Complainant’s Wilful Blindness to Publicly Available Evidence Leads to RDNH

Complainant’s Wilful Blindness to Publicly Available Evidence Leads to RDNH

This is a clear and well-reasoned decision in which the Panel not only rejected the Complaint on the merits, but also issued a firm finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking (“RDNH”) grounded in the Complainant’s failure to conduct even minimal due diligence. Continue reading commentary here.

We hope you will enjoy this edition of the Digest (vol. 6.11) as we review these noteworthy recent decisions with expert commentary. (We invite guest commenters to contact us):

‣ Complainant’s Wilful Blindness to Publicly Available Evidence Leads to RDNH (speroni .com *with commentary)
‣ No Acquired Distinctiveness in Doctor’s Personal Name (michaelpiepkorn .com *with commentary)
‣ Misleading the Panel: Concealed Purchase Offer Backfires with RDNH (poshpod .com *with commentary)
‣ Implausible Ignorance? Panel Rejects Domain Investor’s “Ultra Fit” Defense (ultafit .com *with commentary)
‣ Common Word, Real Business, Misleading Complaint: RDNH Found (splice .ai *with commentary)
‣ No Targeting at Acquisition; Broker Outreach Insufficient for Bad Faith (evertrust .com *with commentary)

Speroni General Trading LLC OPC v. Joseph Speroni, WIPO Case No. D2026-0277

<speroni .com>

Panelist: Mr. Andrew F. Christie

Brief Facts: The UAE-based Complainant is active in the field of footwear, leather goods, retail services, and related commercial activities and has an online presence at <speronishoe .com>. The Complainant is the owner of a number of registrations for a trademark consisting of a heraldic shield-like device and the text string “Speroni” in a stylized font, including EU registration dated May 28, 2015 and Qatar registrations dated January 23, 2025 and October 2, 2025. The disputed Domain Name was created on February 3, 1997. The Respondent provided a screenshot of an Internet Archive Wayback Machine record for the disputed Domain Name on December 21, 1997, showing it resolved to a page providing contact details for the Respondent and his wife, including email addresses using the disputed Domain Name.

The Complainant alleges that the passive holding of a domain name identical to a third party’s trademark does not confer rights or legitimate interests, particularly where the Respondent has taken steps to conceal its identity. Although the Respondent appears to bear the surname “Speroni”, there is no evidence that the Respondent has been commonly known, in a commercial or public sense, by the name SPERONI in connection with goods, services, or any legitimate business activity. The Respondent contends that the fact that the Respondent in this proceeding is Mr. Joseph Speroni should be sufficient, in its entirety, as a response to the Complaint. The right to register one’s own surname as a domain name for personal use is one of the most basic species of legitimate interests under the Policy.

Held: The Respondent’s surname is identical to the disputed Domain Name, once the gTLD is ignored. The Respondent has been the registrant of the disputed Domain Name for a number of decades, and until relatively recently the Respondent used the disputed Domain Name for email addresses for him and his wife, and to redirect to another website about amateur radio that was authored by him. There is no evidence that the Respondent has at any time used the disputed Domain Name for any other purpose, including any purpose that might cause confusion with the Complainant or its business. It is clear that the Respondent has, and always had, rights and legitimate interests in the disputed Domain Name.

RDNH: Prior to filing the Complainant, the Complainant could have taken the obvious and simple step of using the Internet Archive Wayback Machine to ascertain when, how and by whom the disputed Domain Name had been used. The information would have put the Complainant on notice that, though the identity of the actual registrant of the disputed Domain Name was hidden due to use of a proxy registration service, it very likely was a person known as Joe Speroni, and hence was someone very likely to have rights and legitimate interests in the disputed Domain Name due to it being that person’s surname.

Nevertheless, after receiving the Registrar’s verification response, the Complainant continued the proceeding by filing an amended Complaint in which it made multiple incorrect assertions concerning the Respondent and the disputed Domain Name. The failure of the Complainant to properly consider the revealed registrant information or undertake the obvious and simple step of using the Internet Archive Wayback Machine to inform itself of when, how, and by whom the disputed Domain Name had been used imposed an unnecessary and significant burden on the Respondent, who had to respond to a Complaint that had no foundation. This failure was inexcusable.

Complaint Denied (RDNH)

Complainant’s Counsel: Al Tamimi & Company, UAE
Respondent’s Counsel: John Berryhill, Ph.d., Esq., USA

Case Comment reviewed and approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:

This is a clear and well-reasoned decision in which the Panel not only rejected the Complaint on the merits, but also issued a firm finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking (“RDNH”) grounded in the Complainant’s failure to conduct even minimal due diligence.

On the merits, the case was straightforward. The disputed domain name was registered in 1997 – decades before the Complainant’s trademark rights – and corresponded exactly to the Respondent’s surname. The record showed longstanding personal use, including email and redirection to an amateur radio website authored by the Respondent. As the Panel correctly held, the right to register and use one’s own surname is among the most basic and well-established categories of rights or legitimate interests under the Policy. There was no evidence whatsoever of targeting.

The RDNH finding is where the decision becomes particularly instructive.

First, the Panel emphasized the Complainant’s failure to undertake basic factual investigation. A simple Internet Archive search would have revealed the historical use of the domain name and pointed directly to an individual named “Speroni” as the longstanding registrant. This alone should have put the Complainant on notice that the domain name was very likely held by someone with a prima facie legitimate interest arising from their surname.

Second, and more significantly, the Complainant persisted even after receiving the registrar-verified registrant information identifying the Respondent as Joseph Speroni. Rather than reassess the viability of its case, the Complainant filed an amended Complaint advancing multiple incorrect assertions about the Respondent and the domain name. This conduct – continuing in the face of dispositive contrary evidence – is a classic hallmark of RDNH.

Third, the Panel expressly characterized the Complainant’s conduct as “inexcusable” and noted that it imposed an unnecessary and significant burden on the Respondent. This language is notable. Panels do not always articulate the prejudice to respondents so clearly, but doing so reinforces that the UDRP is not a cost-free experiment for complainants.

From a doctrinal perspective, the case reinforces several important points:

Surname cases remain one of the clearest categories of legitimate interest under Policy ¶4(c), particularly where supported by longstanding personal use.

Constructive knowledge arguments cannot overcome objective facts showing a lack of targeting.

Complainants have an affirmative obligation to investigate readily available evidence – including Internet Archive records – before filing.

Continuing a complaint after registrar disclosure contradicts the complainant’s theory can independently justify RDNH.

The decision also fits squarely within the growing body of cases recognizing that failure to reassess after registrar verification is itself sanctionable conduct. Once the Complainant knew – or plainly should have known – that the registrant was “Joseph Speroni,” the case should have been withdrawn immediately.

Finally, this case illustrates a recurring and troubling pattern: complaints brought against domain names corresponding to common surnames without any credible theory of targeting. Such cases are particularly ill-suited to the UDRP and risk misuse of the procedure as a form of leverage rather than a legitimate rights-protection mechanism.

In short, this is a textbook RDNH case – not because the Complaint was merely weak, but because it was pursued in the face of obvious, easily verifiable facts demonstrating that it should never have been filed, and certainly not maintained.

No Acquired Distinctiveness in Doctor’s Personal Name

Dr. Michael W. Piepkorn v. Siddharth Jha, Pier 67 Capital Partners LP, WIPO Case No. D2025-4640

<michaelpiepkorn .com>

Panelists: Mr. Phillip V. Marano (Presiding), Mr. David H. Bernstein, and Mr. Justin Hughes

Brief Facts: The US-based Complainant is a medical doctor, co-owner of a commercial laboratory, and co-author of numerous medical textbooks. He asserts ownership of the unregistered MICHAEL PIEPKORN MD trademark based on inherent distinctiveness and acquired secondary meaning in the medical textbook field, and also owns a Washington state trademark registration issued on September 18, 2025. The Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name on June 26, 2025 and it resolves to a website that compiles allegations of sexual misconduct and abuse against the Complainant. The Parties have a long history of litigation, having been embroiled in an acrimonious boundary dispute regarding neighboring properties since 2019. The proceedings included multiple unsolicited supplemental filings from both parties, which the Panel heavily criticized.

The Complainant alleges that the Domain Name is confusingly similar to his personal name mark, that the Respondent lacks legitimate interests by using it as a “fount of disinformation and libel,” and registered it in bad faith as part of a “long sordid track record” of frivolous litigation and harassment targeting the Complainant. The Respondent contends that they have a genuine critical fair use interest in disseminating truthful information and court documents, asserting that factual disputes concerning defamation belong in court, not a UDRP proceeding. The Respondent further contends that the Complainant’s limited book authorship does not constitute sufficient commercial activity to establish common law trademark rights in his personal name.

Held: The Panel found that the Complainant failed to satisfy the first element of the Policy (standing based on trademark rights). The Policy does not explicitly provide standing for personal names that are not registered or otherwise protected as trademarks; the Complainant must establish the personal name acts as a distinctive source-identifier in trade or commerce. The Complainant’s unexamined state trademark registration did not automatically confer rights under the Policy, requiring proof of secondary meaning. The Complainant submitted very limited evidence of acquired distinctiveness: his name printed on textbooks (alongside other marks), a self-serving assertion of consumer recognition, mention of two academic awards, and low sales/royalty volumes. This evidence was insufficient to prove his personal name functions as a common law trademark.

RDNH: The Respondent requested a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking, arguing that the Complainant was trying to silence his victims and bully them into taking down the website under a pretextual “trademark violation” after previously failing to obtain court orders for defamation. The Panel did not view the Complainant’s failure to proffer sufficient evidence of common law trademark rights as a standalone basis for RDNH, and declined to “wade through all of the hyperbole in this matter only to further muddy the waters of the ongoing acrimonious dispute between the Parties.”

Complaint Denied

Complainant’s Counsel: Admon Law Firm, USA
Respondent’s Counsel: The Law Firm of George M. Santana, P.C., USA

Case Comment reviewed and approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:

This decision turns on a threshold issue that is too often overlooked in UDRP complaints involving personal names – namely, that not all personal names function as trademarks, and standing under the Policy requires proof of distinctiveness in trade or commerce.

The Panel dismissed the Complaint at the first element, finding that the Complainant failed to establish common law trademark rights in his name. While the Complainant relied on authorship of medical textbooks, a recent Washington state trademark registration, and general assertions of professional recognition, the evidentiary record was notably thin. The Panel emphasized that personal names are not inherently distinctive and require proof of acquired secondary meaning. Here, the Complainant’s evidence – including limited sales figures, modest royalties, and the appearance of his name alongside other marks – fell well short of demonstrating that “Michael Piepkorn MD” functions as a source identifier.

Importantly, the Panel did not accept that the Complainant’s state trademark registration, obtained without substantive examination, was sufficient to establish rights under the Policy. This reflects a consistent and correct approach: UDRP standing is not satisfied by formalities alone where the underlying mark lacks demonstrated distinctiveness.

Although the case could have proceeded to consider legitimate interests and bad faith – particularly given the Respondent’s operation of a criticism website containing allegations and court materials – the Panel properly declined to do so after finding no standing. This reinforces that the first element is not a mere formality but a substantive gatekeeping requirement.

The Respondent argued that the domain name was used for legitimate noncommercial criticism and that the dispute was, at its core, a defamation matter arising from a long-running personal conflict between neighboring parties. While the Panel did not reach these issues, the factual context underscores a recurring problem: attempts to repurpose the UDRP as a forum for resolving broader personal or reputational disputes that properly belong before courts.

The Panel also criticized both parties for filing multiple unsolicited supplemental submissions, describing the record as cluttered with hyperbole. This serves as a reminder that over-litigation within UDRP proceedings is not only disfavored but may detract from the core issues.

On Reverse Domain Name Hijacking, the Panel declined to make a finding despite the Respondent’s arguments that the Complaint was brought to suppress criticism after unsuccessful litigation efforts. The Panel reasoned that the Complainant’s failure to establish common law rights, on its own, was insufficient to warrant RDNH and declined to engage further with the broader factual disputes between the parties.

That restraint is notable, but arguably debatable. Where a complainant advances a weak and under-evidenced claim to trademark rights in a personal name – particularly in the context of an ongoing personal dispute and a criticism website – panels should be prepared to scrutinize whether the UDRP is being used as a strategic tool rather than for legitimate rights protection. While not every failed claim justifies RDNH, the surrounding circumstances here could have supported a more searching inquiry.

From a doctrinal standpoint, the decision reinforces several key principles:

Personal names require clear evidence of acquired distinctiveness to qualify for UDRP standing.

Limited professional recognition or authorship, without more, will not suffice.

State trademark registrations lacking substantive examination carry limited weight.

The first element serves as a meaningful threshold filter and should not be bypassed.

Overall, the case is a useful reminder that the UDRP is not a forum for reputational disputes dressed up as trademark claims, and that complainants relying on personal name rights must meet a meaningful evidentiary burden at the outset.

Misleading the Panel: Concealed Purchase Offer Backfires with RDNH

Poshpod, LLC v. Mark Golden, WIPO Case No. D2026-0171

<poshpod .com>

Panelist: Mr. Assen Alexiev

Brief Facts: The US-based Complainant operates an aesthetic medical and wellness business under the brand POSHPOD and has an official website at <posh-pod .com> (registered January 3, 2024). The Complainant is the owner of the US trademark POSHPOD, applied for on May 10, 2025, and registered on December 16, 2025, with a claimed first use in February 2024. The disputed Domain Name was acquired by the Respondent on March 17, 2019 and is currently inactive. The Respondent submitted evidence that there are many trademark registrations for POSHPOD in China dating back to 2020, owned by an alter ego of the Respondent. In February 2024, the Parties engaged in unsuccessful email correspondence regarding a potential sale of the disputed Domain Name, which was initiated by the owner of the Complainant.

The Complainant alleges that the Respondent registered and is holding the disputed Domain Name with the intent to extract payment from the Complainant, noting the domain resolves to a commercial sales landing page. The Complainant further claims the Respondent demanded substantial sums of money and that their conduct reflects a pattern of trademark warehousing designed to block legitimate brand owners. The Respondent contends that their domain registration predates any of the Complainant’s claimed rights by over a decade. The Respondent further contends that the Complainant contacted them in 2024 offering US $100 for the Domain Name, and after being rejected, proceeded to register the similar hyphenated domain name and file for a U.S. trademark to weaponize against the domain’s legitimate owner.

Held: Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there is nothing to support a conclusion that the Respondent might have had any information about the Complainant and its trademark before 2024 or that it may have targeted the then non-existent Complainant and its non-existent trademark in 2019, when it acquired the disputed Domain Name. There is, therefore, no basis for a finding that the disputed Domain Name was registered in bad faith. As mentioned above, the contact between the Parties was initiated by the Complainant rather than by the Respondent, and it was the Complainant who attempted to purchase the disputed Domain Name rather than the Respondent trying to sell it.

There is no evidence that the disputed Domain Name has resolved to a website or that the Respondent has targeted the Complainant in any way with the use of the disputed Domain Name or through its offering for sale. The case file contains evidence that the Respondent has registered a significant number of POSHPOD trademarks in China years before the Complainant and its trademark came into existence. In these circumstances, without any evidence of targeting of the Complainant, the fact that the Respondent has indicated a price at which it is prepared to sell the disputed Domain Name does not as such show bad faith use of the disputed Domain Name.

RDNH: The Complainant attempted to mislead the Panel by claiming the Respondent initiated contact and demanded substantial sums of money. However, the Complainant’s own evidence showed they initiated the offer to buy, and the Respondent only indicated a price in reply. When negotiations started in February 2024, the Complainant had not yet started using its trademark or filed the application for its registration. It is evident that the Complainant filed the Complaint after an unsuccessful attempt to acquire the disputed Domain Name from the Respondent without a plausible legal basis, in furtherance of a classical “Plan B”. Such conduct justifies and necessitates a finding of RDNH.

Complaint Denied (RDNH)

Complainant’s Counsel: Internally Represented
Respondent’s Counsel: Self-represented

Case Comment reviewed and approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:

This is a textbook “Plan B” case in which the Complainant, having failed to acquire the disputed domain name through negotiation, resorted to the UDRP despite the absence of any plausible basis for bad faith. The Panel not only denied the Complaint, but issued a clear and well-supported finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking (“RDNH”), grounded in both the chronology of events and the Complainant’s mischaracterization of the record.

On the merits, the case was straightforward. The Respondent acquired the disputed domain name in 2019, years before the Complainant came into existence or adopted the POSHPOD mark. The Panel correctly held that there could be no finding of bad faith registration in circumstances where the Complainant and its alleged rights did not exist at the time of acquisition. This temporal disconnect is fatal under the Policy and continues to be a point that complainants either misunderstand or ignore.

The Panel further rejected the Complainant’s attempt to rely on the Respondent’s willingness to sell the domain name as evidence of bad faith. As is well established, offering a domain name for sale is not inherently indicative of bad faith, particularly where there is no evidence of targeting. Here, the record showed that it was the Complainant who initiated contact in 2024 with an offer to purchase the domain name. The Respondent merely replied with a price. In the absence of targeting, such conduct is entirely consistent with legitimate domain name investment activity.

Notably, the Respondent also produced evidence of prior POSHPOD trademark registrations in China dating back to 2020, held by an alter ego of the Respondent. While not strictly necessary to the outcome, this evidence further undermined any suggestion that the Respondent’s registration was opportunistic or directed at the Complainant. Rather, it supported an independent basis for the Respondent’s interest in the term.

The RDNH finding is particularly strong and rests on two key pillars. First, the Panel found that the Complainant attempted to mislead the Panel by asserting that the Respondent initiated contact and demanded substantial sums of money, when in fact the Complainant’s own evidence showed the opposite. This kind of factual mischaracterization goes beyond mere advocacy and supports a finding of abuse of the administrative proceeding.

Second, the Panel emphasized the timing of the Complainant’s actions. When the parties entered into negotiations in February 2024, the Complainant had not yet commenced use of the mark or filed its trademark application. Only after failing to acquire the domain name did the Complainant proceed to adopt the mark, register a hyphenated domain name, and ultimately file the Complaint. This sequence of events strongly supports the conclusion that the UDRP was used as a fallback mechanism – the classic “Plan B” scenario.

From a doctrinal perspective, the decision reinforces several well-established principles:

A complainant cannot establish bad faith registration where its rights post-date the domain name registration.

An offer to sell a domain name, particularly in response to an unsolicited inquiry, does not constitute bad faith absent targeting.

Misrepresenting material facts to the Panel is a serious abuse that supports an RDNH finding.

Filing a complaint after a failed purchase attempt, without a credible legal basis, is paradigmatic “Plan B” conduct.

Overall, the decision is a clear reaffirmation that the UDRP is not a substitute for failed commercial negotiations. Where a complainant attempts to retrofit trademark rights onto a pre-existing domain name and mischaracterizes the factual record in the process, a finding of RDNH is not only appropriate but necessary to preserve the integrity of the Policy.

Implausible Ignorance? Panel Rejects Domain Investor’s “Ultra Fit” Defense

Ulta Beauty, Inc. v. Names Company / DNS Support, NAF Claim Number: FA2603002209682

<ultafit .com>

Panelist: Mr. David E. Sorkin

Procedural History: The Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on March 10, 2026; Forum received payment on March 10, 2026. On March 11, 2026, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of March 31, 2026 by which the Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint. A Response was received on March 11, 2026. The Panel notes that the Response omits the certification statement that is required by Paragraph 5(c)(viii) of the Rules for the Policy. On March 11, 2026, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, Forum appointed David E. Sorkin as Panelist. The matter was decided by the Panel on March 12, 2026.

Brief Facts: The US-based Complainant is the largest beauty retailer in the United States, operating 1,500 retail stores and selling products online. The Complainant has used the ULTA mark since at least 1990 and owns longstanding trademark registrations for ULTA in the US, UK, EU, and other jurisdictions. The disputed Domain Name was registered in January 2026 using a privacy registration service. At the time of the Complaint, the domain name redirected to an automatically-generated parked page composed of fitness-related advertisements.

The Complainant alleges that ULTA has no meaning other than as an identifier for its business and that the Respondent is not authorized to use the mark. The Respondent filed a deficient, uncertified response identifying the underlying registrant as Colin Malcolm. The Respondent acknowledged the Complainant’s rights but argued the domain name suggests concepts like “ultra fit” or “ultimate fitness” and was registered as a strong, brandable name for a future fitness project, denying any knowledge of the Complainant at the time of registration.

Procedural Issue: Deficient Response: Paragraph 5(vii) of the Rules provides that the Response must conclude with a statement certifying its accuracy and completeness, followed by the signature of the Respondent or its representative. Paragraph 5(ix) provides that the Response is to be accompanied by any documentary or other evidence upon which the Respondent relies. The Panel has discretion whether to accept and consider a response that fails to comply with these provisions. The Response omits the required certification statement and signature, and the only accompanying evidence is a screenshot of the parked page to which the domain name redirects. The Panel elects to consider that documentary evidence but not the uncertified statements that appear within the deficient Response.

Held: The Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests as there is no evidence of active use or demonstrable preparations for a bona fide offering of goods or services, given the domain simply redirects to fitness-related ads. The Respondent used a privacy service and what appears to be internally consistent but possibly fictitious underlying registration information. The Panel found it implausible that an entity engaged in the business of registering and marketing brandable domain names would be unaware of the Complainant and its mark when registering a domain name that merely appends a generic term to the mark. The Panel inferred that the Respondent registered the Domain Name intending to sell it to the Complainant or a competitor, or to profit by creating and exploiting confusion with the Complainant’s mark.

Transfer

Complainant’s Counsel: Melissa A. Vallone of Barnes & Thornburg LLP, United States
Respondent’s Counsel: Self-represented

Case Comment reviewed and approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:

This decision adopts a strict approach to both procedural compliance and inference of bad faith, resulting in a transfer of the domain name. However, aspects of the reasoning – particularly given the procedural posture – warrant a measured and cautious reading.

A key procedural issue shaped the outcome. The Respondent’s submission was deficient, lacking the required certification and signature. The Panel exercised its discretion to disregard the Respondent’s factual assertions while considering only limited documentary evidence. While consistent with the Rules, this effectively deprived the Panel of a fully developed record, with the Respondent’s explanation receiving little to no evidentiary weight.

On the merits, the Panel found no rights or legitimate interests, relying on the lack of active use and the presence of a parked page. The bad faith finding turned largely on the Panel’s view that it was implausible for a domain investor to be unaware of the Complainant’s well-known ULTA mark when registering a domain name incorporating it in full with an added descriptive term. From that, the Panel inferred an intent to target the Complainant or profit from confusion.

While that inference is consistent with many prior decisions involving well-known marks, it rests heavily on the absence of a credited alternative explanation. In circumstances where the Respondent’s position is effectively excluded on procedural grounds, panels should take care to ensure that findings of bad faith are grounded in affirmative evidence of targeting rather than inference alone.

Finally, the case was decided within two days of filing. Although efficient, such speed raises legitimate concerns about whether respondents have a meaningful opportunity to cure defects or supplement the record, particularly where the outcome turns on the absence of evidence.

Common Word, Real Business, Misleading Complaint: RDNH Found

Distributed Creation, Inc. v. Amelie Clement, NAF Claim Number: FA2602002203747

<splice .ai>

Panelist: Mr. Nick J. Gardner

Brief Facts: The Complainant operates SPLICE, a cloud-based music creation platform offering a subscription-based library of royalty-free audio samples, and operates its primary platform at <splice .com>. The Complainant holds trademark registrations for the SPLICE mark in multiple jurisdictions, including US registration (issued May 5, 2015), UK, EU, and Canada. The disputed Domain Name was registered on December 15, 2017. The Respondent is the CEO and co-founder of splice.ai GmbH, an Austrian limited liability company founded following a grant awarded (valued at EUR 55,000) to support the development of a conversational gaming interface platform. The disputed Domain Name has been used for email correspondence with contractors and the website identifies the company’s project. Before filing the Complaint, the Complainant’s counsel sent a message to the Respondent via LinkedIn indicating interest in purchasing the domain name, but the Respondent did not reply.

The Complainant alleges that the disputed Domain Name resolves to a skeletal website that has not been materially updated since 2019 and whose associated social media accounts show years of inactivity. The Complainant characterises this as passive holding and describes the website as a “facade of legitimacy” and the business as a “sham”. The Respondent contends that the word SPLICE is a common English word subject to widespread concurrent use by dozens of entities worldwide, and that Complainant, therefore, cannot plausibly claim anything approaching exclusive or famous status in the word. The Respondent further contends that the disputed Domain Name was registered in connection with a bona fide business project that predated any notice of this dispute by several years and was supported by a government grant. The company is formally registered under Austrian law, and this information was clearly displayed on the Respondent’s website.

Held: The Respondent has established demonstrable preparations to use, and actual use of, the disputed Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services prior to any notice of this dispute. These are not the acts of a passive cybersquatter. They are the documented activities of a small business operating under its chosen name across an extended development period. Further at no point has the Respondent taken any steps that could be said to be targeting the Complainant. Indeed there is nothing on the record before the Panel to show that the Respondent had any knowledge at all of the Complainant until December 5, 2025 when the Complainant approached the Respondent enquiring about purchasing the disputed Domain Name. The Complainant in a number of different respects seeks to deprecate Respondent’s business. It is also the case that the company the Respondent co-founded, splice.ai GmbH, has clearly been commonly known by the domain name.

As to registration in bad faith, the Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name in December 2017 in connection with a specific project for which she had already obtained government grant funding in 2016 under the splice .ai name. The project has nothing to do with Complainant’s business of audio sample libraries and music production tools. “SPLICE” is a common English word, and the record establishes that it is used concurrently as a trademark and business name by dozens of entities worldwide across wholly unrelated fields. Absent any evidence of targeting, the Panel cannot conclude, on this record, that the Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name with Complainant’s mark in mind. As to use in bad faith – the disputed Domain Name currently resolves to the splice.ai website describing its project and identifying its principals. This is active, if modest, use of the disputed Domain Name in connection with a genuine ongoing business project.

RDNH: The Complainant is professionally represented and knew or ought to have known that it had no reasonable chance of prevailing. The Complaint took no account of the fact that SPLICE is an ordinary English word with multiple concurrent users. Furthermore, the Complainant portrayed the position in an extremely misleading manner by stating there was no evidence the Respondent had ever been known as “Splice,” while entirely ignoring the copyright footer on the website referencing Splice .ai GmbH and providing an imprint link to corporate details.

To compound matters, the copy of the website that the Complainant placed in evidence was of extremely poor quality and the copyright footer barely legible. Finally, neither the Complainant’s characterization of the Respondent’s activities as “aggravated passive holding” is a recognized concept in any previously decided UDRP decisions, nor is the Complainant’s characterization of the Respondent’s business as a “facade of legitimacy” and a “sham” supported by the evidence.

Complaint Denied (RDNH)

Complainant’s Counsel: Jordan LaVine of Flaster Greenberg PC, USA
Respondent’s Counsel: John Berryhill, USA

Case Comment reviewed and approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:

This is a strong RDNH decision where the Panel rejected an overreaching complaint involving a common English word and a respondent operating a genuine business. The Panel found not only that the Respondent had rights and legitimate interests, but that the Complaint was advanced in a misleading manner that warranted sanction.

On the merits, the Respondent presented clear evidence of a bona fide business operating under the name “splice.ai,” including incorporation of an Austrian company, government grant funding, and actual use of the domain name for email and a project website. The Panel correctly held that these were not the actions of a passive holder, but rather demonstrable preparations and ongoing use in connection with a legitimate enterprise. There was also no evidence of targeting: the Respondent’s project was unrelated to the Complainant’s music platform, and the record did not support any awareness of the Complainant prior to its outreach in 2025.

The Panel also emphasized that “splice” is a common English word with widespread third-party use. This significantly undercut the Complainant’s theory of exclusivity and reinforced the absence of targeting. In such circumstances, mere ownership of a trademark does not entitle a complainant to displace another party using a dictionary term in connection with a bona fide, unrelated business.

The RDNH finding is particularly notable. The Panel found that the Complainant, despite being represented by counsel, ignored key facts and advanced a misleading narrative. It asserted that there was no evidence the Respondent had been known by the name “Splice,” while overlooking clear evidence on the Respondent’s own website identifying “splice.ai GmbH.” The Complainant also relied on poor-quality evidence that obscured this information and advanced unsupported characterizations of the Respondent’s business as a “sham.”

Further, the Panel rejected the Complainant’s attempt to frame the case as one of “aggravated passive holding,” noting that no such doctrine exists under the Policy. This reflects an effort by the Complainant to stretch UDRP concepts beyond their recognized limits in order to fit the facts.

Overall, this decision reinforces several core principles:

Common or dictionary terms are entitled to broader legitimate use, particularly where supported by bona fide business activity.

Evidence of incorporation, funding, and operational use strongly supports rights or legitimate interests.

Mischaracterizing the record or ignoring obvious evidence may justify a finding of RDNH.

In short, this was not a close case. The Respondent’s position was well-documented, the Complainant’s theory lacked foundation, and the attempt to reframe legitimate business activity as bad faith resulted in a clear and justified finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking.

No Targeting at Acquisition; Broker Outreach Insufficient for Bad Faith

Evertrust v. Arash Ansari, WIPO Case No. D2026-0407

<evertrust .com>

Panelist: Mr. Adam Taylor

Brief Facts: The France-based Complainant, incorporated in January 2017, provides software and digital trust services under the mark EVERTRUST. The Complainant registered <evertrust .fr> in December 2016, and owns a French trademark for EVERTRUST registered in September 2025. The disputed Domain Name was registered on May 10, 2017, and was acquired by the Respondent for US $10,060 via a DropCatch auction. It has since been resolved to a webpage offering the domain for sale. In October 2018, the Complainant received an email from a broker at “NameAgency .com” offering the domain for sale. In December 2025, an employee of the Complainant emailed the Respondent from a personal email address attempting to buy the domain name.

The Complainant contends that the Respondent lacks legitimate interests, holding the domain passively, and that the 2018 broker email reflects a bad faith offer to sell the domain under paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy. The Respondent contends that the domain was acquired for its inherent value as a brandable combination of two dictionary words (“ever” and “trust”). The Respondent further argues they acquired the domain without knowledge of the Complainant, which was a local, newly formed startup at the time. Furthermore, the Respondent asserts the 2018 email was sent by an independent broker without their authorization or instruction, and noted the Complainant deliberately omitted its own 2025 purchase attempt from the Complaint.

Held: The Panel found no evidence that the Respondent’s aim in registering the disputed Domain Name was to profit from or exploit the Complainant’s trademark. The Complainant had only incorporated five months prior to the Respondent’s acquisition and provided no evidence of actual trading or significant cross-border reputation at that time. The domain consists of a combination of two dictionary words. Moreover, there is no evidence that the disputed Domain Name has ever been resolved to a website with content relating to the Complainant’s industry; so far as the Panel can tell, the disputed Domain Name has only ever been used for various webpages offering the disputed Domain Name for sale. Furthermore, the Panel accepted that the 2018 broker email post-dated the acquisition by 17 months, did not explicitly state it was on behalf of an owner, and lacked proof of being initiated or controlled by the Respondent.

RDNH: The Respondent seeks a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking on the basis that the Complainant should have known that it could not prevail in this proceeding, relying amongst other things on the allegedly “misattributed” broker sale enquiry email. However, in the absence of any reason from the Respondent as to why the Complainant should have doubted the email’s authenticity, the Panel considers that it was reasonable for the Complainant to assume that the broker was connected with the owner of the disputed Domain Name and that the email provided the Complainant with a reasonable prospect of success in this case. The Panel would add that, in its view, the failure of the Complainant to disclose its pre-Complaint purchase enquiry via a personal email address is immaterial in this context. Accordingly, the Panel declines to make a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking in this case.

Complaint Denied

Complainant’s Counsel: Internally Represented
Respondent’s Counsel: Self-represented

Case Comment reviewed and approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:

This decision reflects a careful and well-reasoned application of core UDRP principles by the Panel. The Complaint was denied on the basis of a clear absence of targeting, with the Panel methodically assessing both the factual record and the applicable legal standards.

On the merits, the timing was decisive. The Respondent acquired the domain name in May 2017, just months after the Complainant’s incorporation and well before any demonstrated reputation or trademark rights beyond a local presence. The Panel correctly found no evidence that the Respondent had knowledge of, or targeted, the Complainant at the time of acquisition. The domain name consists of two common dictionary words, “ever” and “trust,” supporting its inherent value as a brandable term independent of the Complainant.

The Panel also dealt carefully with the Complainant’s reliance on a 2018 broker email offering the domain name for sale. He noted that the communication post-dated the acquisition by 17 months and did not establish that the Respondent initiated or authorized the outreach. In the absence of evidence linking the broker to the Respondent, the Panel appropriately declined to infer bad faith. The decision reinforces that offering a domain name for sale, without more, does not constitute bad faith where there is no evidence of targeting.

On RDNH, the Panel adopted a measured and balanced approach. While the Respondent pointed to weaknesses in the Complaint and the Complainant’s omission of its own purchase attempt, the Panel found it was not unreasonable for the Complainant to assume a connection between the broker and the domain owner. The Panel’s restraint underscores the high threshold required for an RDNH finding and reflects a disciplined focus on whether the Complaint was truly abusive rather than merely unsuccessful.

Overall, this is a thoughtful and disciplined decision that reinforces fundamental UDRP principles while demonstrating appropriate caution in the application of RDNH.

Ankur Raheja is the Editor-in-Chief of the ICA’s new weekly UDRP Case Summary service. Ankur has practiced law in India since 2005 and has been practicing domain name law for over ten years, representing clients from all over the world in UDRP proceedings. He is the founder of Cylaw Solutions.

He is an accredited panelist with ADNDRC (Hong Kong) and MFSD (Italy). Previously, Ankur worked as an Arbitrator/Panelist with .IN Registry for six years. In a advisory capacity, he has worked with NIXI/.IN Registry and Net4 India’s resolution professional.

Complainant’s Wilful Blindness to Publicly Available Evidence Leads to RDNH – vol. 6.11