From AI-Generated Complaints to Hallucinated Precedents and AI-Generated Evidence: Emerging Issues in Domain Name Disputes
Article by Mr. Stefaan Meuwissen, Knowledge Lawyer I.P. at Hogan Lovells International LLP
Artificial intelligence has become a routine feature of proceedings under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). Both complainants and respondents now use AI to draft pleadings, identify legal arguments, generate or support evidence, build websites and business plans, and produce automated domain name valuations. Used carefully, these tools can make the UDRP more accessible and more efficient. Used carelessly, they introduce real risks around accuracy, evidential reliability, confidentiality and accountability. Continue reading here
Join us for this year’s Levine Lecture featuring Nick Gardner, who will present: “26 Years of Deciding UDRP Cases – What Does a Panelist Actually Do, and Why? How Will AI Change This?“ A veteran of UDRP practice, Nick’s experience ranges from early landmark English court cases to presiding over hundreds of disputes as a leading WIPO and Nominet panelist. The session will include an introduction by Zak Muscovitch, opening remarks by Tony Willoughby, and closing remarks from Gerald Levine.
We hope you will enjoy this edition of the Digest (vol. 6.29) as we review these noteworthy recent decisions with expert commentary. (We invite guest commenters to contact us):
‣ When .AI Cuts Both Ways: Applying UDRP Perspectives on Targeting (maddi.ai *with commentary)
‣ A Transfer Order Is Not Enough: EPP Code Interception Exposes a UDRP Implementation Gap (gibsondum.com *with commentary)
‣ Panel’s Independent Research Saves Defaulting Respondent; Guggenheim Abu Dhabi Museum Project Provides Plausible Good Faith Use (guggenheimabudhabi.ai *with commentary)
‣ Unique Coined Term Undoes an Undocumented Business Plan (ascyrus.com *with commentary)
‣ NCAA Defeats AI Platform Startup in NIL Domain Dispute; Bad Faith Registration Not Established (nilassist.com *with commentary)
When .AI Cuts Both Ways: Applying UDRP Perspectives on Targeting
Aderant North America, Inc. v. Sasan Aghdasi, Forum Claim Number: FA2605002222727
<maddi.ai>
Panelist: Mr. Nick J. Gardner, Professor David E. Sorkin and Mr. Eugene I. Low (Chair)
Brief Facts: The Complainant is a US-based provider of an AI platform for law firm operations, including billing compliance, docketing, financial management, and time entry. It owns US trademark registration for the mark MADDI, (registered May 7, 2024; claimed first use: June 21, 2023), along with corresponding registrations in Canada and the United Kingdom. The disputed Domain Name was registered on January 15, 2026, and resolves to a parking page offering the domain for sale at USD 34,888. The Respondent is an entrepreneur and domain name investor, who maintains a portfolio of personal name domains across AI and other TLDs. The Complainant alleges that its MADDI Mark has a strong reputation in the AI assistant platform community, supported by nearly three years of use and widespread unsolicited media coverage of its AI platform at the time Respondent registered the Domain Name.
The Complainant further alleges that the Respondent has acted in bad faith, where its primary intent was to sell the Domain Name to the trademark owner or one of its competitors for a price in excess of out-of-pocket expenses. The Respondent contends the Domain Name involves a feminine personal name, and surname, which is non-distinctively and concurrently used by many persons as a personal name and by various companies as a trademark or domain name for a range of goods and services, including digital services. The Respondent further contends that the burgeoning market for AI “chatbots,” companions, and assistants demonstrates a distinct tendency to assign such products personal names, for example, Alexa, Siri, Eliza, and Claude and it is a well-known principle by now, trade in short words and common names as domain names is a legitimate business.
Held: The more descriptive or generic the term is, the more likely the Panel will find rights or legitimate interests. Here, the Panel accepts Respondent’s submissions that Maddi can be a personal name and is not an exceptional or unusual one, and that it is quite a popular practice in the AI field to have personal-named domains/products/services. Thus, the Panel is satisfied that absent evidence of targeting, the Respondent can have rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Investing and trading in domain names can constitute rights and legitimate interests, when done without taking unfair advantage of the trademark owner’s rights. Use of the domain name for a website with substantive contents is not a prerequisite to proving rights and legitimate interests under the Policy. Therefore, the fact that the disputed domain name resolves to a “for sale” webpage by itself is not conclusive of the matter. Respondent’s personal history and pattern of registering personal name domain names supports the Respondent’s contention that he has a legitimate interest in investing in personal name domain names.
The Complainant’s attack on Respondent’s use of privacy registration service is perhaps overstated. Given how common privacy and proxy services are, their use alone is generally neutral and not an indicator of bad faith absent false or misleading information or efforts to conceal the domain’s transaction history. Further, to quote UDRP Perspectives Paragraph 3.3: “The onus is on the Complainant to prove its case and this includes providing evidence of the Respondent’s intention to target a specific Complainant rather than anyone who may have a trademark for the corresponding or similar term”. Here, the Complainant falls short of proving that Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name are targeting Complainant. The Complainant has provided fairly limited evidence to demonstrate the use and reputation of its MADDI Mark; coupled with the fact that Maddi is not an exceptional or unusual personal name, the Panel is not satisfied Respondent must have targeted Complainant or must have Complainant in mind when registering and using the disputed domain name.
Complaint Denied
Complainant’s Counsel: Nicole K. McLaughlin of Duane Morris, LLP, Pennsylvania, USA
Respondent’s Counsel: John Berryhill, Pennsylvania, USA
Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
The .ai extension played a different role at different stages of the analysis. Under the first element, the Panel found that it was not an effective differentiator because the MADDI registration covered an AI platform. Under the second and third elements, however, the wider AI context assisted the Respondent: “Maddi” was a relatively common personal name, and personal names are frequently adopted for AI products and services. The same combination that made the Domain Name commercially attractive to the Complainant therefore also gave it plausible value to numerous unrelated users. Suitability for the trademark owner is not equivalent to selection because of the trademark owner.
The targeting requirement supplied the bridge between these findings. The Panel expressly quoted UDRP Perspectives, Paragraph 3.3, “Targeting”: “The onus is on the Complainant to prove its case.” It emphasized that the required evidence must show an intention to target the specific Complainant, rather than merely anyone holding a corresponding or similar trademark. That formulation draws a critical distinction between establishing trademark standing and proving abusive intent. An exact match, a sector-relevant extension, and a sale listing may make a domain useful to a complainant, but they do not by themselves establish why the respondent registered it.
The decision’s reasoning closely tracked the examples identified in Paragraph 3.3. UDRP Perspectives explains that a respondent may rebut an allegation of targeting by showing that the complainant was not well known, that the domain name’s value derives from the nature of the term rather than the complainant, or that the registration fits a pattern of acquiring comparable domain names for investment. Here, the Complainant produced limited evidence of pre-registration reputation, “Maddi” had broad personal-name appeal, and the Respondent showed an established pattern of registering personal-name domains. Those facts provided a coherent explanation for the registration independent of the Complainant, without requiring the Respondent to produce a developed business plan for this particular Domain Name.
The $34,888 asking price did not close the evidentiary gap. The Panel reaffirmed that investing and trading in domain names may constitute rights or legitimate interests when undertaken without unfairly exploiting another party’s trademark rights, and that substantive website content is not a prerequisite. A public sale page proves that a registrant is willing to sell. It does not establish that the registrant selected the name to sell it to this trademark owner or that the asking price is attributable to the complainant’s goodwill. Where a personal name has a broad potential market, a substantial price can reflect perceived domain value rather than trademark value.
The Panel’s treatment of the reputation evidence is also notable. Although the Complaint alleged nearly three years of use and widespread unsolicited media coverage existing when the Domain Name was registered on January 15, 2026, the record contained only a small number of articles, most dated May 2026, and the references to MADDI were passing. The trademark registration was sufficient to satisfy the first element, but the evidence did not establish the marketplace recognition needed to infer that the Respondent probably knew of and targeted the Complainant. Reputation evidence offered to prove bad-faith registration must speak to the mark’s recognition at the registration date, not principally to publicity arising afterward.
The decision also provides a useful corrective concerning privacy services. The Panel described the Complainant’s attack as overstated and treated the use of privacy or proxy registration as neutral absent false or misleading information or an effort to conceal the Domain Name’s transaction history. Ordinary registration privacy is not itself evidence of concealment or bad faith, particularly where the provider process discloses the registrant’s identity for purposes of the proceeding.
A Transfer Order Is Not Enough: EPP Code Interception Exposes a UDRP Implementation Gap
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP v. Hello There, None, WIPO Case No. D2026-1948
<gibsondum.com>
Panelist: Mr. Douglas M. Isenberg (Presiding), Mr. Phillip V. Marano, and Mr. Jeffrey M. Samuels
Brief Facts: The Complainant was founded in 1890, has been known as Gibson Dunn since at least 1911, and is a prominent international law firm headquartered in Los Angeles, California, with over 2,000 attorneys across 22 offices globally. It owns a US trademark registration for GIBSON DUNN (registered September 3, 2002) and has operated the domain <gibsondunn.com> since 1997. The disputed Domain Name was created on September 29, 2024 and is passively held. The Complainant had previously prevailed in WIPO Case No. D2025-2987, which ordered transfer of the same domain, and a prior panel had already concluded that <gibsondum.com> is not comprised of dictionary words and appears on its face to represent an instance of typo-squatting a distinctive and well-established service mark.
Following that order, Namecheap successfully pushed the domain to the Complainant’s account on October 10, 2025. However, when the Complainant subsequently requested an EPP authorization code to transfer the domain to its GoDaddy account, Namecheap failed to disable the domain’s privacy service, causing the code to be automatically emailed to the privacy-shielded address still controlled by the Respondent. The Respondent intercepted the code and used it to initiate an unauthorized transfer of the domain to its own GoDaddy account. At the time of this proceeding, the disputed Domain Name was not associated with any active website. The Complainant alleges that the Respondent’s passive holding of the domain and its use of false contact details, including an incomplete street address, an invalid telephone number, and a nonexistent ZIP code, all establish bad faith registration and use. The Respondent did not file a Response.
Held: Before evaluating the substantive issue of bad faith, the Panel notes the unusual circumstance that the Disputed Domain Name was ordered to be transferred to the Complainant only five months before this Complaint was filed. Namecheap confirmed that it had pushed the domain name to the account provided by the Complainant, but warned that, unless privacy settings were updated or disabled before a transfer request, the EPP code could be sent to the previous registrant; it appears that this may have occurred, enabling the Respondent to transfer the domain name to an account under its control. Despite the lack of evidence in the record on what occurred, one plausible conclusion is that the transfer instructions at issue were easy to overlook, unnecessarily difficult to apply, and clearly contributed to an unintended transfer of the Disputed Domain Name. This entire proceeding could have been avoided had there been a uniform, clear, and simple documented process for registrar implementation of decisions under the Policy, and if that process had been made known and enforced by ICANN.
Notwithstanding what occurred following the previous decision regarding the Disputed Domain Name, it appears that the Respondent, having mistakenly received the auth code, then used it to initiate a transfer of the Disputed Domain Name from the Complainant’s account at Namecheap to its own account at the Registrar. Having just lost a decision regarding the Disputed Domain Name, the Respondent surely knew that it was not entitled to register the Disputed Domain Name, even though it had the technical ability to do so, which means that its registration was obviously in bad faith. Although the Complainant does not specify which, if any, of the factors set forth in paragraph 4(b) of the Policy is applicable here, the Panel has no difficulty finding bad faith based on the strength and distinctiveness of the GIBSON DUNN Trademark as well as the typographical nature of the Disputed Domain Name. See, WIPO Overview 3.1, section 3.1.4. Further, the Panel agrees with the Complainant that the passive-holding doctrine does not prevent a finding of bad faith here, as set forth in section 3.3 of WIPO Overview 3.1.
Transfer
Complainant’s Counsel: Internally Represented
Respondent’s Counsel: No Response
Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
The unusual feature of this case was not the underlying typo-squatting, which had already been adjudicated, but the failure of the first transfer order to produce secure and durable control of the Domain Name. The prior registrar pushed the Domain Name into an account provided by the Complainant. Yet, when the Complainant sought an EPP authorization code to move it to its preferred registrar, the code apparently also went to a privacy-shielded email address associated with the former registrant. The Respondent then used the code to initiate a transfer into its own account. The first UDRP decision was therefore implemented in form, but defeated in practice.
The Panel identified the structural problem in Paragraph 4(k) of the Policy. Although a registrar must “implement the decision,” the Policy does not prescribe the technical process by which a transfer order must be carried out. Some registrars push the domain name into an account at their own platform rather than transferring it directly to the complainant’s registrar of choice. The prevailing complainant may then have to update the registration and privacy information, unlock the domain name, obtain an EPP code, and initiate a second transfer. On the apparent facts here, the privacy setting became a live security vulnerability because the credential required to move the Domain Name was transmitted to the party that had been ordered to relinquish it. This was more than a post-decision delay. It demonstrated how inconsistent implementation procedures can expose a transferred domain name to immediate recapture.
The Panel did not purport to conclusively allocate responsibility between the registrars and the Complainant. It acknowledged the incomplete evidentiary record and noted that the prior registrar had warned that the privacy service should be updated or disabled before requesting the EPP code. Nevertheless, the Panel considered it plausible that the instructions were easy to overlook, unnecessarily difficult to apply, and contributed directly to the unintended transfer. That measured finding strengthens the institutional criticism. A UDRP remedy should not depend upon a successful complainant navigating registrar-specific operational steps that leave the losing registrant within the authorization-code delivery chain. Where implementation requires the complainant to become a customer of a registrar it did not select and then undertake a separate inter-registrar transfer, control has not been securely delivered until the former registrant’s access and communication routing have been conclusively removed.
The EPP-code incident also transformed what might otherwise have been analyzed primarily as passive holding into active post-decision misconduct. The Respondent did not acquire the Domain Name merely because the authorization code was mistakenly delivered. It had to use the code to initiate a transfer into an account under its control. Having just lost a UDRP proceeding concerning the same Domain Name, the Respondent knew that it had no entitlement to reacquire it. The Panel’s distinction between technical ability and legal entitlement is particularly useful: possession of an authorization code may enable a transfer, but it cannot legitimize one. The active use of a mistakenly delivered credential to reacquire the Domain Name therefore constituted a fresh acquisition in bad faith. The distinctive mark, obvious typographical variation, false registration details, and continued passive holding reinforced that conclusion, but the more compelling evidence was the Respondent’s deliberate circumvention of the earlier transfer order.
Most notably, the Panel expressly relied upon the Final Report of the WIPO-ICA UDRP Review Project Team, which identified concerns regarding registrar compliance and post-transfer delays and recommended that ICANN reinforce registrar training and compliance, while considering practical means to standardize, streamline, or automate implementation. The Panel urged ICANN to adopt those recommendations and observed that the entire second proceeding could have been avoided through a uniform, clear, and simple documented process. The facts give that recommendation concrete urgency. The absence of standardization did not merely inconvenience the Complainant. It required the Complainant to file and prosecute a second UDRP Complaint to recover a Domain Name that had already been awarded to it. Registrar implementation is not ancillary to the UDRP remedy. It is the mechanism that determines whether the remedy is effective and secure.
Panel’s Independent Research Saves Defaulting Respondent; Guggenheim Abu Dhabi Museum Project Provides Plausible Good Faith Use
Guggenheim Capital, LLC v. John Hawkins, Louvre Abu Dhabi Museum, WIPO Case No. DAI2026-0035
<guggenheimabudhabi.ai>
Panelist: Ms. Stephanie G. Hartung
Brief Facts: The US-based Complainant claims to be a global leader in providing investment and financial advisory services in six different countries, including the United Arab Emirates, and has operated the domain <guggenheimpartners.com> since 2000. It is the owner of numerous trademarks relating to its company name and brand GUGGENHEIM, inter alia, but not limited to, US word marks GUGGENHEIM (July 25, 2006); GUGGENHEIM PARTNERS, (July 4, 2006). The disputed Domain Name was registered on November 20, 2024, by the Respondent, identified as John Hawkins of the Louvre Abu Dhabi Museum, United Arab Emirates. Around the time the Complaint was filed, the disputed Domain Name resolved to a website at <guggenheimabudhabi.ae> bearing the heading “GUGGENHEIM ABUDHABI” and the text “COMING SOON” in both English and Arabic.
The Complainant alleges that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith, since the oldest of the Complainant’s GUGGENHEIM trademark registrations around the world was issued nearly two decades before the Respondent registered the disputed domain name, and over the years, the Complainant has invested many millions of dollars in advertising and promoting its services under its GUGGENHEIM trademark in the United States and throughout the world. The Complainant further asserts that the resolution of the disputed domain name to an error message page constitutes passive holding, which supports a finding of bad faith use, given the implausibility of any good-faith use to which the disputed domain name could be put by the Respondent. The Respondent did not file a Response.
Held: The Panel certainly notes the undisputed distinctiveness or reputation of Complainant’s GUGGENHEIM trademark, and the composition of the disputed domain name which reproduces such trademark entirely adding the geographical term “abudhabi”, whereas Complainant is an international enterprise with business in the United Arab Emirates, too. At the same time, the Panel has undertaken some limited independent research within its general powers set forth by paragraph 10 of the Rules. Hereafter and by its own knowledge, the Panel is well aware of the ongoing creation for many years of the “Guggenheim Abu Dhabi” Museum, which is being developed by the “Department of Culture and Tourism Abu Dhabi” and its opening is finally expected in 2026.
The Panel, thus, concludes that, despite Complainant’s contentions and Respondent’s failure to submit a Response and to explain why it needed to rely exactly on “guggenheim” which corresponds to Complainant’s GUGGENHEIM trademark to compose the disputed domain name, the circumstances of this case allow to think of some very plausible good faith registration and use to which the disputed domain name may be put, concretely in connection with the soon to start operation of the “Guggenheim Abu Dhabi” Museum. Having said so and absent other factors in the record, Complainant has not met its burden of proof set forth by paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy to establish that the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Complaint Denied
Complainant’s Counsel: Snell & Wilmer LLP, USA
Respondent’s Counsel: No Response
Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
This decision is a good example of a panel declining to convert a default into a win. The Respondent filed nothing and offered no explanation for its choice of “guggenheim”, yet the Panel undertook limited independent research under paragraph 10 of the Rules and satisfied itself that a well-known third party project of that exact name, the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi Museum, has been under development for years and is expected to open in 2026. Once that fact was on the record, the Complainant’s case on bad faith could not stand. Independent panel research is sometimes criticized as descending into the arena, but this is precisely the situation where it is warranted: a decision reached in ignorance of a widely known project bearing the identical name would have been wrong on the facts, and no respondent would have been there to correct it.
A complainant’s invocation of the passive holding doctrine in the absence of an explanation from the respondent as to why it registered the domain name can place the Panel in the difficult position of attempting to evaluate the plausibility of a legitimate good faith use for the dispute domain name when the evidentiary record does not directly address that issue. As this is a recurring, challenging aspect of UDRP jurisprudence, my co-author, Igor Motsnyi, and I, address this specific topic in section 3.8 of UDRP Perspectives, “Applying the Passive Holding Doctrine in the Absence of a Response”. We review the approaches available to a Panel including the approach taken here, which is for the panel to conduct limited independent research to develop adequate evidence to assess the question of a plausible good faith use.
The result is also explained by something the decision touches on only indirectly. The Complainant is a financial services firm, and its GUGGENHEIM marks are registered for financial services. The museum project is that of an unrelated entity. A domain name combining “guggenheim” with “abudhabi” points naturally toward the museum rather than toward the Complainant’s investment advisory business, and the burden was on the Complainant to establish that the Respondent had its trademark in mind. Distinctiveness and reputation in one field do not establish targeting where the composite domain name corresponds to a well publicized venture of someone else entirely.
There is an obvious tension the Panel had to navigate. The plausible good faith use it identified would belong to the museum or its developers, and the Respondent is apparently neither, having identified itself as an individual associated with the Louvre Abu Dhabi Museum. That is not a comfortable record. But the Complainant bears the burden on the third element, and the existence of an obvious alternative referent defeated the inference of targeting that the Complainant needed. If the Respondent has no genuine connection to the museum project, the party with the real grievance is the museum’s proprietor, not this Complainant, and the appropriate complainant should bring the appropriate complaint.
Unique Coined Term Undoes an Undocumented Business Plan
Ascyrus Medical LLC v. Aleksei Raikerus, Forum Case No. FA2606002224870
<ascyrus.com>
Panelist: Mr. Dennis A. Foster
Brief Facts: The US-based Complainant, founded in 2015, has offered since 2020 a medical stent device used in the surgical repair of acute aortic conditions under the trademark ASCYRUS MEDICAL (USPTO, registered June 9, 2020). The Complainant once owned the disputed Domain Name <ascyrus.com> but that ownership lapsed inadvertently. The disputed Domain Name was acquired by the Respondent on February 5, 2026, and is not currently attached to a website used for any purpose.
The Complainant alleges that since the disputed Domain Name does not resolve to an active website and there is no evidence of any preparations to activate it, the Respondent is not making a bona fide offering of goods or services nor a legitimate non-commercial or fair use in connection with the disputed Domain Name. The Complainant further alleges that any use of the disputed Domain Name by the Respondent would mislead the Complainant’s potential customers into believing that such use is authorized or associated with the Complainant’s actual services, with potentially significant consequences for the public given that the Complainant’s services involve life-saving medical care.
The Respondent contends that the disputed Domain Name is clearly not identical to the Complainant’s ASCYRUS MEDICAL trademark, as the second term of that mark is entirely absent. The Respondent further denies knowledge of the Complainant’s trademark and contends that he has been unable to fully develop a website for his planned provision of independent technology consulting and infrastructure services. The Respondent also alleges that the Complainant has engaged in Reverse Domain Name Hijacking.
Held: Having provided clear evidence of the registration of its ASCYRUS MEDICAL trademark with the USPTO, the Complainant has convinced the Panel that its ownership rights per Policy paragraph 4(a)(i) have been satisfied. Clearly, the disputed Domain Name <ascyrus.com> does not contain the Complainant’s full ASCYRUS MEDICAL trademark. However, the Panel notes that the more distinct of the two terms found within that mark, “ascyrus,” is fully included in the disputed Domain Name. Accordingly, the Panel concludes that the Complainant has proved that the disputed Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark in which the Complainant has rights per Policy paragraph 4(a)(i).
To counter the Complainant’s successful prima facie case, the Respondent asserts that he is involved in preparations to make a bona fide offering of services in conjunction with the disputed Domain Name in compliance with Policy paragraph 4(c)(i). The Respondent claims that he will provide independent technology consulting and infrastructure services for profit through a website attached to the disputed Domain Name. However, the Respondent has presented no clear evidence, such as documented expenses, personnel hiring, or comprehensive back-up documents, to sustain his burden of proving that his claim is true. As a result, the Panel cannot find that the Respondent meets the requirements of Policy paragraph 4(c)(i).
In contending that the Respondent has registered and used the disputed Domain Name in bad faith, the Complainant has implicitly cited Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv). The Complainant does assert correctly that the disputed Domain Name is inactive, which in some prior Policy decisions has led to findings of bad faith registration and use. See Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. D2000-0003. While the Respondent has submitted a Response, the Complainant asserts that its trademark bears a very distinct element, ASCYRUS, that its trademark and products are well-known in international medical circles, and that the Respondent is concealing his identity with a privacy/proxy service. The Panel finds that the evidence presented does validate these assertions, and thus, combined with the Respondent’s current non-use of the disputed Domain Name, the Complainant has provided a sufficient argument to affirm that the Respondent has registered and is using the disputed Domain Name in bad faith.
Transfer
Complainant’s Counsel: Walter S. Freitag, Ascyrus Medical LLC, USA
Respondent’s Counsel: Self-represented
Commentary by ICA President, Nat Cohen:
The Panel reached a defensible result, but grounded it in a rationale weaker than the record supported. Passive holding under the Telstra doctrine — Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. D2000-0003 — is most applicable where a respondent does not provide a plausible good-faith rationale for having registered the disputed domain name. Here the Respondent appeared and offered an explanation. The Panel’s actual finding was not that the explanation was implausible but that it was undocumented — a meaningful distinction that pointed toward a stronger rationale the Panel did not fully develop. Reliance on Telstra led to reasoning that unfortunately appears contradictory on its face (emphasis added): “combined with Respondent’s current non-use of the disputed domain name, Complainant has provided a sufficient argument to affirm that Respondent has registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.”
A stronger rationale to support a transfer decision lay in the nature of the term itself. “Ascyrus” is a highly distinctive term. While not explicitly stated in the decision, the Panel appears to have reasoned that pre-acquisition research would have revealed the Complainant’s many years of prior use of the disputed domain name and that “ascyrus” was exclusively associated with the Complainant such that what attracted the Respondent to this particular domain name was the value of that coined term to the Complainant rather than any independent appeal of the term.
Yet the transfer rationale rests on the assumption, not borne out in the record, that the Respondent conducted pre-acquisition research. In the absence of such an assumption, there is a strong case that denial was also open to the Panel. The usual indicia of targeting and bad faith are absent. The Respondent did not contact the Complainant, did not use the domain name in a way that attempted to profit from the Complainant’s goodwill, and did not offer it for sale. If, as is commonly the case, the list of auction domain names on which the disputed domain name appeared did not reference the prior owner, then the respondent did not coin the term himself and learned of it in a context that had no connection to the Complainant. A reasonable assumption when a domain name has expired is that the prior owner has no further interest in it. The Respondent responded to the Complaint with a statement of intended legitimate, non-infringing use. The complaint was filed just four months after the Respondent acquired the domain name at auction, a timeframe that makes the absence of documented business preparations less telling than it might otherwise be.
The UDRP was not designed as a “domain name recovery service” to recover domain names that a complainant inadvertently let lapse. The following decisions from recent years — each involving a complainant’s claim of inadvertent lapse and a respondent’s acquisition at an expired domain name (“drop”) auction — were all denials:
- D2020-1449 (dspa.com)
- D2024-1282 (ahnu.com)
- D2025-2250 (blockearner.com)
- D2025-2648 (ideatec.com)
- NAF 2061242 (revued.com)
In his Digest comment on revued.com, Zak Muscovitch observed:
This is truly a frustrating situation for the Complainant. Domain names sometimes inadvertently lapse and if scooped up by someone else, can still sometimes be recovered through the UDRP if the Complainant has trademark rights and can demonstrate that the Respondent had targeted the Complainant.
In his comment on ideatec.com, Mr. Muscovitch stated:
A Panel may determine that in disputes that do not clearly favor one party over the other, the overriding consideration is the appropriate scope of the Policy such that a case is best left to the courts which are equipped and intended to resolve unclear cases. Panels should never feel obliged to transfer a Domain Name where the evidence does not permit the Panel to responsibly conclude that the Respondent is likely a cybersquatter.
In revued.com, the Panel did not find sufficient evidence of targeting and denied the complaint. In ideatec.com, the Panel did not find sufficient evidence of bad faith intent and denied the complaint. Comparable indicia were absent in ascyrus.com as well.
The UDRP’s limited procedures — no discovery, no cross-examination, no meaningful credibility testing — make it well-suited only to clear-cut instances of cybersquatting. Treating its decisions as a preliminary step subject to review in the courts understates the practical barrier: the effort and expense of a contested court proceeding would be too high a hurdle, and potentially ruinous, for most respondents. UDRP decisions are in almost all instances the final word on the matter. That reality counsels Panels to remain within the UDRP’s proper scope rather than drawing inferences of bad faith intent where the evidentiary record does not clearly support them.
For respondents and their counsel, the practical lesson from this decision is in the word “demonstrable.” An assertion of a future plan is not a defense. Panels expect documentation: expenses incurred, correspondence, development work, hires, business registrations. Equally important, and often overlooked, is an explanation of why this particular term was chosen for the plan. Where a domain name consists of a unique coinage, a respondent who cannot say what drew him to it — whether some suggestive connotation, a linguistic association, or a connection to his own background — will struggle regardless of how genuine his intentions were. A bare assertion of an unrelated business plan, stacked against a distinctive mark with an appreciable reputation, will generally not carry the day.
NCAA Defeats AI Platform Startup in NIL Domain Dispute; Bad Faith Registration Not Established
protectNIL Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, WIPO Case No. D2026-1658
<nilassist.com>
Panelist: Ms. Ingrīda Kariņa-Bērziņa (Presiding), Ms. Sally M. Abel and Ms. Sandra J. Franklin
Brief Facts: The US-based Complainant develops and operates AI-powered software platforms for the name, image and likeness (“NIL”) market, enabling student-athletes to monetize the use of their images online. It owns a USPTO trademark registration for NILASSIST (registered April 29, 2025; first use: January 6, 2025) for AI-powered virtual assistant software services, and operates its primary business website at <nilassist.app>. The Respondent launched its own “NCAA NIL ASSIST” platform on August 1, 2024, at <nilassist.ncaa.org>, designed to connect student-athletes with service providers, facilitate NIL activity disclosures, and provide regulatory guidance. The disputed Domain Name was registered on November 3, 2024 through a professional domain name acquisition service, and subsequently resolved to a parking page featuring pay-per-click links unrelated to NIL, college athletics, or any Respondent service. At the time of the Decision, it did not resolve to an active website.
The Complainant alleges that the PPC links demonstrate the Domain Name was used as a monetization vehicle rather than in connection with any legitimate platform, that the Respondent holds no trademark registration for NILASSIST or any confusingly similar designation, and that the Respondent’s acquisition of the domain through a professional service demonstrates it was a deliberate acquisition target. The Complainant further alleges that the Respondent’s own counsel conceded non-use of the disputed Domain Name in connection with the NCAA NIL ASSIST platform, and that constructive notice of the NILASSIST trademark filing provided sufficient basis for a bad faith finding. The Respondent contends that the NILASSIST mark is generic or highly descriptive, comprising the generic acronym “NIL” and the generic word “assist,” and that the Complainant’s trademark registration relates to narrowly defined AI software services unrelated to the Respondent’s student-athlete platform. The Respondent further contends that the PPC links related to the generic dictionary meanings of “nil” and “assist” rather than to the Complainant’s business.
Held: The Parties agree that the Respondent has not yet used the disputed Domain Name in connection with its NCAA NIL ASSIST platform. However, neither that fact, nor the fact that the Respondent has engaged in PPC monetization since it obtained the disputed Domain Name, alone or together, establish that the Respondent has no right or legitimate interest. The Complainant does not identify any advertising at the disputed Domain Name that in any way trades off the Complainant’s interests in its NILASSIST mark. Moreover, the Complainant admits that it has no objection to the Respondent’s use of <nilassist.ncaa.org>, which contains the Complainant’s mark in its entirety. The Panel cannot conclude that the previous use of the dormant Domain Name for PPC links unrelated to the Complainant disproves the Respondent’s stated intention to use it in connection with its business, and accordingly finds that the Complainant’s evidence does not support a finding of no rights or legitimate interests.
Further, there is no evidence that the Respondent knew of the Complainant’s trademark applications in 2024 when the disputed Domain Name was registered, and the Complainant asserts its first use of the NILASSIST mark only in 2025. There is no evidence suggesting that, at the time of registration, the Complainant had in any way publicized its planned NIL platform, and the NILASSIST mark comprises elements that are descriptive of a service assisting student-athletes with name, image and likeness management. The record further indicates that, following its demands for transfer, the Complainant offered to purchase the disputed Domain Name for USD 100, later increased to USD 250, which the Respondent refused, and the Panel does not find that the Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name primarily for the purpose of selling it to the Complainant per WIPO Overview 3.1, section 3.1.1. On balance of probabilities, the Respondent did not register the disputed Domain Name in bad faith, as the Complainant had not established trademark rights at the time of registration, per WIPO Overview 3.1, section 3.8.1.
Complaint Denied
Complainant’s Counsel: Internally Represented
Respondent’s Counsel: Barnes & Thornburg, United States
Commentary Edited and Approved by ICA General Counsel, Zak Muscovitch:
The chronology decided this case. The Respondent launched its NCAA NIL ASSIST platform in August 2024 and acquired the disputed Domain Name that November. The Complainant claims first use only in January 2025 and registration in April 2025. Both the Respondent’s adoption of the name and its acquisition of the domain name therefore preceded any trademark rights the Complainant can point to, and section 3.8.1 of the WIPO Overview 3.1 does the rest. There was no evidence the Complainant had publicized its planned platform, so there was nothing for the Respondent to target.
Two of the Complainant’s arguments deserve mention because they recur and rarely succeed. Constructive notice from a trademark filing is a doctrine of United States trademark law that panels have consistently declined to import into the Policy, which asks what a respondent actually knew, not what a search of the register would have revealed. And acquiring a domain name through a professional service is ordinary commercial practice. It shows the buyer wanted the name, not the complainant’s trademark.
The treatment of PPC monetization is a useful restatement. Parking is not inherently illegitimate; it becomes objectionable when the links trade off the complainant’s mark. Here the Complainant identified no such advertising, and where a domain name comprises an industry acronym and an ordinary word, links keyed to those meanings evidence nothing.
Two features of the record stand out. The Complainant conceded it does not object to the Respondent’s operation of <nilassist.ncaa.org>, which reproduces the mark in its entirety, an admission difficult to reconcile with the Complaint. And having demanded transfer, the Complainant offered USD 100, then USD 250, before filing. RDNH does not appear to have been requested, but a post-dating trademark, a failed purchase attempt, and reliance on constructive notice would have made the question a live one.
Disclaimer: The facts are taken from the decisions themselves and have not been independently verified. The editors and publishers accept no responsibility for their accuracy.
Ankur Raheja is the Editor-in-Chief of the ICA’s new weekly UDRP Case Summary service. Ankur has practiced law in India since 2005 and has been practicing domain name law for over ten years, representing clients from all over the world in UDRP proceedings. He is the founder of Cylaw Solutions.
He is an accredited panelist with ADNDRC (Hong Kong) and MFSD (Italy). Previously, Ankur worked as an Arbitrator/Panelist with .IN Registry for six years. In a advisory capacity, he has worked with NIXI/.IN Registry and Net4 India’s resolution professional.