Chronological Barrier Defeats Complaint; Panel Finds RDNH
This case reflects a straightforward application of a foundational UDRP principle, namely that a complainant generally cannot establish bad-faith registration where the domain name predates the complainant’s trademark rights. Panels consistently treat this chronological barrier as decisive unless there is evidence of targeting through insider knowledge or other exceptional circumstances. None existed here. Continue reading commentary here.
We hope you will enjoy this edition of the Digest (vol. 6.10) as we review these noteworthy recent decisions with expert commentary. (We invite guest commenters to contact us):
‣ Chronological Barrier Defeats Complaint; Panel Finds RDNH (racingsnail .com *with commentary)
‣ Questionable Typosquatting Finding Where “CareSoft” Has Obvious Independent Meaning (caresoft .co *with commentary)
‣ Panel Infers Targeting of AI Startup’s “Liquid” Brand Despite Generic Meaning (liquid .app *with commentary)
‣ Panel Conducts Independent Research to Confirm Common Law Rights in Apparent Impersonation Case (valleyequipmentandtrucks .com *with commentary)
‣ Supplemental Register Mark and Descriptive Term Doom Complaint (campspot .ai *with commentary)
Chronological Barrier Defeats Complaint; Panel Finds RDNH
RACINGSNAIL, INC. v. Mark Dawson, NAF Claim Number: FA2602002203212
<racingsnail .com>
Panelist: Dawn Osborne
Brief Facts: The Complainant, founded in 2005, provides software as a service (SAAS) services (featuring software for tracking sales volume for agents and brokers selling policies in operation is service of the insurance industry) under the service name RACING SNAIL. The Complainant provided evidence of common law rights in its mark by way of annual report information, press articles and advertising. The Domain Name was registered in 2002 and the Respondent rejected an approach from the Complainant to sell the Domain Name saying he wished to use it for a website.
However, the Domain Name has never been used for a web site and is being passively held which the Complainant alleges that it is bad faith given that the Complainant is recognised in its field. The Complainant further alleges that the Respondent used a proxy service to anonymise the data registration details for the Domain Name and that the Domain Name is causing confusion for the Complainant which is well known in its field. The Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
Held: In this case the Domain Name was registered three years before the Complainant began use of its RACING SNAIL mark and began trading and accruing common law rights. There is no evidence that the Respondent knew about the Complainant or its mark at the time of his registration or acquisition of the Domain Name. See TicketSms s.r.l. and Mr Andrea Vitali v. Franklin Iziren D2023-0442 (WIPO April 12, 2023) (where a respondent registers a domain name before the complainant’s trade mark rights accrue, panels will not find bad faith on the part of the respondent unless there is a situation of opportunistic bad faith due to insider trading or some other proof that the Respondent was targeting the Complainant).
The Panel determines that the Complainant has failed to establish registration of the Domain Name in bad faith and, in light of this finding, it is unnecessary to make any determination in relation to use of the Domain Name in bad faith.
RDNH: The Respondent did not reply to this Complaint. However the failures in this Complaint inevitably bring considerations of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking into question. In this case the Domain Name was registered three years before the Complainant was incorporated and began trading. As such, based on the evidence, it is not possible that the Respondent had the Complainant in mind at the time of registration of the Domain Name which could not have been registered in bad faith. On balance the Panel believes that exercising reasonable skill and judgement the Complainant must have realised that it had no right to call for the transfer of the Domain Name in this case under the Policy and this Complaint was bound to fail. The Panel makes a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking.
Complaint Denied (RDNH)
Complainant’s Counsel: Mark Lawrence Lorbiecki of Williams Kastner & Gibbs PLLC, USA
Respondent’s Counsel: No Response
Case Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch: This case reflects a straightforward application of a foundational UDRP principle, namely that a complainant generally cannot establish bad-faith registration where the domain name predates the complainant’s trademark rights. Panels consistently treat this chronological barrier as decisive unless there is evidence of targeting through insider knowledge or other exceptional circumstances. None existed here.
The Panel also entered an RDNH finding despite the absence of a Response, reinforcing that complainants and their counsel bear responsibility to assess whether the elements of the Policy can plausibly be satisfied before filing. When the disputed domain name clearly predates the complainant’s business and mark, proceeding with a complaint risks being viewed as an attempt to obtain through the UDRP what could not be obtained through marketplace negotiation.
The decision also illustrates why arguments based on passive holding, privacy services, or industry recognition cannot substitute for evidence of targeting at the time of registration. These factors may support an inference of bad faith only where the complainant’s rights already existed. Where the domain name predates those rights, such arguments carry no weight.
Questionable Typosquatting Finding Where “CareSoft” Has Obvious Independent Meaning
Carahsoft Technology Corp. v. Ivan Spasenovic, NAF Claim Number: FA2602002203655
<caresoft .co>
Panelist: Mr. David L. Kreider, Chartered Arbitrator (UK)
Brief Facts: The Complainant, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Maryland, describes itself as a leading provider of IT products and services to the public sector, including federal, state, and local government agencies, educational institutions, and prime contractors. The Complainant owns several United States trademark registrations for the CARAHSOFT mark, the earliest of which was registered on September 22, 2009. The disputed Domain Name <caresoft .co> was registered on December 16, 2025 and resolves to a page stating that the domain name “caresoft .co is for sale!”
The Complainant alleges that the disputed Domain Name constitutes typosquatting by being confusingly similar to the CARAHSOFT mark. The second-level domain ‘caresoft’ replaces the letters ‘ah’ in CARAHSOFT with ‘e,’ creating a phonetic equivalent. The Complainant further alleges that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed Domain Name in bad faith, pointing to the typosquatting nature of the registration, the Respondent’s passive holding of the domain, the concealment of identity behind a privacy service, and the absence of any plausible legitimate purpose for the registration. The Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Held: The Complainant has established rights in the CARAHSOFT mark through its US trademark registrations, the earliest registered on September 22, 2009. The disputed Domain Name differs from the trademark only by the substitution of the letters “ah” with the letter “e” yielding the term “caresoft.” The resulting domain name sounds nearly identical to the CARAHSOFT mark, and the two terms are phonetic equivalents. Both share the distinctive prefix “car” and suffix “soft.” This is a classic instance of typosquatting. Prior panels have consistently found confusing similarity under analogous circumstances. Further, the disputed Domain Name resolves only to a page offering the domain for sale. There is no evidence that the Respondent has used, or made demonstrable preparations to use, the disputed Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶4(c)(i), or that Respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed Domain Name under Policy ¶4(c)(iii).
The disputed Domain Name is a typographical variation of the CARAHSOFT mark, constituting typosquatting, which UDRP panels have consistently recognized as evidence of bad faith registration and use. See WIPO Overview 3.1, ¶3.2.1. The Complainant’s evidence shows bad actors have registered domains confusingly similar to the CARAHSOFT mark to enable phishing. Even without definitive proof of fraud, prior UDRP panels have held that mere passive holding or use of a domain is not a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial use, but evidence of bad-faith use of the mark. The disputed Domain Name resolves to a page offering the domain for sale, demonstrating Respondent’s bad faith. The Respondent has also concealed its identity behind a privacy service, which prior panels have treated as a factor supporting a finding of bad faith. There is no plausible legitimate explanation for the registration of a domain name that is a misspelling of Complainant’s well-known and distinctive mark.
Transfer
Complainant’s Counsel: Adam D. Mandell of Millen, White, Zelano & Branigan, P.C., USA
Respondent’s Counsel: No Response
Case Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch: The Panel’s bad-faith analysis appears questionable because it assumes too readily that “caresoft” is necessarily a misspelling of CARAHSOFT rather than a term with its own plausible semantic and commercial appeal. Unlike many typosquatting cases involving awkward or inexplicable strings, “CareSoft” reads naturally as a combination of “care” and “soft.” That construction could easily appeal to businesses in software, healthcare, consumer products, or household goods. This makes the Panel’s statement that there is “no plausible legitimate explanation” for the registration difficult to sustain.
The disputed domain name does however resemble CARAHSOFT phonetically, and the fact that the domain was offered for sale entitled the Panel to examine whether the name was registered to target the Complainant. But phonetic resemblance alone is not sufficient, particularly when there is a prima facie appearance of an independent meaning and value in the domain name, as aforesaid. The key issue under the Policy is targeting. On the record, there appears to have been no meaningful evidence that the Respondent was aware of this U.S. complainant, its U.S. trademark rights, or its claimed reputation at the time of registration.
This analytical gap matters. The UDRP is not merely a similarity test. Bad faith requires persuasive evidence that the respondent registered the domain name because of the complainant’s mark. Where the disputed name is also a coherent and independently attractive term, panels should be cautious about inferring targeting solely from phonetic resemblance, particularly where the complainant’s mark is not shown to be globally famous and the respondent is located outside the complainant’s home market.
The domain’s for-sale landing page also does less work here than the Panel appears to assign to it. Offering a domain name for sale is not inherently improper where the name itself is a plausible brandable term. This factor may become significant when paired with convincing evidence that the name was selected for its trademark value. But where the term itself has obvious standalone appeal, the presence of a sales page does not by itself establish targeting.
The contrast with more unusual typo constructions is instructive. Where a domain name is an awkward or inexplicable variation of a mark, the absence of a response may in some circumstances more easily allow a panel to reasonably infer targeting. But “caresoft” is not an inherently strange string that necessarily requires an explanation for its registration. It is exactly the sort of coined yet intuitive term that could plausibly be registered without any awareness of the Complainant – particularly by a Serbian who has no reason to be aware of the Complainant’s brand.
The decision overstates both the distinctiveness of the Complainant’s mark and the inevitability of the targeting inference. Panels should be careful to ensure that findings such as there being “no plausible good-faith reason for its registration” are sustainable on the evidence before making them.
Panel Infers Targeting of AI Startup’s “Liquid” Brand Despite Generic Meaning
Liquid AI, Inc. v. Sam Sharma, WIPO Case No. D2025-5127
<liquid .app>
Panelist: Mr. W. Scott Blackmer
Brief Facts: The US-based Complainant was incorporated on March 30, 2023 and it has been providing artificial intelligence (“AI”) products and services since December 2023 to help customers use general-purpose AI on data center servers and on edge devices. The Complainant’s chief products are called “Liquid Foundation Models”. The Complainant raised seed funding from venture funds in 2023, secured additional funding in 2024 led by chipmaker AMD, and reports a valuation estimated at over USD 2 billion. Articles attached to the Complaint show that the Complainant attracted media attention. The Complainant applied to register LIQUID as a word mark in the United States on October 27, 2023, on an “intent-to-use” basis. That application remains pending as of the date of this Decision. However, the Complainant also has registered marks for Liquid (word and design) in other jurisdictions.
The Respondent acquired the disputed Domain Name at auction on November 10, 2025, and remains the registrant of record. The Response was filed by counsel for Liquid App, LLC (registered on November 24, 2025), which states that it is authorized to act on behalf of Mr. Sharma. The Panel notes further that Liquid App does not appear to have an online presence using that name. The Response furnishes little information about Liquid App or its role but says only, elliptically, that the disputed Domain Name was registered to develop a website with a focus on financial services and “has since, with Liquid App, LLC, broadened the scope of financial services that will eventually be available through the website …”. The Respondent rendered its logo in white on a black background and the Complainant’s logo appears that way in some instances (such as on its YouTube social media site) but otherwise in black design and text on a white or colored background, as shown below.
The Complainant alleges that it is “inconceivable” that the Respondent was unaware of the Complainant, pointing to the earlier version of the Respondent’s website displaying a design logo similar to the Complainant’s as evidence of the Respondent’s intention to exploit the Complainant’s Liquid mark. The Complainant further alleges that the Respondent created confusion with the Complainant’s mark, advertising “digital wallet services that upon information and belief do not exist”. The Respondent claims a legitimate interest in using the term for an alternative meaning with respect to financial matters, as something “capable of ready conversion into cash”, or the condition of liquidity, which the Respondent considers appropriate for its website focused on digital currency. The Respondent further contends that it has not yet developed the ability for consumers to create accounts or do anything other than provide their email addresses on a Wait List for the Respondent to contact when services become available.
Held: The Respondent Liquid App does not yet own the disputed Domain Name, and the record does not reflect steps beyond registering a company name and publishing a “Coming Soon” website with a “Wait List” collecting emails of potentially interested consumers. The Panel does not find that this amounts to prior commercial use or demonstrable preparations to use the disputed Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. Moreover, the Respondent’s asserted legitimate interest in the generic term “liquid” is pretextual, given the apparent targeting of the Complainant’s mark and the close similarity of the logo recently shown on the Respondent’s website. The Response does not advance an argument that Mr. Sharma chose the disputed Domain Name to reflect the name of Liquid App but argues rather that the name was chosen for its value in describing a financial site.
The Panel further notes that the Respondent acquired the disputed domain in November 2025, after the Complainant had registered the LIQUID trademark and gained substantial publicity for its AI products and investments from firms like AMD and Shopify in industry outlets and mainstream business media. The Respondent denies that he had knowledge of the Complainant and its marks when registering the disputed Domain Name, but there is reason to doubt. The record does not include a signed statement of any kind from the registrant Sam Sharma, and Liquid App did not exist when the disputed Domain Name was registered. Given the facts and circumstances, the Panel considers it more likely than not that Sam Sharma, at least, meant to exploit the “high tech” reputation associated with the Complainant. This accords with the example of bad faith found in the Policy under paragraph 4(b)(iv).
Transfer
Complainant’s Counsel: Coates IP LLP, United States
Respondent’s Counsel: Allen, Dyer, Doppelt, Milbrath & Gilchrist, United States
Case Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
This case illustrates the challenges that arise when a complainant asserts rights in a common dictionary term that also has an obvious independent meaning in another commercial context. The complainant relied on the mark LIQUID in connection with artificial intelligence products, supported by significant venture funding and media coverage. The respondent, however, argued that the domain name was selected for its financial meaning – referring to liquidity and the ready convertibility of assets into cash – consistent with a proposed financial services platform.
A complicated factor is that two parties appeared as the Respondent, an individual who was the original registrant and a registered company with the name Liquid App LLC who was in the process of acquiring the Disputed Domain Name from the original registrant. These unusual circumstances raise further complications, as a Respondent whose company name matched that of the Disputed Domain Name would have a strong claim to legitimate interest in that domain name. Further, that the original Respondent found a third-party buyer for the Disputed Domain Name, would undercut the allegations that the Respondent was targeting the Complainant in registering the Disputed Domain Name and offering it for sale.
The Panel ultimately rejected that explanation and concluded that the respondent’s reliance on the dictionary meaning of “liquid” was pretextual. Several factors appear to have influenced that conclusion. The respondent’s website was largely undeveloped and consisted only of a “coming soon” page collecting email addresses for a waiting list, and the respondent did not provide substantial evidence of demonstrable preparations to launch a financial services platform. The Panel also placed weight on the similarity between a logo used on the respondent’s site and versions of the complainant’s branding, viewing that resemblance as suggestive of an effort to benefit from the complainant’s growing reputation in the AI sector.
These circumstances form a reasonable basis for the Panel’s conclusion that the respondent was aware of and targeted the complainant, particularly considering the resemblance between the logos and the timing of the domain acquisition following the complainant’s funding announcements and media coverage. At the same time, the case illustrates the difficulty of resolving disputes involving common dictionary terms where the respondent advances an alternative explanation that is not inherently implausible.
Where the evidentiary record presents competing inferences – on the one hand suggesting possible targeting, and on the other consistent with a plausible descriptive or independent use of the term – the limits of the UDRP process can become apparent. The Policy is designed for relatively clear cases of cybersquatting, and proceedings conducted on a written record without discovery or cross-examination may not always be well suited to resolving disputes that depend heavily on competing factual narratives about intent.
In this instance, the Panel ultimately found the surrounding circumstances sufficient to infer targeting. But the case generally serves as a reminder that disputes can sometimes fall into a grey area, raising the question of whether the UDRP is always the ideal forum for resolving such cases.
Panel Conducts Independent Research to Confirm Common Law Rights in Apparent Impersonation Case
Valley Equipment and Truck Inc v. Axel Deenberg, WIPO Case No. D2026-0067
<valleyequipmentandtrucks .com>
Panelist: Mr. Evan D. Brown
Brief Facts: The Complainant is in the business of selling used construction equipment, used trucks and trailers. It asserts that it has used the domain name <valleyequipmentandtruck .com> since 2008. The Complainant has not asserted ownership of any trademark registrations. However, based on the Panel’s independent review of publicly available records, including the Internet Archive, it is apparent that the Complainant has been conducting business continually for many years, since at least as early as 2012, under the mark VALLEY EQUIPMENT AND TRUCK. The disputed Domain Name was registered on December 6, 2025. The Respondent has used the disputed Domain Name to set up a website which the Complainant asserts is bogus, as shown by the use of fake serial numbers and the unauthorized use of the Complainant’s physical address and government-issued documents.
Held: Although the Complainant has not relied on any trademark registration, the Policy recognizes that unregistered or common law rights may suffice, provided the complainant demonstrates that the mark has become a distinctive identifier associated with its goods or services. Here, the Panel’s independent review of “archive .org” shows longstanding and continuous use of the name VALLEY EQUIPMENT AND TRUCK in connection with the Complainant’s business for many years. In the circumstances of this case, the Panel is satisfied that the Complainant has common law rights in the mark VALLEY EQUIPMENT AND TRUCK. The record further supports a finding that the Respondent targeted the Complainant. The disputed Domain Name is almost identical to the Complainant’s longstanding domain name and business name, differing only by the addition of the letter “s” to the word “truck”.
Given the nature of the Complainant’s business and the content of the Respondent’s Facebook page containing the disputed Domain Name, including the alleged use of fake serial numbers and unauthorized use of the Complainant’s physical address and government-issued documents, the Panel finds it implausible that the Respondent was unaware of the Complainant. By using the disputed Domain Name in this manner, the Panel finds Respondent has acted in bad faith under paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy. Moreover, the apparent impersonation of the Complainant and use of false or misleading information reinforce the conclusion that the Respondent’s conduct is abusive and undertaken in bad-faith. The Panel notes that the Complainant has raised serious allegations against the Respondent, and that the Respondent’s failure to rebut these allegations in these proceedings supports a finding of bad faith.
Transfer
Complainant’s Counsel: John Welch, United States
Respondent’s Counsel: No Response
Case Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
This decision appears to involve a relatively clear case of cybersquatting coupled with apparent impersonation. The disputed domain name differs from the complainant’s established domain name and business name only by the addition of the letter “s” to the word “truck,” and the respondent allegedly used the domain name in connection with a website and social media presence displaying fake serial numbers and incorporating the complainant’s physical address and government-issued documents. On these facts, the Panel found it implausible that the respondent was unaware of the complainant and concluded that the domain name had been registered and used in bad faith.
The more interesting aspect of the case concerns the Panel’s treatment of the complainant’s proof of trademark rights. The complainant did not rely on any trademark registrations and the decision suggests that the evidentiary record for common law rights may have been limited. Rather than dismissing the complaint or denying it without prejudice, the Panel conducted its own review of publicly available sources, including the Internet Archive, and concluded that the complainant had been operating for many years under the name VALLEY EQUIPMENT AND TRUCK.
At first glance, this raises the question whether a denial without prejudice might have been appropriate where the complainant had not clearly established its rights on the face of the complaint. While panels should be cautious about supplementing an evidentiary record where a complainant has not met its burden of proof, decisions do not always reflect such restraint. The UDRP does permit panels to conduct limited factual research into matters of public record. Paragraph 4.8 of the WIPO Overview 3.1 recognizes that panels may consult sources such as the Internet Archive or other publicly accessible records to corroborate a party’s assertions or better understand the factual background of a dispute.
It is not entirely clear from the decision whether the Panel’s research was undertaken primarily to confirm assertions already supported by the complaint or whether it played a more substantial role in establishing the complainant’s common law rights. The wording of the decision leaves some ambiguity on that point. Nevertheless, the Panel’s reliance on publicly available historical records falls within the type of limited factual inquiry contemplated by the UDRP framework.
In any event, the surrounding circumstances strongly supported a finding of targeting. The disputed domain name closely mirrors the complainant’s longstanding domain name and business name, and the respondent’s alleged use of the complainant’s address and identifying materials suggests an attempt to impersonate the complainant’s business. In cases involving apparent impersonation and consumer deception, panels may be reluctant to dispose of the matter on procedural grounds where the broader factual context strongly points to abusive conduct.
The decision therefore illustrates the tension that can arise between the complainant’s burden to prove its case and the Panel’s ability to consult publicly available sources when evaluating the record. In circumstances where the indicia of impersonation and targeting are strong, panels may be inclined to verify key facts and proceed to the merits rather than require a refiling that would delay resolution of what appears to be an abusive registration.
Supplemental Register Mark and Descriptive Term Doom Complaint
<campspot .ai>
Panelist: Mr. W. Scott Blackmer
Brief Facts: The Complainant is a US‑incorporated limited liability company. It provides a searchable online business directory of lodging locations and descriptions for tent sites, recreational vehicles, and other outdoor accommodations via several websites, including one at <campspot .com>. The Complainant holds the US trademark (registered on November 2, 2021; first use: December 19, 2015) for CAMPSPOT as a word mark on the Supplemental Register of the USPTO. As indicated in the USPTO Nonfinal Office Action on September 16, 2021, the registration on the Supplemental Register followed from the USPTO examiner’s conclusion that the mark was not registrable on the Principal Register because it was merely descriptive but was capable of acquiring distinctiveness over time. The disputed Domain Name was created on July 10, 2025 and resolves to a website headed “Campspot .ai” with the tagline, “Your Spot for Camping Gear and Adventure!”
The Complainant alleges that it registered the mark in 2015, and that in July 2025, the Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name and that there is no legitimate use of <campspot .ai> other than diverting business from the trademark holder to a competitor. The Respondent contends that “camp” and “spot” are dictionary words that the Respondent legitimately uses in its tag line, and that it is currently “relaunching” its outdoor apparel business, based in Boulder, Colorado, where its company has been registered since 2020. The Respondent further contends that it had no prior knowledge of the Complainant until the Complainant’s representative contacted the Respondent and that the Complainant’s representative said he had no issue signing a non-compete agreement.
Held: The Complainant has not shown rights in respect of a registered trademark or service mark for the purposes of the Policy. Registration on the USPTO Supplemental Register signifies that a mark is descriptive but capable of acquiring distinctiveness (secondary meaning) and, like an unregistered mark, requires supporting evidence that it has in fact acquired such distinctiveness. The Panel does not find that the Complainant has established unregistered trademark or service mark rights for the purposes of the Policy. The Panel notes the descriptive nature of the mark and the fact that the USPTO found it unregistrable on the Principal Register even after nearly six years of use online. The Complaint offered no evidence of sales or consumer recognition in this proceeding to support a common law trademark claim.
The Complainant began to use the name CAMPSPOT in 2015, and the USPTO found that it was descriptive and had not acquired secondary meaning by 2021. The Complainant has failed to establish that it had a protectible common law mark in 2025, the problem is that the Complainant assumes that the Respondent must have been aware of the Complainant’s brand and intended to exploit it. The Respondent denies prior awareness of the Complainant, and this denial is plausible. The disputed Domain Name is descriptive and composed of dictionary terms, and the Respondent is not in the same market. The Complainant has not established that it is so well known that the Respondent’s denial of knowledge simply lacks credibility. The Complainant bears the burden of proof, and on this record the Panel would have to find for the Respondent on this element of the Complaint.
RDNH: It does not appear that both Parties has had the benefit of UDRP experienced counsel, and the Panel does not find on this record that the Complaint has been brought in bad faith and constitutes an attempt at Reverse Domain Name Hijacking.
Complaint Denied
Complainant’s Counsel: Internally Represented
Respondent’s Counsel: Internally Represented
Case Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
This decision illustrates the limited weight that a U.S. trademark registration on the Supplemental Register carries in UDRP proceedings. The complainant relied on its CAMPSPOT registration on the Supplemental Register, which reflects the USPTO’s determination that the mark is descriptive but potentially capable of acquiring distinctiveness over time. Under the Policy, however, such a registration does not automatically establish trademark rights. Instead, a complainant must still demonstrate that the term has acquired secondary meaning in the marketplace.
The Panel found that the complainant failed to make that showing. Although the complainant had used the CAMPSPOT name since 2015, the USPTO had already determined by 2021 that the term remained descriptive and had not acquired distinctiveness sufficient for registration on the Principal Register. In this proceeding, the complainant submitted no evidence of consumer recognition, sales figures, advertising expenditures, or other indicia of secondary meaning. As a result, the Panel properly concluded that the complainant had not established trademark rights for purposes of the Policy.
This approach is consistent with established UDRP guidance. As noted in UDRP Perspectives at 1.10, a panel reviewing a U.S. trademark claim should consider whether a mark is registered on the Principal or Supplemental Register because the latter reflects that the term is descriptive and has not yet been shown to function as a distinctive identifier. In such cases, the complainant must still prove that the term has acquired distinctiveness through use.
The descriptive character of the term also made the respondent’s explanation plausible. The disputed domain name consists of two common dictionary words – “camp” and “spot” – and the respondent used the phrase in connection with a website promoting camping gear and outdoor adventure products. The respondent’s claim that it selected the domain name for its ordinary descriptive meaning was therefore not inherently implausible, particularly given the absence of evidence that the complainant’s brand had achieved widespread recognition.
The Panel also rejected the complainant’s assumption that the respondent must have been aware of its business and intended to exploit it. The complainant bore the burden of proving targeting, and on this record that inference could not be drawn. The parties operated in somewhat different commercial contexts, and the complainant did not demonstrate that its mark had become so well known that the respondent’s denial of knowledge lacked credibility.
The case serves as a reminder that complainants relying on descriptive marks face a higher evidentiary burden under the UDRP. Registration on the Supplemental Register signals that the mark has not yet been shown to be distinctive, and without evidence of secondary meaning, a complainant may fail to establish the threshold requirement of trademark rights under the Policy.
Ankur Raheja is the Editor-in-Chief of the ICA’s new weekly UDRP Case Summary service. Ankur has practiced law in India since 2005 and has been practicing domain name law for over ten years, representing clients from all over the world in UDRP proceedings. He is the founder of Cylaw Solutions.
He is an accredited panelist with ADNDRC (Hong Kong) and MFSD (Italy). Previously, Ankur worked as an Arbitrator/Panelist with .IN Registry for six years. In a advisory capacity, he has worked with NIXI/.IN Registry and Net4 India’s resolution professional.