian legal-technology business.

The three-member panel considered the descriptive character of the expression, the respondent’s evidence of business preparations and the limited evidence concerning the complainant’s reputation and market recognition in Canada. It concluded that the dispute involved broader trademark and unfair competition issues rather than a clear case of cybersquatting.

The decision illustrates that a trademark registration in one jurisdiction does not automatically establish that a respondent operating elsewhere knew of the mark or intended to exploit its reputation.

Importantly, this case is a particularly clear example of adjudicative restraint as the Panel declined to determine any of the three substantive UDRP elements and denied the complaint without prejudice, leaving the parties to pursue their competing trademark and unfair competition claims before a court of competent jurisdiction.

Similarly, in Mecalac Construction Equipment UK Limited v. Domain Admin, Global IP Holdings Inc., WIPO Case No. D2026-1396, concerning <fermec.com>, the panel declined to infer bad faith merely from earlier trademark registrations and the respondent’s offering of the domain name for sale.

The respondent was a professional domain investor who presented evidence of a commercial strategy involving short, potentially valuable domain names. The panel accepted the plausibility of independent acquisition and declined to impose a universal rule of worldwide constructive notice of trademark registrations. A finding of reverse domain name hijacking followed. This finding was based on material factual omissions and mischaracterizations of UDRP principles and precedent, rather than merely the complainant’s failure to establish bad faith.

The decision does not exempt professional investors from scrutiny. Depending on the distinctiveness and reputation of a mark and the circumstances of acquisition, a registrant’s knowledge or deliberate avoidance of relevant facts may support an inference of targeting.

The important distinction is that trademark registration, commercial resale and the existence of a potentially valuable domain name do not, individually, establish abusive intent.

Descriptive or suggestive expressions can certainly be registered in bad faith. Their independent linguistic significance is simply an evidentiary consideration that must be assessed before targeting is inferred.

The difficult boundary: when infringement evidence establishes cybersquatting

Nevertheless, the distinction must not be taken too far in the opposite direction.

Evidence of trademark infringement can be highly probative of UDRP bad faith.

A respondent who registers a domain name incorporating a distinctive trademark and then reproduces the complainant’s branding, impersonates its business, diverts customers through misleading claims of affiliation or offers counterfeit goods may indeed provide compelling evidence of abusive targeting.

Paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy expressly addresses intentional attempts to attract Internet users for commercial gain through confusion concerning source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement.

The question is, therefore, not whether confusion is relevant, but what inference the evidence supports.

Does the respondent’s conduct demonstrate that the domain name was selected because of its association with the complainant? Or does it establish only that an independently adopted commercial name has generated a potential trademark conflict?

A genuine business is not automatically a bona fide business for UDRP purposes. Equally, the existence of competing products, similar names and marketplace confusion does not automatically establish that the original registration was abusive.

The distinction is one of evidence and inference, not a categorical exemption for operating businesses.

The limits of the UDRP and the proper forum for trademark disputes

The UDRP is a streamlined, document-based procedure intended to address abusive domain name registrations. It does not ordinarily provide the discovery, witness examination and detailed adjudication of contested national-law rights available in trademark litigation.

This distinction is also reflected in UDRP Perspectives §§0.1 (Scope of the Policy) and UDRP Perspectives §0.19 (Trademark Infringement). The commentary distinguishes unintentional infringement from cybersquatting, which requires targeting, and emphasizes that the Policy is directed to clear-cut cases of abusive registration rather than serving as a substitute for litigation between parties asserting competing legitimate interests. Those propositions provide a useful framework, but do not displace the Policy’s elements or the applicable standard of proof.

Where the essential controversy concerns competing trademark rights, disputed priority, geographical reputation, infringement defences or conflicting accounts of independent adoption, judicial proceedings in a competent court may be the more appropriate forum.

This does not mean that a respondent can defeat a complaint merely by characterizing the dispute as one involving trademark law. Clear cases of cybersquatting frequently involve infringement, and unsupported claims of independent rights do not necessarily defeat the Policy.

Panels must still determine whether the evidence establishes the requirements for transfer or cancellation.

But, where the real controversy concerns which of two operating businesses may lawfully use a commercial designation, the UDRP should not become a substitute trademark court.

The remedies also differ. A successful UDRP complaint ensures transfer or cancellation of the domain name. It does not determine damages, provide interdictory relief, or conclusively resolve the parties’ wider entitlement to use a trademark. Conversely, denial of a UDRP complaint does not confer judicial approval upon the respondent’s commercial use of the trademark concerned.

A trademark owner may lose a UDRP proceeding and still possess a viable infringement claim.

A practical warning for trademark practitioners

Before recommending a UDRP complaint, trademark counsel should investigate more than ownership of the mark and similarity of the domain name.

The analysis should address the chronology of registration and trademark rights; the mark’s distinctiveness and reputation at the relevant time; the respondent’s commercial history; the expression’s possible independent meaning; the parties’ geographical locations and circumstances; and any evidence of copying, impersonation or deliberate diversion.

Above all, counsel should ask whether the evidence supports an inference that the respondent selected the domain name because of the complainant’s trademark, rather than independently adopting a designation that may conflict with it.

Counsel should also distinguish evidence bearing on legitimate interests from evidence establishing bad-faith registration and use.

These are not supplementary questions.

They determine whether the proposed proceeding concerns the UDRP or an alternative, more appropriate forum. It may not even concern cybersquatting at all.

A complaint that treats trademark ownership and confusing similarity as sufficient proof of abusive registration may fail. Where a complainant proceeds despite an obvious chronological obstacle, disregards readily available contrary evidence or materially misstates the Policy, a finding of reverse domain name hijacking may follow. Such a finding is not automatic merely because a complaint is unsuccessful. It nevertheless reinforces counsel’s responsibility to investigate the factual basis of a proposed proceeding and select the appropriate legal remedy and forum for the dispute.

Conclusion: the boundary that matters

Trademark law and the UDRP protect overlapping interests, but they address different wrongs.

Trademark infringement may arise from confusing commercial use even where the later business independently adopted its name without deliberately targeting an earlier rights holder.

The UDRP addresses the narrower wrong of abusive domain name registration and use.

As END LABEL illustrates, a panel may consider commercial use insufficiently bona fide to establish a legitimate interest yet conclude that bad-faith registration has not been proved. The findings need not be contradictory: they reflect distinct legal inquiries, although their coexistence raises important questions about the proper limits of UDRP adjudication.

For trademark practitioners, the essential discipline is to resist treating likelihood of confusion, superior trademark rights or potentially infringing commercial conduct as a substitute for evidence of abusive registration.

The decisive question under the UDRP is not simply whether the respondent’s use of the domain name may infringe the complainant’s trademark. It is whether the respondent registered and used that domain name to exploit or otherwise abuse the complainant’s trademark rights.

That is the distinction between trademark infringement and cybersquatting, and the boundary the UDRP must preserve.

About the Author:

 Ivan (Yitzchak) Lipshitz, Adv., is a dual-qualified Israeli and South African attorney with over 40 years of commercial and intellectual property law experience, including approximately 15 years adjudicating disputes arising in global online marketplaces. He serves as a CIIDRC UDRP Panelist and is Of Counsel at JMB Davis Ben-David, Israel. His practice focuses on domain name dispute resolution, digital brand protection and enforcement, online infringement, and marketplace and compliance adjudication. He may be contacted at Ivan.Lipshitz@jmbdavis.com

 

 

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